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Fiscal indicators are the backbone of effective fiscal policy-making, including the 
coordination and surveillance of budgetary policy at the EU level. The Workshop organized 
by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European 
Commission on 22 September 2006 in Brussels aimed at enriching the debate on the fiscal 
indicators and improving the understanding of their functioning. In this Economic Paper we 
publish the proceedings of the workshop. On top of a brief introduction which puts the topics 
into perspective, the volume collects all the contributions presented and discussed at the 
workshop.  Mirroring the structure of the workshop the proceedings are organised in the parts: 
(i) long-term sustainability, (ii) the measurement of the underlying budgetary position and 
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Introduction 




Fiscal indicators are the backbone of effective fiscal policy-making, including the 
coordination and surveillance of budgetary policy at the EU level. The quality and 
success of the EU surveillance framework, in particular the timeliness and 
appropriateness of any policy recommendation or decision taken in the context of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), crucially depend on the quality of its diagnostic 
instruments. The right conclusions can only be drawn if the underlying analysis is 
comprehensive and accurate.  
Ever since its inception, the history of fiscal surveillance in the EU and of the SGP has 
inter alia been characterised by a continuous upgrading of the analytical toolkit, so as to 
be able to respond to new requirements and challenges with the ultimate goal to provide a 
robust, consistent and accurate assessment of fiscal policy in the Economic and Monetary 
Union. 
The 2005 reform of the SGP has confronted us with a number of important new 
challenges. Key requirements of the reformed Pact are made contingent on the prevailing 
economic conditions in the Member States and are expressed in structural terms, net of 
cyclical factors and one-off and other temporary measures. As a consequence, the reform 
has broadened and stepped up the scope for gauging the economic and fiscal 
performance.  
As regards the preventive arm of the reformed Pact, the adjustment process towards 
sustainable medium-term budgetary positions can be modulated depending on prevailing 
or expected cyclical conditions. In good times the annual structural adjustment should be 
higher than the 0.5% of GDP benchmark; it can be less than that in economic bad times. 
The medium-term objectives (MTOs) themselves are defined in structural terms. Finally, 
as regards the corrective arm of the reformed Pact, the annual adjustment to be achieved 
by Member States with an excessive deficit is also expressed in structural terms.  
Besides the increased focus on structural budget balances, there is another and more 
complex element in the reformed Pact with important implications for the assessment of 
fiscal performance, notably long-term sustainability. The EU Council agreement of 
March 2005, which underpins the reform of the Pact, while confirming the key role of the 
3% and 60% of GDP thresholds of the government deficit and debt, puts additional 
emphasis on the public finance developments over the long term. It specifically identifies 
the surveillance of debt and sustainability as one of the main areas where improvements 
can be made to revive the provisions of the SGP. 
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The increased prominence of both the structural budget balance and the long-term 
sustainability in the EU fiscal surveillance framework raises a number of straightforward 
yet taxing questions related to the measurement of economic and fiscal performance. Is 
the current toolkit sufficiently appropriate with respect to the provisions of the reformed 
SGP? How accurate are the available estimates of the cyclical position and the structural 
budget balance? What are the major caveats and how can they be overcome? Besides the 
available standard indicators, what are the viable alternatives to the assessment of the 
long-term sustainability of public finances? 
These and a number of other issues were the focus of the workshop on Fiscal Indicators 
in the EU Budgetary Surveillance organised by the Directorate General for Economic and 
Affairs on 22 September 2006 in Brussels. This volume collects the papers presented at 
the workshop together with the respective discussions. The three sessions of the 
workshop mirror the main challenges outlined above notably (i) long-term sustainability, 
(ii) the measurement of the underlying budgetary position and discretionary fiscal policy 
and (iii) the reliability of fiscal indicators. 
Reflecting the increasing relevance of long-term issues, the first part of this volume 
covers two chapters which discuss alternative avenues to assess the long-term 
sustainability of public finance. The work by F. Ballabriga and C. Martinez-Mongay 
discusses various tests and rules based on the recent literature on fiscal-reaction 
functions. They test for a positive response of the primary surplus to accumulated debt in 
the data and check for robustness considering alternative specifications, estimation 
techniques and structural breaks. One of their interesting policy conclusions is that 
stricter conditions do not necessarily ensure sustainability; what matters is enforcement. 
They conclude that the response to debt has fluctuated over the sample 1977-2005, but 
sustainability has been prevalent in EU15: most governments have tended to apply a 
fluctuating but generally positive primary surplus adjustment in response to debt 
accumulation. 
The chapter by J. Gokhale uses long-term economic and fiscal projections to determine if 
and to what extent current and future expenditure trends, in particular taking into account 
ageing population, give rise to fiscal imbalances. The results show relatively large gaps 
which will have to be tackled in the coming years. He proposes the adoption of an 
extended framework of budget accounting and reporting within the context of the SGP’s 
long-term fiscal policy surveillance requirement. Gokhale argues that traditional debt and 
deficit measures can be potentially misleading as measures of a nation’s fiscal stance and 
suggests adopting fiscal and generational imbalance measures, as these indicators 
incorporate comprehensive information about future fiscal prospects under current 
policies. He also provides estimates which show large fiscal imbalances for most EU 
countries until 2051. The author acknowledges that different underlying assumptions may 
generate wide variations in estimates of fiscal and generational imbalances and in their 
ratios to GDP or tax bases. Yet, rather than an argument against adopting such measures, 
this implies a need to supplement those estimates with measures of the associated 
uncertainty.  
The second part of this volume is devoted to the measurement of the underlying 
budgetary position and discretionary fiscal policy. The empirical results in Chapters 4 
and 5 highlight a tendency of running pro-cyclical policies, especially in ‘good times’. 
P. Brandner, L. Diebalek and W. Köhler-Töglhofer estimate an unobserved components 
model while A. Afonso and P. Claeys apply structural VAR analysis. These two chapters   13
identify a recurring pattern according to which estimated changes in the headline deficit 
net of cyclical factors were not consistent with the policy objective of stabilising cyclical 
swings of aggregate output. More in particular, Brandner and co-authors track fiscal 
policy behaviour over time by decomposing the observed budget balance into four 
unobserved components: a core balance, an automatic or built-in fiscal stabiliser 
component, a component reflecting discretionary fiscal policy responses to the business 
cycle, and, finally, a component reflecting all other transitory shocks to the fiscal 
position. Their results for Austria highlight that the revenue side seems to be prone to 
procyclical responses whereas the expenditure side shows opposite behaviour. Moreover, 
during economic downturns, the overall impact of fiscal policy seems to be 
countercyclical, whereas in periods of economic upturn the impact of automatic 
stabilisers is nearly neutralised. 
Afonso and Claeys’ focus is on the relation between the cyclical components of total 
revenues and expenditures and the budget balance in France, Germany, Portugal and 
Spain. A disaggregate analysis of fiscal policy in a structural VAR that mixes long- and 
short-term constraints allows them to look into the transmission channels of fiscal policy 
and to derive a model-based indicator of structural balance. Their main conclusions are 
that fiscal slippages are mainly due to reversals in tax policies, which are unmatched by 
expenditure adjustments. As a consequence, deficits rise when economic conditions 
worsen but cause a ‘ratcheting up’ in the size of government in economic booms. The 
Pact has not eradicated these procyclical policies. Bad policies in ‘good times’ also 
contribute to aggregate macroeconomic instability. The result of both teams clearly raises 
concerns about the current situation and calls for both improvements in the available 
diagnostics as well as particular vigilance. Starting in 2005, Europe entered in a 
comparatively positive cyclical phase, in which Member States that have not yet reached 
their medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) are expected to step up their consolidation 
efforts and Member States that are already in MTO should implement counter-cyclical 
policies.  
The third part of these proceedings calls attention to the reliability of fiscal indicators; the 
two respective chapters recall and illustrate the margins of uncertainty involved in the 
available set of fiscal indicators. A critical view of the reliability of the underlying fiscal 
statistics is offered in Chapter 6 by F. Balassone, D. Franco and S. Zotteri on the basis of 
episodes of large-scale upward revision in government deficits. They discuss the causes of 
such revisions and raise attention to the potential for opportunistic accounting, or ‘fiscal 
gimmickry’ in their own words. A permanent and detailed cross-checking of available 
data – starting with, but going deeper than, the simple comparisons of deficit and changes 
in debt – should reduce the scope for exploiting existing loop holes in the reporting of 
budgetary positions. 
In Chapter 7, R. Barrell, I. Hurst and J. Mitchell provide estimates of the degree of 
uncertainty attached to the output gap. Uncertainty about the cyclically-adjusted budget 
deficit is further compounded by uncertainty on the link between the gap and the 
government accounts. They advocate that the measurement of fiscal stance should make 
explicit the bounds around the available data on the cyclically adjusted deficit. Yet, those 
in charge of fiscal surveillance cannot waive the responsibility of taking action, even if 
taking decisions in real time implies taking into account a certain, and in some cases a 
high, degree of uncertainty. Part I 
 
Long-term Sustainability2.   
 
A Further Inquire about the Sustainability of Fiscal Policy in the EU 





The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is one of the main pillars of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). It was agreed with the aim of setting a proper balance between 
fiscal discipline and the macroeconomic stabilization role of fiscal policy. It was 
conceived as a discipline device which should ensure budgetary balances close to balance 
or in surplus, while keeping gross debt at low levels in terms of GDP.  
Since the very moment of its conception the Pact has been the subject of numerous 
criticisms, which would suggest more or less drastic reforms of the institutional 
framework of the EU Member States (see, among many others, Brunila and Martinez-
Mongay, 2002; Buti et al., 2003, 2005). The debate on the drawbacks, challenges and 
possible reforms of the Pact significantly gathered momentum in 2002, when budgetary 
developments in some Member States, especially in Germany and France, put the Pact 
under serious stress. The final trigger for reform took place in November 2003 when the 
ECOFIN Council refused to adopt the recommendations by the European Commission to 
step up the excessive deficit procedure for France and Germany (see, for instance, Buti, 
2007).  
In a communication adopted in September 2004 the European Commission put forward a 
series of proposals to introduce changes in the Pact (European Commission, 2004). These 
mainly aimed at avoiding pro-cyclical policies, better defining the medium-term 
objective (MTO) of fiscal policy, giving greater prominence to the debt criterion, 
considering economic circumstances in the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) and improving governance and enforcement. Taking the Commission 
communication as a starting point, the ECOFIN Council of March 2005 reached an 
agreement to introduce changes in the Pact. Where necessary, legislative changes were 
proposed in both its preventive (surveillance and coordination of economic policies 
basically through the assessment of convergence and stability programs) and corrective 
(excessive deficit procedure) arms (Council, 2005). The legislative process ended in July 
2005. 
One of the most recurrent critical issues on the Pact was based on an apparently excessive 
focus on short-term objectives for the budget deficit, which might not only create 
incentives for creative accounting and the recourse to one-off deficit-reducing measures, 
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but also to almost fully disregard debt developments, and so to an inadequate handling of 
long-term sustainability issues.  
Disregard of the issue of public debt was considered as a clear limitation of the original 
SGP (Buti et al., 2005). Consequently, taking more into consideration public debt and 
long-term sustainability when assessing budgetary positions was broadly shared by policy 
makers as one of the lines along which the Pact should be reformed. The agreement 
reached at the ECOFIN Council in March 2005 gave a more prominent role to debt in the 
preventive arm by differentiating medium-term budgetary objectives across Member 
States on the basis of their potential growth and debt levels. Also, structural reforms with 
positive effects on long-term fiscal sustainability have to be taken into consideration 
when assessing the adjustment path toward the medium-term objective, when considering 
deviations from the target, and when evaluating the deficits exceeding the 3% of GDP 
limit. 
The Council also called for giving a stronger weight to public debt in the implementation 
of the Pact, but was not able to agree on, for instance, a minimum debt reduction for 
countries with very high debt ratios (Buti et al., 2005). In terms of the role of debt and 
sustainability, the reform of the Pact also appears limited when compared with some 
proposals made during the long debate on the Pact, such as the permanent balance rule by 
Buiter and Grafe (2003) and the debt sustainability pact by Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry 
(2003). The permanent budget balance is given by the difference between the constant 
long-run average future values of tax revenue and government spending. The rule 
proposed by Buiter and Grafe (2003) was to keep the permanent budget adjusted for 
inflation and real growth in balance or surplus. For countries with debt levels below 50% 
of GDP, Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry (2003) proposed to give them the choice of opting out 
the corrective arm (the excessive deficit procedure) and adopt a so-called debt 
sustainability pact, according to which countries should submit a five-year budgetary 
program with a debt ratio target for the period.  
However, if the concern is government solvency such debt criteria impose unnecessary 
constraints on fiscal policy on the basis of debt ceilings (as the Pact also does) or 
relationships between the components of the budget and ad hoc discount factors. Where 
government solvency is concerned, this paper emphasizes that sufficient conditions for 
solvency are rather weak, while, as general rule, it does not appear that sustainability has 
been in danger during the last 30 years in Europe. 
Specifically, this paper analyzes sustainability within the framework of the recent 
literature on fiscal reaction functions, which provides a convenient framework to assess 
fiscal sustainability. This literature investigates the type of fiscal flow reaction (viz. the 
primary surplus) to public debt accumulation that would guarantee fiscal sustainability. 
Bohn (1998) and Canzoneri et al. (2001) have developed and applied this approach for 
the US case. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003, 2005) have estimated the reaction 
of the primary surplus to debt levels for the EU Member States. In the line of Canzoneri 
et al. (2001), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) focused on the fiscal dominance 
versus monetary dominance debate. They estimated fiscal and monetary policy reaction 
functions and found supportive evidence of a monetary dominance regime in the EU 
Member States. Our paper of 2005 put the emphasis on fiscal sustainability and, in this 
sense, is closer to Bohn (1998). By fine-tuning the estimation of the fiscal reaction 
functions reported in 2003, the paper provided evidence of the existence of a structural 
policy shift in the run-up to the euro (after 1995), which enhanced sustainability.   19
On theory grounds, Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2005) have been criticized for 
seemingly discarding the distinction between ad hoc sustainability and model-based 
sustainability as discussed in Bohn (2005a). On empirical grounds, the availability of 
additional sample evidence allows to confront the existence of the sustainability-
enhancing impulse associated to the run-up to the euro with a potential post-EMU 
fatigue, which would have shown up after 1999. Furthermore, the ad hoc dummy-
modelling approach for the ‘euro impulse’ can be complemented with an endogenous 
mechanism for structural shift detection. 
Within this framework, the objective of this chapter is to develop further the assessment 
of the sustainability of EU public finances. Alternative theoretical and empirical 
approaches in the literature to assess the sustainability of public finances are discussed in 
section 2.2. Section 2.3 takes a first descriptive look at the evolution of gross debt series 
in 14 Member States (EU 15 except Luxembourg), the US and Japan over the period 
1977-2005. Section 2.4 presents alternative estimates of the reaction of the primary 
surplus to debt levels and concludes that a positive reaction of the former to the latter is 
rather ubiquitous both across countries and over time. This section also presents evidence 
of a series of structural breaks in such a response, which can be associated to the adoption 
of the Maastricht Treaty and the convergence criteria after 1992, to the launching of the 
euro after 1995, and to the adoption of the euro after 1999. Moreover, a positive response 
of the primary surplus to debt levels is robust with respect to alternative specifications 
and estimation methods. Comparing the posterior distributions generated by the pre-
Maastricht, Maastricht and EMU sub-sample periods, Section 2.5 considers Bayesian-
modelling as a systematic endogenous mechanism to explore potential structural breaks 
in the response of the primary surplus to debt levels. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2  How to Assess the Sustainability of Fiscal Policy 
Definition of Sustainability 
In line with standard practice in dynamic optimization models, we term fiscal policy as 
sustainable when government debt issuing policy does not use Ponzi financing schemes, 
i.e. financing strategies consisting in rolling over a given initial level of debt that would 
never be repaid. The absence of Ponzi schemes in debt policy is a general equilibrium 
condition required by rational private sector agents in order to be willing to lend to the 
government. A no-Ponzi scheme condition guarantees that the government intertemporal 
budget constraint (IBC) is satisfied, so that its outstanding debt is backed by future 
primary surpluses.  
Formally, a no-Ponzi scheme condition takes the form of a transversality condition (TC) 
whereby the discounted value of debt issued infinitely far in the future is zero. In 
stochastic economies, IBCs and TCs take the algebraic form of expectations of products 
of the discount factor and the components of the government budget equation. As we 
discuss below, this fact turns out to be relevant to distinguish between existing 
approaches in the literature to assess the sustainability of fiscal policy.  
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To make explicit the IBC and TC expressions we start out from the budget equation for 
period t: 
() t t t t d s d β + = −1         (2.1) 
where d is the stock of debt at the end of the period, s is the primary surplus, both as a 
percentage of GDP, and β is the discount factor. Forwarding equation (2.1) one period, 
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which shows that: 
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The right-hand side term in (2.4) is the TC that excludes Ponzi schemes, so that the 
discounted value of debt issued infinitely far in the future is zero, and the left term is the 
government IBC, which states that outstanding debt is backed by future primary 
surpluses. Bohn (1995) has shown that conditions of type (2.4) apply to a wide range of 
general equilibrium stochastic models, providing therefore a rather general test for fiscal 
sustainability.  
A key characteristic of (2.4) is that, in a general equilibrium stochastic setting, the 
discount rate α depends on the risky rate of return, which in turn depends on the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumers (Bohn, 1995). This means that 
we should expect, in general, a non-zero correlation
1 between α and fiscal variables s and 
d, and implies therefore that the factorization of expression (2.4) as discounted values of 
expected fiscal terms is generally incorrect. This complicates the empirical testing of 
fiscal sustainability. 
Testing Sustainability 
The most common empirical approach in the literature to test fiscal policy sustainability 
is based on the analysis of the time series properties of fiscal data. Influential papers in 
this stream of the literature are Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 
1991) and Quintos (1995). 
 
                                                 
1   In particular, all three may depend on aggregate output.   21
This approach rewrites (2.4) in the form: 
() () 0 ) 1 ( lim ) 1 (
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where  r is usually interpreted as the difference between the expected return on 
government debt and the growth rate of GDP. Then unit roots and cointegration 
conditions on fiscal debt and deficit guaranteeing that this version of the government IBC 
holds are derived and tested.  
But versions of (2.5) are problematic. A first problem is that (2.5) factorizes the product 
of the discount rate and fiscal variables, ignoring that the discount factor may be 
correlated with the primary surplus and debt, as we have just mentioned. The choice of 
this discount factor is a second controversial feature of this empirical approach, since, as 
we have also mentioned, the proper discount factor in an stochastic setting is the risky 
rate of return (i.e. the return of state-contingent claims), not the rate of safe assets. The 
arbitrariness of both the factorization and the choice of the discount factor have motivated 
the distinction (Bohn, 2005a) between ad hoc sustainability, based on (2.5), and model-
based sustainability, based on (2.4). 
The third characterizing feature of this approach is that it tests (2.5) by testing for unit 
roots and cointegration among debt and the components of the budget deficit. However, 
the order of integration of debt seems to be irrelevant, as any debt series that are 
stationary after any finite number of differencing operation would satisfy (2.5) (Bohn, 
2005b), rendering the order of integration of government debt uninformative for fiscal 
policy sustainability. 
A more recent and promising alternative empirical approach to sustainability testing is 
provided by the literature on fiscal reaction functions. This literature investigates the type 
of flow reaction to government debt accumulation that would guarantee that (2.4) is 
satisfied. Its main result (Bohn, 1998; Canzoneri et al., 2001) is that a positive response 
of the primary surplus to debt accumulation is a sufficient condition for sustainability. 
More precisely, assume that the primary surplus can be written as:  
t t t t d s ϕ δ + = −1         (2.6) 
where φ is a bounded component and  t t ∀ ≥ 0 δ  with  0 > t δ applying infinitely often. 
Then it can be shown that fiscal policy satisfies the general condition (2.4).  
The intuition of this result is that by adjusting the primary surplus in response to debt 
developments the government reduces the exponential growth of debt by a factorδ  
relative to the discount rate, which is sufficient to satisfy the TC in (2.4). 
2.3  Government Debt Accounting 
The evolution of government debt is the bottom line reference for the sustainability of 
fiscal policy. In this section we take a look at debt developments in the EU 15 Member 
States, excluding Luxembourg, during the sample period 1977-2005, with the US and   22
Japan as background references. A debt accounting exercise is also performed, which 
provides an illustrative first contact with fiscal data. 
Fiscal Developments 
While in 1977 debt levels measured in terms of GDP were close to or well below the 60% 
Maastricht reference value, 15 years later, in the aftermath of the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty, seven European countries, as well as the US and Japan, were recording 
debt levels above such a reference value (Table 2.1). In three of them (Belgium, Greece 
and Italy), government gross debt had jumped above 100% of GDP, while in Ireland the 
figure was higher than 90% of GDP. In the rest of the countries debt had also increased, 
and it was approaching the 60% ratio in the cases of Spain and Portugal. Until the first 
half of the nineties, just after the formal launching of the euro, the upward trend 
continued in most of the countries in the sample. Only Ireland, Finland and, to a lesser 
extent, Belgium and the Netherlands had managed to curve rising debt levels. As a result, 
all the countries in the sample, except the UK, were recording debt levels close to or well 
above the 60% reference value by the middle of the past decade.  
Table 2.1  Gross Debt Developments, 1977-2005 (% of GDP) 
  1977 78-93* 1993 94-96* 1996 97-99* 1999 00-05* 2005 
Belgium  58,7  4,5 130,5 -1,2 126,9 -4,4 113,6 -3,4  93,3 
Germany  26,8 1,2 45,8 4,2 58,4 0,6 60,2 1,3 67,7 
Greece  20,1  5,6 110,1 0,4 111,3 0,3 112,3 -0,8 107,5 
Spain  12,9 2,8 56,9 3,3 66,7 -1,7 61,6 -3,1 43,2 
France  19,1 1,5 43,7 4,6 57,6 0,2 58,3 1,5 67,2 
Italy  54,7  3,8 114,9 1,9 120,6 -2,3 113,7 -1,2 106,4 
Ireland  58,5 2,1 92,6 -6,7 72,4 -8,1 48,1 -3,4 27,6 
Netherlands  37,8 2,3 74,8 -0,9 72,1 -3,9 60,5 -1,3 52,9 
Austria  28,5 2,0 60,4 2,4 67,6 -0,4 66,5 -0,6 62,9 
Portugal  30,3 1,7 58,2 0,6 59,9 -2,9 51,4 2,1 63,9 
Finland  7,8  3,0 56,1 0,2 56,7 -3,6 46,0 -0,9 40,5 
Denmark  13,8 4,0 77,0 -2,6 69,2 -3,9 57,4 -3,6 35,9 
Sweden  26,7 2,7 70,6 0,8 73,0 -3,6 62,2 -2,0 50,3 
UK  60,8 -0,8 47,5 1,6 52,2 -2,4 44,9 -0,2 43,5 
US  46,9 1,8 75,4 -0,7 73,4 -3,1 64,1 0,4 66,4 
Japan  34,9 2,5 74,9 6,3 93,9  10,6  125,7  5,9  161,1 
Note: * Average of the annual changes in percent of GDP over the period, including the extremes of the 
interval. 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan. 
 
The mid-1990s marked a turning point in debt developments in most EU countries, as 
well as in the US. Only in Germany, Greece and France were the debt ratios still on an 
increasing path. Between 1996 and 1999, the debt had decreased by around 8 percentage 
points of GDP per year in Ireland, by 4½ in Belgium and by between 3 and 4 points in the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Denmark and Sweden. Debt reduction was also sizeable 
in Spain, Italy and the UK. Similar debt-decreasing trends seem to be still in motion in 
the current decade, albeit at a slower pace. However, debt has continued to increase in 
Germany and France, while the downward trends have been reversed in Portugal and the 
US. In Japan, debt levels have not ceased to increase, especially since the early nineties 
on the back of a strong expansionary fiscal policy.    23
Such debt developments are associated to soaring deficits and interest expenditure, and 
resulted in a perverse feedback between higher deficits, higher debt levels, higher interest 
expenditure and back to higher deficits, while primary surpluses plummeted (Table 2.8 in 
Appendix 2.A).  
Already in the second half of the 1970s, the size of the general government deficits in 
percentage of GDP were high by international standards in a few EU countries. This was 
the case of Belgium, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, which, as shown above, recorded debt 
increases until the early nineties. However, in a majority of countries, budget balances 
were below the 3% of GDP threshold and in some cases they were close to balance or in 
surplus. Deficits soared during the 1980s, and in 1993, in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis, only Ireland and Denmark were recording deficits below 3% of GDP. High deficits 
were also predominant until the mid-nineties, and it was only after the launching of the 
euro when countries were able to rein on deficits. Leaving aside Greece (and Japan) no 
country recorded a government deficit above 3% of GDP in 1999. In EMU and 
underlying the slowdown in debt reduction, deficits have risen again, especially in 
Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK, although up to lower levels than in 
the past, especially than in the first half of the nineties.  
A steadily rising debt, combined with high interest rates,
2 put pressure on interest 
expenditures. In 1977, interest expenditure represented less than 5% of GDP. Only in 
Belgium, Italy, Ireland and the UK, countries with debt levels above 50% of GDP, did 
interest expenditure represent more than 3½% of GDP. In countries like Spain or Finland, 
interest expenditure was almost negligible (less than 1%). However, 15 years later, in no 
European country, except in the UK, interest expenditure was below 3% of GDP, and in 
the high-debt ones interest expenditure was above (Greece, Italy) or very close to 10% of 
GDP (Belgium). Since then, the ratio to GDP of interest expenditure has been on a steady 
downward path. This appears unambiguously linked to the stability-oriented economic 
policy framework already largely set up in the second stage of EMU (until the late 
1990s), characterized by a better control of inflation, which significantly lowered interest 
rates in many countries, and a fiscal tightening prompted by the Maastricht criteria and 
further enhanced by the SGP, which reduced debt levels. In the most recent years, interest 
expenditure has attained levels well below those corresponding to the early nineties and, 
in some cases, of the magnitude observed in the late seventies.
3 
In a majority of countries, primary deficits were contributing to debt accumulation in the 
late seventies. Only in France, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, and the UK 
revenues overweighted primary spending. However, in the early nineties, when both 
deficits and interest expenditures were at their peaks, a positive reaction of the primary 
surplus to debt accumulation seems to be predominant. Only in Spain and France, and the 
US, primary surpluses deteriorated while debt was rising.
4 With the exception of Portugal 
                                                 
2    For instance, between 1977 and 1993 the implicit interest rate on government debt (the ratio of 
interest expenditure to the stock of debt) had increased from 6.5% to 8% in Belgium, from 6% to 
11.5% in Greece, from 2% to 9% in Spain, from 6% to 7.5% in France, from 8% to 10%% in Italy, 
or from 4.5% to 10% in Portugal (see Table 2.8 in Appendix 2.A). 
3    In addition, the implicit interest rates on government debt are well below not only those recorded in 
the early nineties, but also those recorded at the beginning of the sample period (1977). As a matter 
of fact, the implicit interest rates have converged across euro area Member States to around 4.5% in 
2005 (see Table 2.8 in Appendix 2.A). 
4    Note that a stronger deterioration was recorded in Finland and Sweden. However, the timing in 
Tables 2.1 and 2.8 may not be the most appropriate for these two countries. The bulk of the increase   24
in the second half of the 1990s, and Japan, a general improvement of primary balances 
over the nineties helped to put debt levels on a downward path. However, in parallel with 
the reduction of debt levels, primary surpluses have actually worsened during the current 
decade. This is the case of all the EU countries except Spain, Austria and Denmark, 
where primary surpluses did not deteriorate while debt fell. 
All in all, periods of rising debt appear broadly coincidental with an improvement in 
primary balances, while primary balances have tended to worsen in parallel with the 
reduction of debt. Therefore, Tables 2.1 and 2.8 (the latter in Appendix 2.A) seem to 
suggest that fiscal behaviour in the EU (and probably in the US, but less evident in Japan) 
has overall been sensitive to debt developments.  
Debt Accounting 
Further insights about government debt developments during our sample period are 
obtained by performing a simple accounting exercise of the sources of debt growth. The 
exercise highlights the importance of the growth dividend compared to that of the so-
called stock-flow adjustment (SFA) as determinants of debt growth.  
Expressing the fiscal variables in percent of GDP, the flow government budget identity 


















       ( 2 . 7 )  
where i is the nominal interest charge in government debt and λ is the nominal GDP 
growth rate. Subtracting then dt-1 in both sides of expression (2.7) and rearranging terms, 
we obtain the equivalent expression: 
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according to which the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio in year t is equal to the budget 
deficit inclusive of interest expenditure,  1 − + − = t t t t d i s def  , minus the growth dividend, 
the second term in the right-hand side.  
In the real world, equations (2.7)-(2.8) do not generally hold. The reason is that the 
principles according to which the government deficit and debt are compiled are different. 
As a result, once it is corrected from the effect of nominal growth, the change in the 
outstanding stock of debt can be larger or smaller than the deficit (European Commission, 
2005). One of the main reasons for this comes from the differences in the gross and net 
                                                                                                                                               
in debt levels in Finland took place suddenly in the early 1990s, when after the fall of the soviet 
regime and the concomitant drastic reduction of Finish exports plunged the country into a recession, 
the result of which was that the surplus of 5% of GDP recorded in 1990 turned into a deficit of 8% of 
GDP in 1993. In parallel, debt levels rose from 14% of GDP in 1990 to 56% of GDP in 1993. 
Similarly, in Sweden the surplus of 4% of GDP recorded in 1990 turned into a deficit of 11% of 
GDP in 1993, with debt going up from 42% to 71% of GDP. Also note that the deterioration of the 
primary surplus in the UK in the late 1980s/early 1990s is associated to a reduction of debt levels 
from 61% of GDP in 1977 to 48% of GDP in 1993.   25
recording of transactions with financial assets.
5 Specifically, the government balance is 
the difference between expenditures and revenues, excluding financial transactions. 
However, government debt is compiled in gross terms, and it changes when the financial 
assets of the government change, thus generating flows of payments and receipts that do 
not enter the deficit. When the government accumulates financial assets, debt increases 
above the right-hand side of equation (2.8), while the opposite applies for a reduction of 
financial assets. Such a residual is known as the stock-flow adjustment (SFA). Taking it 
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where sfa is the stock-flow adjustment in percentage of GDP.  
Averaging over the sample period both sides of expression (2.9) it is possible to obtain 
the average contribution of each of the right hand side components to the average debt 
growth, all in terms of GDP. The result is shown in Table 2.2 for the whole sample 
period, 1977-2005, and for the first half of it, 1977-1993. Table 2.10 in Appendix 2.A 
presents the results of the same exercise for different sub-periods between 1994 and 2005.  
Considering the whole sample period, the most striking feature in Table 2.2 is that, as a 
general rule, the growth dividend has fully offset pervasive budget deficits. The 
exceptions appear to be Germany, where annual deficits have been around ¼ of a 
percentage point of GDP higher than the growth dividend, France, with a difference 
slightly above ½% of GDP, and Italy (and Japan), where the difference is around 1% of 
GDP. The table also reveals that SFAs have been important for debt dynamics in an 
ample majority of the 16 countries in the sample.
6  
The picture changes slightly if one looks at the first part of the period. Until 1993, the 
number of countries in which the growth dividend did not compensate for the deficit 
includes not only France and Italy (and Japan), but also Belgium, Greece, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, the contribution of the SFA is even greater that in the 
whole sample period. 
Interestingly, both over the full sample and until 1993, the number of countries that 
managed to maintain primary surpluses is not negligible, although the surpluses were in 
many cases relatively small. As a matter of fact, primary deficits appear to be the 
characteristic of only some catching-up countries, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
where the growth dividend was relatively high. 
                                                 
5   This is not the only reason (European Commission, 2005). The fact that deficits are compiled in 
accrual terms, while debt is a cash concept also leads to differences between the changes in debt and 
the deficit in any given year. Additional differences arise from other adjustments and valuation 
effects. 
6    As noted in European Commission (2005) large SFAs are a source of concern, especially in high-
debt countries in deficit. On the one hand, by excessively focusing on deficits, budgetary 
surveillance may create incentives to shift budget items from deficit (‘above the line’) to SFAs 
(‘below the line’). On the other hand, large SFAs may be indicative of inconsistent and low-quality 
budgetary statistics. However, large SFAs may not always be the result of bad fiscal behavior. It 
appears that countries with low debt levels and in surplus (see the cases of Finland, Denmark or 
Sweden in Table 2.1) would prefer to invest in financial assets rather than to reduce the already low 
debt.   26

























Belgium 1,23  5,07 7,79  -2,72  -5,09  -2,95  -2,14 1,26 
Germany 1,46  2,44 2,81 -0,37 -2,22 -1,25 -0,97  1,24 
Greece 3,12  7,73  6,84 0,89 -8,66  -6,82 -1,85  4,05 
Spain 1,08  3,14  2,77  0,28  -3,52  -2,31  -1,22  1,46 
France 1,72  2,59  2,65  -0,05  -1,95  -1,13  -0,82  1,07 
Italy 1,84  7,52  7,58  -0,05  -6,83  -5,26  -1,57  1,15 
Ireland -1,10  3,94  5,36  -1,42  -7,09  -3,80  -3,29  2,04 
Netherlands 0,54  2,86  4,56  -1,70  -2,78  -1,37  -1,40  0,46 
Austria 1,23  2,54  3,34  -0,79  -2,47  -1,29  -1,18  1,16 
Portugal 1,20  5,15 4,61 0,54  -6,11  -4,80  -1,31 2,16 
Finland 1,17  -1,47  2,25  -3,72  -1,71  -0,85  -0,86  4,34 
Denmark 0,79  0,76 5,32 -4,62 -2,99 -1,92 -1,07  3,02 
Sweden 0,84  1,32  4,90  -3,58  -3,46  -2,30  -1,16 2,98 
UK -0,62  2,54  3,58  -1,04  -3,60  -2,51  -1,09  0,45 
US 0,70  3,09  2,67  0,41  -2,82  -0,97  -1,85  0,43 
Japan 4,51  3,12  1,45  1,67  -2,16  -0,28  -1,88  3,55 
1977-1993 
Belgium 4,48  7,75 8,45 -0,70 -5,74  -3,83 -1,91  2,34 
Germany 1,19 2,30  2,56  -0,26 -2,91 -1,85 -1,06  1,80 
Greece 5,63  8,89  5,56 3,33 -8,17  -7,70 -0,47  4,51 
Spain 2,75  3,84  2,22  1,47  -3,23  -2,51  -0,71  2,08 
France 1,54  2,14  2,32  -0,17  -1,94  -1,37  -0,56  1,25 
Italy 3,76  9,95  7,63  2,32  -8,23  -6,69  -1,54  1,85 
Ireland 2,13  7,31  7,21  0,10  -8,05  -5,23  -2,81 2,84 
Netherlands 2,31  3,95  4,98  -1,03  -2,56  -1,30  -1,26  0,72 
Austria 1,99  2,74  0,00  -0,46  -2,62  -1,61  -1,02 1,84 
Portugal 1,74  6,02 5,26 0,76 -8,30  -6,94  -1,36  3,88 
Finland 3,02  -1,89  1,62  -3,51  -1,05  -0,83  -0,22 5,74 
Denmark 3,95 2,02  6,17  -4,24 -3,28 -2,52 -0,77  5,22 
Sweden 2,74  1,95 5,30  -3,35  -3,96  -3,26  -0,70 4,53 
UK -0,83  2,88  4,12  -1,23  -4,54  -3,59  -0,95  0,85 
US 1,78  3,86  2,69  1,16  -3,75  -2,18  -1,56  1,56 
Japan 2,50  1,11  1,47  -0,36  -3,57  -1,42  -2,14  5,06 
Notes: (1) Annual average change in the debt-to-DGP ratio (%)  
(2) Annual average change in the deficit-to-DGP ratio (%) 
(3) Annual average change in interest expenditure (% of GDP) 
(4) Annual average change in the primary balance-to-DGP ratio (%) (4)=(2)-(3) 
(5) Annual average effect of nominal GDP growth 
(6) Annual average effect of inflation 
(7) Annual average effect of real GDP growth (7) = (5) - (6) 
(8) Annual average stock-flow adjustment (8) = (1) - (2) - (5) 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan. 
 
A drastic reduction of budget deficits below the average growth dividend, which is 
unambiguously associated to the reduction of debt levels recorded after 1996, is the most 
salient characteristic of debt dynamics in most EU countries after 1993, and in particular 
after 1996 (see Table 2.10 in Appendix 2.A), once the effects of the 1992-1993 economic 
crisis had faded out, and the enhanced budgetary surveillance and fiscal discipline 
framework was in place. Still, favourable developments in the SFA, in many cases 
reflecting the allocation of privatisations proceeds to redeem debt, had a significant   27
impact on debt dynamics, especially in the second half of the 1990s. During most of the 
last decade, primary surpluses have been ubiquitous. 
Although informative about debt developments and the contribution of different budget 
components to debt accumulation, data in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 convey scarce information 
about the sustainability of fiscal policy. For example, one might be tempted to interpret 
the fact that budget deficits have been the norm in our sample as indicative of underlying 
Ponzi games. However, sustainability conditions impose very weak constraints in the 
behaviour of deficits. As a matter of fact, sustainability is compatible with permanent 
budget deficits as long as they induce a debt growth rate lower than the discount rate.
7 
Similarly, a declining debt-to-GDP ratio might be seen as indicative of fiscal 
sustainability, but it is actually compatible with Ponzi schemes whereby the government 
rolls over a given level of debt when the interest rate on government debt is lower than 
the GDP growth rate. This analysis above suggests in fact that commonly used fiscal 
indicators may be misleading as signals of sustainability and that more formal approaches 
are needed in order to establish whether a given fiscal policy is sustainable. 
2.4  Determinants of the Fiscal Primary Surplus  
Baseline Model 
In accordance with the fiscal reaction function approach to sustainability discussed in 
section 2.2, we start with the following basic specification of the determinants of the 
primary surplus: 
t t t t t s x d c s ε ρ γ δ + + + + = − − 1 1       ( 2 . 1 0 )  
The motivation for equation (2.10) is to capture the potential response of the primary 
surplus to debt, while trying to avoid omitted variable bias. To that end we include two 
components considered important in government fiscal behaviour. On the one hand, the 
response to the cyclical conditions of the economy, as represented by the output gap x. On 
the other hand, the inertial process typically associated with fiscal policy that is captured 
by the primary surplus lag. Finally, equation (2.10) incorporates a random term 
representing other potential factors affecting the evolution of the primary surplus, as for 
example non-systematic discretionary policy actions. 
Figure 2.1 plots the three series involved in equation (2.10) for each one of the 16 
countries in the sample. As already pointed out in Section 2.3, there seems to be in a 
number of countries a positive correlation between the primary surplus and the stock of 
debt at the end of the previous period. Interestingly, although one would have expected a 
strong positive correlation between primary surpluses and output gaps, so primary 
balances would improve in times of positive output gaps, Figure 2.1 seems to suggest that 
in a number of countries such an automatic counter-cyclical behaviour of the primary 
balances has been offset by pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policies. 
                                                 
7   Sustainability is even compatible with policies that may generate primary deficits on average, as for 
example fiscal policies that targeting debt/output stabilization require a surplus or a deficit depending 
on output fluctuations.   28








































































































Note: DEBT (-1) – government gross debt (rhs); PSUR – primary surplus; GAP – output gap.   29
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Table 2.3 presents summary statistics related to the estimation of model (2.10) by 
ordinary least squares (OLS). A positive and statistically significant (at 5% at least) 
response is observed in Belgium, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, 
UK and the US. In the rest of the countries, except in Japan, the reaction of the primary 
balance to debt stocks is either significant at 10% (Ireland and Austria) or non-significant, 
although the estimate is positive. Only in Japan, the estimate is negative but non-
significant. When significant, the reaction of the primary surplus to the output gap is 
positive, thus pointing to counter-cyclical fiscal policies. This seems to be the case in 
most EU Member States not in the euro area, as well as Finland, Austria and, to a much 
lesser extent, Portugal. In Belgium, Germany, Greece and Ireland the correlation between 
the primary balance and the output gap is negative albeit non-significant. Finally, in all 
the countries, except in Portugal, the inertia is statistically significant, positive indeed and 
in some cases relatively strong. In countries like Ireland, Japan and, to a lesser extent, 
Belgium, UK and US it appears pretty close to 1.    34
Table 2.3  Fiscal Reaction Function: Econometric Results for the Baseline Model 
 Intercept  DEBT  GAP  PSUR-1 R²  h-Durbin 







0.09***  0.95 -1.73 







0.24**  0.33 -0.54 







0.13***  0.74 0.01 







0.18***  0.82 0.001 







0.19***  0.48 6.06 







0.10***  0.92 0.09 







0.06***  0.88 0.76 







0.21**  0.57 0.98 







0.16***  0.48 0.68 







0.16  0.72 2.00 







0.10***  0.78 1.34 







0.10***  0.84 2.57 







0.14***  0.84 2.41 







0.09***  0.78 1.34 







0.10***  0.79 2.68 







0.08***  0.86 1.78 
Note: The sample period is 1997-2005. 
Models estimated by OLSQ with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; 
'***' significant at 1%; '**' significant at 5%; '*' significant at 10%. 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan. 
 
In general, and given its simplicity, the explanatory power of the model is relatively good. 
In any case, it is comparable or better than other estimates in the literature, such as 
Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) or Bohn (2005a). The explanatory power is high 
in Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, UK, US and Japan, 
where 75% or more of the variability of the primary surplus within the sample period is 
explained by the stock of debt, the output gap and the inertia. However, in some cases, 
such as Germany, France and Austria the explanatory power of the model is lower. In 
addition, although in many countries the model passes the usual specification tests, in 
others, such as Belgium, France, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, US and Japan, the h-
Durbin statistic suggests a clear departure from the white noise hypothesis for the 
residuals. 
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Robustness Checks 
Taken at face value, Table 2.3 raises some doubts about the sustainability of fiscal 
policies in Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Austria, Finland, and, indeed, Japan, where 
a positive and significant reaction of the primary balance to the stock of debt has not been 
estimated. However, according to Section 2.2, the reaction of the primary surplus to debt 
levels does not need to be positive all the time, while the descriptive analysis carried out 
in Section 2.3 suggests that fiscal policy has changed over the sample period, in particular 
after 1993 once the convergence criteria entered into force. Therefore, there is a case to 
explore possible structural breaks, as well as non-linearity (Bohn, 2005a), in the response 
of the primary balance to the stock of debt. In addition, the fact that the fiscal policy 
stance may have an impact on the cycle would imply that output gaps may be partially 
determined by the primary surplus, thus leading to simultaneity biases (Ballabriga and 
Martinez-Mongay, 2003), which might put into question the estimation method and 
advocate for instrumental variable methods. Alternatively, it might also call for the 
substitution of the contemporaneous output gap by the lagged one in order to avoid 
simultaneity. Finally, the parameters in specification (2.10) can be seen as a linearization 
of the parameters in a partial adjustment non-linear model, in which the actual responses 
of the primary balance to the debt and the output gap are the estimated in (2.10) divided 
by the complement of the inertia (Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2005). This would 
ask for a non-linear estimation of (2.10). Alternatively, one could consider a linear 
specification in which the inertia is absent.  
Table 2.4 contains the result of the analysis of robustness of the estimates of the primary 
surplus reaction to debt against the above alternative specifications of the reaction 
function. In all cases, the table shows the estimate of the coefficient of debt and its 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard error.
8 The first column reproduces the results for the 
baseline model (2.10) in Table 2.3. The second column presents the baseline model 
estimated by instrumental variable methods. Following Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay 
(2003), the instrument for the contemporaneous output gap for each country is a sort of 
country-specific international gap estimated on the basis of the bilateral trade-weighted 
average of the output gaps of the rest of the OECD countries. Overall, the potential 
simultaneity bias seems to be negligible. France, where the estimate shifts from positive 
to negative but remains non-significant; the Netherlands, where it decreases; and 
Portugal, where it increases but remains positive and significant, are the only differences 
with respect to the OLSQ estimation. Similarly, dealing with potential simultaneity bias 
by substituting the contemporaneous gap with the lagged one (third column) leaves 
results basically unaffected, with just a reduction in the size and significance (10%) of the 
coefficient in Portugal.  
The fourth column considers the effects of dropping inertia in (2.10). As a general rule, 
the reaction of the primary surplus to debt becomes larger in many countries, and 
significant in Greece and Austria. However, it decreases in Portugal and becomes non-
significant in Sweden and the UK. Moreover, usual tests indicate the presence of 
significant misspecification errors. The estimation of the baseline model by non-linear 
methods (fifth column) does not change the conclusions of the baseline model either, 
since the non-linear estimates are very close to the linear ones in the first column of Table 
2.4 after being divided by (1-ρ) with ρ as estimated in the fourth column of Table 2.3. 
Similarly, estimation of the model by non-linear two-stage least squares (instrumental 
                                                 
8    Detailed estimates are available upon request from the authors.     36
variables with the international gap as the instrument for the contemporaneous gap, 
column sixth) gives debt reactions which are equal to those in the second column of Table 
2.4 when divided by (1-ρ). 
Columns 7 to 12 deal with possible specification bias linked to non-linearities and 
structural breaks in the response to debt. Only Greece, Ireland and Denmark (and the US) 
appear sensitive to the inclusion of the square of the deviation of the debt with respect to 
its sample average (column DEBT2). The consideration of dummies that take value 1 
from 1993 onwards (DUM93), from 1996 (DUM96) or from 2001 (DUM01), 
individually or combined, has significant effects on the estimates of the reaction to debt in 
several countries, with interesting implications about the effects on fiscal behaviour of 
economic integration in the EU. This seems to be the case in at least Germany, Greece, 
Spain, Ireland, Austria and Finland. As shown below, in most euro area countries, the 
introduction of structural breaks leads to an increase of the reaction to debt after 1993 
and/or 1996, while in some cases the response falls after 2001. Also, the consideration of 
structural breaks has significant impacts in the US and Japan. More detailed estimation 
results for models with structural breaks are provided below. 
To assess the impact of the large and relatively omnipresent and persistent SFAs showed 
in section 2.3, the baseline model has been re-estimated by including a sort of ‘gross 
primary surplus’ obtained by subtracting the SFAs, calculated for each year in the debt 
accounting exercise (see Table 2.2) to the recorded primary surplus. The result is the 
primary surplus that would have been compiled if positive SFAs had been considered as 
primary expenditures, while negative SFAs had been accounted as revenues. The results 
of re-estimating (2.10) with this gross primary balance is presented in Table 2.5 in the 
rows labelled GPSUR.  
Table 2.4  Estimates of the Response of the Primary Surplus to Debt in Alternative Models  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: '***' significant at 1%; '**' significant at 5%, '*' significant at 10% 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan.     
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Table 2.5  Robustness with Respect to the SFAs. Baseline Models 
 Model  Intercept  DEBT  GAP  PSUR-1 R²  h-Durbin 
GPSUR -7.77**  0.08**  -0.18  0.73***  0.85  -2.42  Belgium 
NDEBT -3.52*** 0.04***  -0.00  0.75***  0.92  -1.62 
GPSUR -4.49*** 0.08***  -0.14  0.13  0.24  -0.20  Germany 
NDEBT -0.03  0.01  -0.14  0.50  0.29  -0.48 
GPSUR -9.33**  0.07*  0.35  0.13  0.29  -0.31  Greece 
NDEBT -2.89  0.03  -0.15 0.62*** 0.74  -0.22 
GPSUR -4.44*** 0.09***  0.53**  0.24  0.70  1.06  Spain 
NDEBT -1.65*** 0.04***  0.17  0.55***  0.85  0.16 
GPSUR -0.81  0.58  0.38**  0.20  0.26  2.06  France 
NDEBT 0.30  -0.01  0.16 0.55***  0.51  6.38 
GPSUR -9.16*** 0.10***  0.34**  0.47***  0.91  0.18  Italy 
NDEBT -5.76*** 0.06***  0.01  0.57***  0.92  0.13 
GPSUR -3.28  0.05*  0.24 0.66*** 0.50  -2.65  Ireland 
NDEBT -0.98  0.02  -0.03 0.90*** 0.87  0.73 
GPSUR -4.20*** 0.09***  0.34  0.38**  0.69  -0.28  Netherlands 
NDEBT  -1.95** 0.05**  0.20  0.49**  0.66  1.08 
GPSUR -5.68*** 0.10***  0.07  0.20  0.47  1.57  Austria 
NDEBT -0.54  0.02  0.19* 0.46*** 0.48  0.80 
GPSUR -13.6***  0.23**  0.35  0.44***  0.59  -0.82  Portugal 
NDEBT -7.59**  0.14**  0.13  0.38  0.65  1.98 
GPSUR -3.18*** 0.10***  0.82**  0.21  0.66  2.93  Finland 
NDEBT 1.94***  0.02  0.63*** 0.39***  0.82  1.14 
GPSUR -4.37* 0.12***  1.31***  0.45*** 0.79  0.41  Denmark 
NDEBT -0.35 0.05***  0.47***  0.61*** 0.83  2.88 
GPSUR -15.4*** 0.32*** 1.81***  0.00  0.88  -0.71  Sweden 
NDEBT -1.50 0.09***  1.25***  0.37*** 0.88  2.36 
GPSUR -6.59*** 0.15***  0.39*  0.67***  0.72  0.47  UK 
NDEBT -7.63*** 0.17*** 0.28*** 0.79***  0.85  0.37 
GPSUR -7.97*** 0.13***  0.24  0.51***  0.62  0.06  US  NDEBT -2.36**  0.04** 0.29*** 0.75***  0.81  2.40 
GPSUR -1.48  0.00  -0.01 0.67*** 0.55  -0.71  Japan 
NDEBT 0.27  -0.01  0.02 0.90***  0.88  1.95 
Note: '***' significant at 1%; '**' significant at 5%, '*' significant at 10% 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan. 
 
Alternatively, model (2.10) has been re-estimated by re-calculating the stock of debt net 
of SFAs to obtain the stock of debt that would have prevailed had the SFAs been zero. 
The results are shown in Table 2.5 in the rows labeled 'NDEBT'. Leaving aside the fact 
that the reactions of the 'gross primary surplus' to gross debt tend to be higher than that of 
the standard primary surplus, be it to gross or 'net' debt, the main conclusions of Table 2.3 
remain unaltered.  
Finally, the main conclusions of Table 2.3 also remain when a country-specific selection 
model is carried out, so that for each country the model with the best adjustment power 
and the least misspecification error is chosen, as shown in Table 2.6.
9 
                                                 
9   Notice that some models (Belgium, France, Italy, see Table 2.6) include an intervention in 1993 (i.e. 
a variable that takes value 1 in that year 0 elsewhere) with no significant impacts as regards the 
reaction of the primary surplus to debt levels. This intervention tries to deal with a large increase in 
debt levels observed in many countries in 1993, which appear to be associated to the application of 
the statistical regulations adopted in connection with the fiscal Maastricht criteria with a view to 
providing rigorous criteria to compile deficit and debt levels in the Member States. As shown by the 
large SFAs recorded that year, such debt increases were not associated to increases in the deficit     
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Table 2.6  Refined Estimates 
 Intercept  DEBT  GAP  PSUR-1 Maastricht Launching
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0.01***  0.55 -0.66 










  0.77 -1.38 










  0.87 0.69 











0.01***  0.70 1.96 








   -0.01 
0.003***  0.93 -1.16 










  0.88 1.04 










  0.64 1.49 
































    0.82 -1.20 



















    0.85 1.52 
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    0.83 1.25 










   0.95 -0.09 
Notes: (1a) The model includes an intervention in 1993 to correct for the effect of large statistical revisions of debt 
levels that took place in such a year; 
(1b) The model includes an intervention in 1995 when the debt rose by almost 8 percentage points ¾ of which was 
explained by a stock-flow adjustment; 
(1c) The model includes a non-linear term, positive in the cases of Portugal and the US and negative in the UK; 
(1d) The model includes a dummy taking value 1 between 1990 and 1992, the coefficient of which is negative and 
significant at 1% (-0.15) in Finland and at 5% (-0.05) in Sweden; 
(2) The dummy takes value 1 between 1993 and 2000; 
Standard errors are shown below the parameter estimate:  
'***' significant at 1%, '**' significant at 5%, '*' significant at 10%. 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan. 
 
If the whole period is considered (see column 'DEBT' in Table 2.6) there is no country for 
which a negative and statistically significant reaction to debt has been estimated. 
Moreover, in some euro area countries such as Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Austria, the reaction of the primary balance to the stock of debt was 
increased either after 1993, thus linked to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
convergence criteria, or after 1996, thus in the aftermath of the formal launching of the 
                                                                                                                                               
and/or the reduction of the growth dividend. In the case of Germany the intervention takes place in 
1995, when the new Erblastentilgungsfonds (administered by the federal level) took over the debt 
from the Treuhandanstalt, which privatized the assets of the former East-Germany and accumulated 
debt in order to make the companies fit for privatization (or cover the social payments if companies 
were liquidated). The new fund also took over a debt stock of about 7% of GDP. While they do not 
have a significant impact on the estimates of debt reaction, the inclusion of such interventions 
improves the adjustment and the specification tests.     
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euro at the end of 1995. As a result, a non-significant reaction in Greece and Austria 
became significant during the nineties, thus fulfilling the sustainability condition (2.6). In 
the case of Spain, a relatively weak response became much stronger after 1996. In France, 
the positive and relatively large response of the primary balance to debt was halved after 
1993, but still leaving it to a size comparable to that estimated for other countries (around 
0.05). In Japan, the change in fiscal policy that occurred after the crisis of the early 
nineties has totally offset the secular positive reaction of the primary surplus to debt. 
Interestingly, in a number of countries, namely Germany, Greece, France and Italy, there 
is some evidence of a sort of EMU fatigue, which has lowered the reaction of the primary 
surplus to debt during the 2000s. The reduction appears sizeable in Germany, as well as 
in France, where it added to that taking place after 1993. The reduction has also been 
important in Greece, where the positive reaction of 0.03 that prevailed during the nineties 
left way to the behaviour already observed in the seventies and the eighties. 
All in all, after controlling for breaks in the baseline model (Table 2.3), Table 2.6 
confirms that the fulfilment of the sustainability condition given by (2.6) has been general 
across the sample.
10 Greece and Finland seem to be the only outstanding exceptions. 
However, in the latter case, one should bear in mind that the events of the period 1990-
1992, when the effects of the fall of the former USSR and the 1992 crisis overlapped 
prompting a dramatic increase of debt levels (see Section 2.3), made the estimation of 
reaction function for this country very difficult. In addition, the primary surplus has 
started to fall only recently while its debt has been on a downward path since 1993, which 
does not point precisely to an unsustainable fiscal behaviour. On the other hand, we 
should not forget that our requirement for sustainability is a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition. 
2.5  A Closer Look at the Response of Primary Surplus to Debt 
The analysis in Section 2.4 provides robust evidence supporting the conclusion that most 
EU countries can be characterized as having a positive response of the primary surplus to 
debt accumulation over the full sample period. It also allows to identify some significant 
shifts in the response of some countries as the economic and monetary integration process 
in Europe has evolved, indicating the existence of some degree of time variation in that 
response. 
However, the analysis of last section does not allow tracing with some precision that 
degree of time variation. This is so because it cannot provide relatively precise estimates 
of the value of the response in small sub-samples, due to the lack of degrees of freedom. 
It provides estimates of the average response for the overall sample period, which is then 
permanently corrected with ad hoc dummy effects after specific sample events. But it 
does not provide a systematic updating mechanism to obtain explicit probability 
distributions of the primary surplus response to debt for different (small) sub-sample 
periods. Explicit characterization of these distributions would be helpful for a systematic 
investigation of the statistical evolution of time variation over the sample. 
                                                 
10    Implicit in our analysis is the assumption that debt and primary surplus have the same order of 
integration. Appendix 2.B reports unit root test results which fail to display unambiguous statistical 
evidence in this sense. However, our sample size is too small for this matter and we take this as 
inconclusive evidence.      
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This section gives a step in this direction by specifying and estimating a Bayesian version 
of our basic model (2.10), which avoids ad hoc permanent corrections of the response to 
debt accumulation. A Bayesian updating scheme is a sensible approach in our small 
sample setting, where low degrees of freedom and difficulties to apply asymptotic results 
or to establish long run statistical properties of time series make questionable the 
application of classical econometric methods. 
Model (2.10) has a vector autoregressive form with government debt and output gap as 
exogenous variables. This allows a straight application of the Bayesian Vector 
Autoregressive (BVAR) methodology.
11 BVAR models are well designed to handle the 
trade-off between over and under parameterization in contexts of limited size samples, 
providing an objective scheme for the updating of prior estimates.  
The specification of prior beliefs is in fact the critical point once we move to a Bayesian 
framework. With long samples, the prior effect on posterior estimates is negligible 
because sample information ends up shaping the final results. However, with small 
samples, the prior might be the determinant factor (arguably leading to ad hoc final 
results when prior information is ad hoc). This would be the case if the specified prior is 
so tight (very small variance) that final results are unaffected by sample observations. On 
the other extreme, a too loose (large variance) prior could lead to very volatile posterior 
estimates, largely affected by new sample observations, as it is the typical case in a 
context of scarce degrees of freedom. Ideally we want a not too loose/not too tight prior. 
A prior that deals with the degrees of freedom problem, but is at the same time sensitive 
to new sample observations that call for its modification. This is one of the underlying 
principles in BVAR models. A second principle is that the prior odds are tilted towards 
own lags, which have a higher prior variance. 
With these principles in mind our prior specification treats the parameter vector in (2.10), 
β = (ρ, δ, γ, c), as a multivariate normal with independent components and the following 






















β ;           (2.11) 
where ρ ˆ  and δˆ are the least square estimates in Table 2.6 and  ε σ ˆ is the least square 
estimate of the error term variance in an autoregressive regression of the primary surplus 
with one lag, a scaling factor helpful to control for the units of measurement of variables.  
In line with BVAR models, the covariance in (2.11) gives more weight to the own lag 
coefficient (50% of the error term variance) than to the coefficients of other variables (1% 
of the own lag coefficient variance), and specifies a flat prior for the constant term. As for 
the prior mean vector, a common practice in the BVAR literature is to specify a prior 
mean equal to one for the own first lag and equal to zero for the rest of the coefficients in 
the equation. The vector in (2.11) incorporates a slight deviation from this practice by 
taking as useful prior information the estimates in Table 2.6 for the inertia component 
and, our focus of attention, the reaction to debt accumulation.  
                                                 
11   For a description of the methodology see e.g. Doan et al. (1986) and Ballabriga (1997).  
)] ˆ 5 . 0 ( 40 ) ˆ 5 . 0 ( 01 . 0 ) ˆ 5 . 0 ( 01 . 0 ˆ 5 . 0 [ ) cov( ε ε ε ε σ σ σ σ β diag =    
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Our objective is to compare the posterior distribution of the primary surplus response to 
debt across different sub-samples. To that end, we combine according to the Bayes rule 
the prior information in (2.11) with each of the following three sub-sample periods: 1977-
1991, 1992-1999, 2000-2005. Doing this, we can assess the extent to which the 
information in each of these sub-periods is compatible with the estimates for the overall 
sample response in Table 2.6. The resulting posterior densities are reported in Table 2.7, 
with the corresponding graphical representation in Figure 2.2. 
Table 2.7  Posterior Distributions for δ  








Belgium  0,05 0,022 0,02 0,019 0,04 0,027 
Germany  0,07 0,043 0,04 0,023 0,02 0,010 
Greece -0,02  0,035  0,07 0,049 0,00 0,032 
Spain  0,04 0,025 0,04 0,043 0,02 0,015 
France  0,07 0,028 0,07 0,032 0,04 0,042 
Italy  0,04 0,020 0,03 0,032 0,02 0,014 
Ireland  0,06 0,027 0,00 0,020 0,10 0,041 
Netherlands  0,04 0,020 0,01 0,033 0,05 0,057 
Austria  0,03 0,018 0,01 0,040 0,02 0,044 
Portugal  0,15 0,058 0,11 0,008 0,10 0,070 
Finland  0,05 0,105 0,06 0,046 0,11 0,031 
Denmark  0,08 0,038 0,01 0,015 0,05 0,075 
Sweden  0,10 0,051 0,10 0,097 0,09 0,056 
UK  0,05 0,039 0,16 0,053 0,10 0,029 
US  0,01 0,026 0,03 0,016 0,03 0,045 
Japan  0,05 0,017 -0,02 0,028 -0,02 0,030 
 
A general feature of the information in Table 2.7 is that it conveys evidence of time 
variation in the response to debt accumulation in most countries. More specifically, we 
detect a rather clear shift across sub-periods of the posterior distribution in the cases of 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, UK and 
Japan. The rest of the countries in the panel seem to display more stability. On the other 
hand, in most euro area countries the shift in the posterior may be associated with the 
economic and monetary integration effects modelled as dummy effects in Table 2.6. Only 
in the cases of Spain and Austria the integration effects identified in Table 2.6 are not 
visible in Table 2.7. 
Looking at particular countries, some interesting features are noteworthy. First, the results 
for Germany and France nicely reflect the progressive deterioration of fiscal discipline 
across sub-periods, especially in the case of Germany. Second, the posterior is centred on 
a non-positive mean in the cases of Greece (except in 1992-99) and Japan (except in 
1977-91). Third, Finland now displays a progressive and significant improvement in 
terms of the sustainability of its fiscal policy. The difficulties visible during the period 
1977-91 are overcome in the following two sub-periods, ending with a current sound 
fiscal position. This is in sharp contrast with the overall conclusion in Table 2.6. 
Overall, Table 2.7 conveys a similar qualitative message of Table 2.6: the response of the 
primary surplus to accumulated debt has been generally positive across countries and sub-
sample periods, except in Greece and Japan. This result reinforces the robustness of the     
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conclusion that fiscal policy has been sustainable in EU15 countries during the last 30 
years. 
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This chapter analyses the sustainability of EU15 public finances in line with the recent 
literature on fiscal reaction functions. According to this approach a positive response of 
the primary surplus to debt accumulation is sufficient for sustainability in a wide range of 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, thus providing a rather general condition 
for testing the sustainability of fiscal policy. 
Our baseline fiscal reaction function specification assumes that the primary surplus 
responds to debt accumulation and to the output gap, and also incorporates the lagged 
surplus to capture fiscal inertia. The estimation of this baseline model for the sample 
period 1977-2005 suggests that a positive response to debt accumulation is quite 
widespread, thus indicating that fiscal policy is sustainable in most countries. 
A main concern of the chapter is the robustness of this result. Therefore, we consider 
several alternatives to our baseline in order to investigate the potential existence of 
simultaneity bias, the effect of including and excluding different explanatory variables, 
and the effect of specifying a non-linear fiscal reaction function. The qualitative baseline 
result is robust to these changes. We also explore the existence of structural breaks in the 
-0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15  0.2 0.25    
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response to debt through the inclusion of ad hoc dummy effects associated with specific 
events along the process of economic and monetary integration in the European Union. 
This analysis does not change the qualitative baseline result, but reveals the existence of a 
Maastricht/euro-launching positive correction in the response to debt in many countries, 
and the existence of a “Maastricht fatigue” in some of them, indicating time variation in 
the response of governments to debt accumulation. 
Another main concern of this chapter is to provide an alternative to ad hoc dummies in 
order to investigate this time variation in the response to debt accumulation from a more 
systematic perspective. In this respect, we argue that a Bayesian approach provides a 
sensible endogenous updating scheme in our small sample context, and we estimate a 
Bayesian version of the baseline model for three different sub-samples: 1977-1991, 1992-
1999, 2000-2005. We find that the posterior distribution has tended to shift across sub-
samples in most countries, which supports the hypothesis of a time varying response to 
debt. The comparison of posteriors provides an explicit characterization of this time 
variation, and indicates that a positive posterior mean for the response to debt 
accumulation is pervasive. This enhances the robustness of our results. 
From a policy perspective, we see two messages from our analysis. First, if sustainability 
is the issue, there is no clear reason for concern. The evidence for last 30 years suggests 
that, with the exception of Greece, EU15 governments have tended to apply a fluctuating 
but generally positive primary surplus adjustment in response to debt accumulation. This 
is sufficient to guarantee the sustainability of fiscal policy.
12 Second, the posterior 
distribution from our Bayesian analysis provides a sensible, easy-to-update indicator for 
the evolution of the sustainability position of countries. A country with a posterior 
centred on a non-positive response for a given number of periods could be called for a 
fiscal correction on sustainability grounds.   
Finally, a comment on follow-up research. A natural direction for further work in the 
issue of sustainability is to try to specify and estimate a model with time varying 
coefficients. This may require longer samples. A successful attempt though would 
generate time series for the response of the primary surplus to debt accumulation, thus 
providing the raw material that would allow moving from the objective of testing 
sustainability, the focus of this chapter, to the objective of identifying its potential 
determinants.
                                                 
12   Although the size of response is also relevant in order to exclude explosive debt-to-GDP ratios.     
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Appendix 2.A   Complementary Tables 
Table 2.8  Government Balances, Interest Payments and Primary Surpluses
*, 1977-
2005 
Government balances (net lending in % of GDP)* 
  1977 77-93** 1993 93-96** 1996 96-99** 1999 99-05** 2005 
Belgium  -5,6 -7,8 -7,0 -4,8 -3,8 -1,8 -0,5 0,0 -0,1 
Germany  -2,4 -2,3 -3,4 -3,1 -3,3 -2,4 -1,5 -2,5 -3,3 
Greece -2,5 -8,9  -13,6  -10,3  -7,4 -5,4 -3,5 -4,9 -4,4 
Spain  -0,6 -3,8 -6,6 -6,1 -4,9 -3,0 -1,2 -0,3 1,1 
France -0,8 -2,1 -5,6 -5,0 -4,1 -2,8 -1,7 -2,7 -2,9 
Italy  -6,9  -10,0  -9,1 -8,1 -6,9 -3,7 -1,7 -2,8 -4,3 
Ireland -6,9 -7,3 -2,3 -1,5 -0,1 1,5  2,4  1,4  1,0 
Netherl.  -0,8 -4,0 -3,0 -3,0 -1,7 -0,7 0,6 -0,7 -0,3 
Austria -2,2 -2,7 -4,1 -4,4 -4,0 -2,6 -2,3 -1,3 -1,6 
Portugal  -3,8 -6,0 -5,6 -5,3 -4,5 -3,4 -2,7 -3,6 -6,0 
Finland 5,4  1,9 -7,8 -5,6 -3,5 -0,4 1,6  3,5  2,4 
Denmark  -0,6 -2,0 -2,8 -2,1 -1,1 0,6  2,2  2,4  4,7 
Sweden 1,6  -2,0 -11,4 -7,7  -2,8  0,1  2,3  1,9  2,7 
UK  -3,2 -2,9 -7,7 -6,0 -4,2 -1,3 1,1 -0,9 -3,5 
US  -2,1 -3,9 -4,9 -3,5 -2,2 -0,4 0,9 -2,1 -4,1 
Japan  -2,8 -1,1 -2,4 -4,0 -5,1 -5,4 -7,2 -6,9 -6,1 
Interest expenditure (% of GDP) 
  1977 77-93*** 1993 93-96*** 1996 96-99*** 1999 99-05*** 2005 
Belgium  3,8  8,4 10,3 9,3 8,5 7,6 6,9 5,8 4,5 
Germany 1,7  2,6  3,1  3,4 3,5 3,3 3,1 3,0 2,8 
Greece 1,2 5,6  12,6  12,8  12,0  10,1  8,4 6,5 4,8 
Spain 0,3  2,2  4,9  5,0  5,2 4,4 3,5 2,7 1,8 
France 1,1 2,3 3,3 3,5 3,6 3,3 3,0 2,9 2,7 
Italy 4,3  7,6  11,7  11,1  11,3  8,9 6,7 5,7 4,7 
Ireland 4,9 7,2 6,2 5,3 4,5 3,5 2,4 1,5 1,2 
Netherl. 2,9  5,0  5,8  5,5 5,3 4,8 4,3 3,1 2,4 
Austria 1,8 3,2 4,2 4,1 3,9 3,7 3,5 3,3 2,9 
Portugal 1,4  5,3  5,7  5,6 5,1 3,9 3,0 2,9 2,7 
Finland 0,8  1,6  4,5  4,7 4,2 3,7 3,0 2,3 1,6 
Denmark 1,7  6,2  7,2  6,4 5,7 4,8 4,1 3,1 2,1 
Sweden 2,4  5,3  5,8  6,3 6,5 5,7 4,7 3,0 1,9 
UK 4,3  4,1  2,8  3,3  3,7 3,5 2,9 2,3 2,2 
US 1,6  2,7  3,4  3,4  3,4 3,1 2,7 2,1 1,8 
Japan 0,5  1,5  1,2  1,3  1,3 1,4 1,5 1,5 1,6 
Primary surpluses* 
  1977 77-93**** 1993 93-96**** 1996 96-99**** 1999 99-05**** 2005 
Belgium -1,7  0,7  3,4  4,5 4,7 5,8 6,4 5,8 4,5 
Germany  -0,7 0,3 -0,2 0,2 0,2 0,9 1,7 0,5 -0,5 
Greece -1,3 -3,3 -1,0 2,5  4,6  4,6  4,9  1,6  0,5 
Spain  -0,1 -1,5 -1,7 -1,1 0,4  1,4  2,3  2,4  2,9 
France  0,3  0,2 -2,3 -1,5 -0,4 0,5  1,2  0,2 -0,2 
Italy  -2,6  -2,3 2,5 3,0 4,3 5,2 4,9 2,8 0,4 
Ireland -2,0 -0,1 3,9  3,8 4,4 5,0 4,8 2,9 2,2 
Netherl.  2,1 1,0 2,8 2,5 3,6 4,1 4,9 2,4 2,2 
Austria  -0,5 0,5 0,1 -0,4  -0,1 1,1 1,2 2,0 1,2 
Portugal  -2,4  -0,8 0,1 0,4 0,6 0,4 0,3 -0,7  -3,3 
Finland 6,1  3,5  -3,3 -0,9 0,6 3,3 4,6 5,8 4,1 
Denmark  1,2 4,2 4,4 4,3 4,6 5,5 6,3 5,4 6,8 
Sweden  4,0 3,3 -5,6  -1,5 3,7 5,8 7,0 5,0 4,6 
UK  1,1  1,2 -4,9 -2,7 -0,5 2,1  4,1  1,5 -1,3 
US  -0,6 -1,2 -1,5 0,0  1,2  2,7  3,6  0,0 -2,3 
Japan  -2,3 0,4 -1,2 -2,7 -3,7 -4,0 -5,8 -5,5 -4,4 
Notes: * A minus sign represents a deficit. 
** Averages of the balances recorded during the period including the two extreme years of the time interval. 
*** Averages of the interest expenditure recorded during the period including the two extreme years of the time 
interval. 
**** Averages of the balances recorded during the period including the two extreme years of the time interval. 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan.     
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Table 2.9  Implicit Interest Rates of Gross Government Debt, 1977-2005 
  1977 77-93* 1993 93-96* 1996 96-99* 1999 99-05* 2005 
Belgium  6,5 8,1 7,9 7,2 6,7 6,3 6,0 5,6 4,8 
Germany  6,2 6,7 6,9 6,5 6,0 5,6 5,2 4,8 4,2 
Greece 6,1  9,4  11,5  11,7  10,8 9,0  7,5 5,9 4,5 
Spain  2,2 5,6 8,7 8,2 7,9 6,8 5,6 5,0 4,2 
France  6,0 8,0 7,5 7,0 6,3 5,7 5,1 4,7 4,0 
Italy  7,8  9,6 10,2 9,4  9,3  7,6  5,9  5,3  4,4 
Ireland  8,3 8,4 6,7 6,4 6,2 5,9 5,0 4,3 4,2 
Netherlands  7,7 8,3 7,7 7,6 7,4 7,3 7,1 5,8 4,6 
Austria  6,2 6,8 6,9 6,3 5,8 5,6 5,3 5,0 4,5 
Portugal  4,5 9,7 9,9 9,4 8,5 7,0 5,9 5,2 4,2 
Finland  9,8 9,2 8,0 8,3 7,4 7,2 6,5 5,2 4,1 
Denmark  12,5  11,5  9,3 9,0 8,2 7,6 7,1 6,5 6,0 
Sweden  9,0 10,4 8,2  8,7  8,9  8,3  7,5  5,6  3,9 
UK  7,1 8,3 5,9 6,5 7,0 7,1 6,5 5,7 5,0 
US  3,4 4,6 4,5 4,6 4,6 4,5 4,2 3,5 2,7 
Japan  1,4 2,2 1,6 1,5 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,0 1,0 
Note: * Averages of the ratio of the interest expenditure to debt recorded during the period including the 
two extreme years of the time interval. 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan. 
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Table 2.10  Debt Accounting, 1994-1996, 1997-1999 and 2000-2005 
       Nominal    Real  Stock- 
     Interest  Primary  GDP  Inflation  GDP  flow 
  Debt  Deficit  burden  balance  growth  growth  adjustment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
1994-1996 
Belgium -1,19  4,08 8,89  -4,81 -4,44 -1,65 -2,79  -0,83 
Germany 4,20 3,04 3,44 -0,40 -1,60 -0,74 -0,86  2,76 
Greece 0,40  9,26  12,89  -3,63  -11,49 -9,39  -2,10  2,63 
Spain  3,27 5,91 5,01 0,90 -3,73 -2,33 -1,40  1,08 
France  4,63 4,80 3,57 1,23 -1,48 -0,68 -0,80  1,31 
Italy 1,89  7,74  10,93  -3,20  -7,29 -5,19 -2,10  1,45 
Ireland -6,73  1,24  4,98  -3,75 -8,02 -1,89 -6,13  0,05 
Netherlands -0,88  2,97  5,41  -2,44 -3,49 -1,34 -2,15  -0,35 
Austria  2,42 4,57 0,00 0,54 -2,60 -1,14 -1,46  0,45 
Portugal 0,60  5,14  5,58  -0,44  -4,13 -2,48 -1,65  -0,41 
Finland  0,21 4,84 4,76 0,09 -3,09 -1,09 -2,00  -1,54 
Denmark -2,62 1,93  6,20 -4,27 -3,79 -1,14 -2,65  -0,76 
Sweden  0,78 6,49 6,43 0,06 -3,75 -1,69 -2,06  -1,96 
UK  1,56 5,43 3,41 2,02 -2,79 -1,25 -1,54  -1,08 
US -0,65  2,96  3,44  -0,48  -1,86 0,66 -2,51  -1,76 
Japan  6,34 4,51 1,28 3,23 -1,02 0,48 -1,50  2,85 
1997-1999 
Belgium -4,45  1,12 7,31  -6,19 -4,78 -1,52 -3,26  -0,79 
Germany 0,58 2,09 3,29 -1,20  -1,37 -0,24 -1,13  -0,15 
Greece  0,33  4,78  9,43 -4,65 -8,95 -5,35 -3,60  4,50 
Spain -1,72  2,41  4,10  -1,69 -4,23 -1,58 -2,65  0,10 
France 0,22  2,45  3,24  -0,79  -2,04 -0,37 -1,67  -0,19 
Italy -2,29  2,55  8,08  -5,52  -4,48 -2,49 -1,99  -0,37 
Ireland  -8,10 -2,03 3,19 -5,23 -8,47 -2,83 -5,64  2,40 
Netherlands -3,88  0,39  4,64  -4,25 -4,14 -1,41 -2,73  -0,13 
Austria -0,38  2,18  0,00  -1,44 -2,02 -0,20 -1,82  -0,54 
Portugal -2,86  3,05 3,45  -0,40 -4,19 -1,96 -2,23  -1,72 
Finland  -3,58 -0,69 3,56 -4,25 -3,66 -1,15 -2,51  0,77 
Denmark -3,93 -1,19 4,54 -5,74 -2,69 -1,04 -1,65  -0,04 
Sweden  -3,60 -1,07 5,39 -6,47 -3,10 -0,77 -2,33  0,58 
UK -2,44  0,34  3,38  -3,04  -2,77 -1,28 -1,49  -0,01 
US  -3,12 -0,16 3,02 -3,19 -1,81 1,23 -3,04  -1,14 
Japan  10,59  5,52 1,40 4,11 0,61 0,36 0,26  4,46 
2000-2005 
Belgium  -3,38 -0,08 5,61 -5,69 -3,83 -1,95 -1,88  0,53 
Germany 1,26 2,70 2,96 -0,26  -1,12 -0,42 -0,69  -0,32 
Greece  -0,80 5,17  6,16 -0,99 -8,41 -3,90 -4,51  2,44 
Spain -3,07  0,14  2,54  -2,40 -3,87 -2,11 -1,76  0,66 
France  1,49 2,84 2,84 0,01 -2,18 -1,08 -1,09  0,82 
Italy -1,23  3,02  5,51  -2,48  -4,05 -2,86 -1,19  -0,20 
Ireland  -3,41 -1,27 1,36 -2,63 -3,37 -1,40 -1,96  1,22 
Netherlands -1,26  0,94  2,89  -1,95 -2,32 -1,56 -0,76  0,12 
Austria -0,59  1,16  0,00  -2,08 -2,23 -1,09 -1,14  0,47 
Portugal  2,09 3,72 2,85 0,87 -2,21 -1,64 -0,57  0,57 
Finland  -0,92 -3,81 2,14 -5,94 -1,80 -0,63 -1,17  4,69 
Denmark -3,59 -2,42 2,88 -5,30 -1,96 -1,16 -0,80  0,79 
Sweden  -1,97 -1,87 2,75 -4,62 -2,16 -0,80 -1,36  2,06 
UK -0,23  1,21  2,25  -1,04  -1,92 -0,89 -1,03  0,48 
US  0,39 2,59 2,05 0,54 -1,34 0,34 -1,68  -0,86 
Japan  5,91 6,90 1,49 5,41 -0,37 2,06 -2,43  -0,61 
Notes: (1) Annual average change in the debt-to-DGP ratio (%);  
(2) Annual average change in the deficit-to-DGP ratio (%);  
(3) Annual average change in interest expenditure (% of GDP);  
(4) Annual average change in the primary balance-to-DGP ratio (%) (4)=(2)-(3);  
(5) Annual average effect of nominal GDP growth;  
(6) Annual average effect of inflation;  
(7) Annual average effect of real GDP growth (7) = (5) - (6);  
(8) Annual average stock-flow adjustment (8) = (1) - (2) - (5). 
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan.     
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Appendix 2.B   Unit Root Tests  
The comparison of developments in government gross debt over the last ten years (see 
figures below) reveals that debt growth has been entirely nominal in Belgium, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, and has been real in Germany, Greece, 
France, Austria, Portugal, UK, US and Japan. Both when measured in nominal and real 
terms, government gross debt appear to behave as integrated series in a majority of 
countries. As a matter of fact the usual unit root tests are not able to reject the null of 
unit root for both nominal and real debt.
13  
When debt levels are scaled by GDP a somewhat different picture emerges. After being 
on a rising path, the debt-to-GDP ratio attained a maximum in most countries around 
the mid-nineties and has been on a descendent path since them. The clearest exceptions 
appear to be Germany and France (and Japan). Yet, as shown in Table 2.11, the usual 
unit root tests, including that by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), where the null hypothesis is 
mean or trend stationary when the residuals are assumed to be AR(1)
14 fail to present 
unambiguous statistical evidence against the existence of a unit root in the debt-to-GDP 
ratios.  
Table 2.11  Unit Root Tests for Gross Debt Series in % of GDP, 1977-2005 










Belgium 0.60  0.37  -1.71  -2.88  -0.86 
Germany 1.46 0.10*  -2.04  -2.83  -8.77 
Greece 1.44  0.30  -0.63  0.25  0.64 
Spain 1.15  0.28  -1.27  -1.44  0.74 
France 1.50  0.14*  -1.46  -3.14°  -8.18 
Italy 1.28  0.32  -0.67  -1.39  -0.93 
Ireland 0.79  0.36  -1.33  -2.81  -2.53 
Netherlands 0.44*  0.37  -2.86  -3.18°°  -1.74 
Austria 1.36  0.33  -0.25  -0.64  -0.86 
Portugal 0.62  0.29  -1.65  -3.74°°  -4.74 
Finland 1.15  0.15*  -2.02  -2.21  -5.38 
Denmark 0.35* 0.29 -1.08 -2.35 -3.66 
Sweden 0.46*  0.19  -2.15  -2.70  -5.91 
UK 0.75  0.13*  -2.63  -3.08  -8.44 
US 0.83  0.33  -2.18  -2.29  -2.94 
Japan 1.32  0.31  -1.32  -3.25  -2.24 
Notes: (1) Test of Kwaikowski et al. (null hypothesis mean-stationary): critical value at 5%: 0.46. 
(2) Test of Kwaikowski et al. (null hypothesis trend-stationary): critical value at 5%: 0.15. 
(3) Weighted-symmetric (null hypothesis unit root). 
(4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller (null hypothesis unit root). 
(5) Phillips-Perron (null hypothesis unit root). 
* The null of mean/trend-stationary can be accepted at 5%. 
°°° The null unit root can be rejected at 1% (°° 5%, ° 10%). 
 
                                                 
13    Results available on request from the authors. 
14    The Barlett window, 1 – s/(l + 1), in the test is calculated for l=1 (then s=1).     
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Table 2.12 reports unit root test results for the primary surplus scaled by GDP with only 
marginally more consistent results across alternative tests. 
Table 2.12  Unit Root Tests for Gross Primary Surplus Series in % of GDP, 1977-
2005 










Belgium 1.30  0.23  -1.70  -1.20  -4.92 
Germany 0.19*  0.14* -2.48 -2.19 -12.6 
Greece 0.77  0.17  -1.74  -1.97  -6.95 
Spain 1.03  0.12*  -2.19  -3.94°°  -10.1 
France 0.08*  0.06*  -3.73°°°  -3.73°°  -10.5 
Italy 1.18  0.19  -1.10  -0.71  -3.02 
Ireland 0.94  0.28  -1.49  -1.30  -4.60 
Netherlands 0.54  0.12*  -3.11°°  -3.08  -11.1 
Austria 0.64  0.06*  -2.77  -2.47  -12.7 
Portugal 0.48  0.28  -1.30  -0.75  -4.76 
Finland 0.14*  0.14*  -2.13  -1.92  -8.76 
Denmark 0.34* 0.16 -2.47 -2.48 -7.83 
Sweden 0.11*  0.08*  -3.56°°  -3.22°  9.69 
UK 0.11*  0.07*  -3.76°°°  -3.37°°  -9.22 
US 0.24*  0.12*  -3.36  -3.22°°  -7.07° 
Japan 0.70  0.30  -2.02  -2.35  -3.84 
Notes: (1) Test of Kwaikowski et al. (null hypothesis mean-stationary).Critical value at 5%: 0.46. 
(2) Test of Kwaikowski et al. (null hypothesis trend-stationary). Critical value at 5%: 0.15. 
(3) Weighted-symmetric (null hypothesis unit root). 
(4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller (null hypothesis unit root). 
(5) Phillips-Perron (null hypothesis unit root). 
* The null of mean/trend-stationary can be accepted at 5%. 
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Chapter 2 estimates fiscal reaction functions for EU member countries over 1977-2005 to 
assess the sustainability of fiscal policy. Specifically, the chapter tests the consistency of 
fiscal policy with solvency as defined by the “no-Ponzi game” condition. The authors find 
that a necessary condition for solvency ⎯  i.e. that the primary balance improve in 
response to an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio ⎯ is met in most countries (the more so 
after Maastricht). From this they derive strong policy implications. They argue that “if the 
concern is government solvency [debt ceilings] impose unnecessary constraint on fiscal 
policy” and “if sustainability is the issue, there is no clear reason for concern [in the 
EU]”.  
The chapter clearly defines the analytical issues. The econometric analysis is accurate. 
The results appear to be robust. However, some caution is warranted in deriving the 
policy implications.  
The no-Ponzi game condition is a weak requirement. It requires that the debt-to-GDP 
ratio grows at a rate lower than the difference between the interest rate and the growth 
rate (McCallum, 1984). It is consistent with an ever growing debt ratio, a situation that 
most analysts would not regard as sustainable.  
Moreover, while the chapter finds that the response of the primary balance to the debt 
ratio was positive in most EU countries over 1977-2005, this does not allow a 
straightforward extrapolation of this behaviour in the future. A growing debt ratio calls 
for a growing primary surplus, but what is the maximum sustainable primary surplus? 
Whether a given fiscal policy is or is not sustainable ultimately depends on its effects on 
macro parameters such as the rate of interest and the rate of growth. “[T]he issue [...] is 
how interest service will affect the economy” (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984, p. 689), 
and “the problem of the debt burden is a problem of an expanding national income...” 
(Domar, 1944, p. 166). 
Policy implications aside, the reading of econometric results in the chapter would benefit 
from further discussion of some issues. For instance, those concerning the “power” of the 
tests conducted in the chapter, and the role of the cyclicality of fiscal policy in 
determining debt dynamics.  
The solvency test conducted in the chapter cannot identify policies that are inconsistent 
with solvency. A positive response of the primary balance to the debt ratio is a sufficient 
condition for solvency, but it is not necessary. A policy characterised by a negligible or 
even negative response of the primary balance to the debt ratio could still be consistent 
with solvency (and sustainability). This may explain, for instance, why a country like 
Finland, whose debt-to-GDP ratio has never exceeded 57 percent over the sample period 
fails to pass the solvency test in Section 2.4.     
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The estimated fiscal reaction functions indicate a very low sensitivity of the primary 
surplus to cyclical conditions (as measured by the output gap). As noted by the authors, 
this suggests that pro-cyclical discretionary policy is offsetting the operation of automatic 
stabilizers. There is evidence that such offsetting is asymmetric ⎯ i.e. that it mainly 
occurs during upturns ⎯ thereby introducing a ratchet-effect on debt dynamics, with 
significant implication for sustainability (Balassone and Francese, 2004).  
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3.   
 





3.1 Introduction   
Europe is undergoing two major transitions – demographic and economic. First, the 
populations of many European countries are aging rapidly as their baby-boom generations 
approach and enter retirement, human longevity continues to increase, and fertility rates 
remain well below replacement. Second, thirteen European countries have joined in a 
monetary union (EMU) by adopting the euro as a common currency, and more countries 
are to join the EMU during the next few years. The objective of monetary union is to 
eliminate exchange rate risks and streamline product pricing and price comparisons of 
similar goods and services across member nations to induce greater competitive 
efficiencies. Entering a monetary union implies surrendering control over monetary 
policymaking, but all current and prospective EMU nations would largely retain 
sovereignty in setting fiscal policies – except for the loose overall constraints set under 
the latest Maastricht agreement.  
Both transitions will place tremendous but conflicting pressures on Member States’ 
domestic national budgets. Decision makers will face growing demands to increase public 
expenditures and fulfil promises of retirement and health care benefits to retirees 
precisely when growth in labour forces and tax bases slows. That points toward larger 
future fiscal deficits and growing debt levels. At the same time, policymakers will face 
growing pressures from the “EMU club” to maintain low deficits, prevent increases in 
interest rates, and maintain European investment levels. Exercising proper economic 
stewardship during these twin transitions will become more difficult if policymakers 
remain poorly informed about the likely consequences of making alternative policy 
choices.  
To streamline the process of monetary union, prospective EMU member countries 
adopted the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997 (SGP-97). Along with the Treaty of the 
European Union, SGP-97 provided the framework of rules for coordinating fiscal policies 
across EMU members – both current and prospective ones. It was generally accepted that 
without such coordination, member states would have stronger incentives to follow 
“short-sighted” fiscal policies causing chronic budget deficits and higher debt-to-GDP 
ratios. If carried too far, such policies would erode the European Central Bank’s ability to 
                                                 
*   The author thanks Alan Auerbach, Martin Larch, João Nogueira Martins, William Niskanen and 
Peter Vandoren for helpful discussions during the preparation of this manuscript and Joanne Fung 
for excellent research assistance. Use of data from Eurostat and the UK’s Economic and Social Data 
Service is hereby acknowledged. All opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not 
necessarily those of the Cato Institute.     
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maintain the euro’s purchasing power. If high deficits ultimately cause faster inflation, it 
would only neutralize the advantages of establishing a monetary union. 
Beginning in 2002, however, the SGP-97’s deficit and debt constraints and its preventive 
and corrective mechanisms proved unacceptable.
15 SGP-97 called for corrective fiscal 
policies to be adopted if a breach of deficits or debt limits appeared imminent regardless 
of the Member State’s position in the business cycle and potential for GDP growth. A 
revised Stability and Growth Pact has now been in effect since March 2005 (SGP-05). It 
incorporates constraints and objectives (time paths of future deficits and debt) tailored to 
each member country’s economic conditions.  
The revised agreement introduces greater flexibility in implementing the SGP’s 
constraints and allows implementation of preventive and corrective mechanisms to be 
deferred in case a member country faces temporary economic difficulties. Some 
observers claim, however, that although SGP-05 continues to define constraints in terms 
of traditional deficit and debt-to-GDP levels, it really represents an abandonment of the 
original objectives underlying those constraints (Feldstein, 2005 and Wierts et al., 2006) 
of preventing excessive discretion in fiscal policies. If correct, this would constitute good 
news. This chapter’s thesis is that traditional fiscal measures – annual deficits and debt-
to-GDP levels – are both potentially misleading indicators of a country’s fiscal stance.  
The SGP-05 also calls for the development of long-term fiscal indicators for policy 
surveillance of Member States. This effort should consider recently developed fiscal 
measures that are theoretically sound and policy relevant. They would better inform EU 
policymakers of the condition of each Member State’s current fiscal stance and provide a 
basis for an apples-to-apples comparison of the policy options and trade-offs that each 
country faces. The bad news is that many member countries and EMU policymaking 
bodies appear to be a long way from developing appropriate long-term fiscal accounting 
measures and from developing a consensus on whether they should be part of formal 
preventive mechanisms.  
This chapter first addresses issues relating to the proper accounting and reporting of the 
government’s net prospective payment obligations. It compares alternative long-term 
measures of a country’s fiscal stance and discusses their theoretical soundness, 
applicability to budget reporting, and ability to reveal information about the true 
economic choices that policymakers face. Four types of measures are considered -- 
traditional deficit and debt measures, accrual accounting measures and two measures 
based on actuarial accounting. The latter include generational accounting and fiscal and 
generational imbalance measures.  
The chapter argues for the adoption of fiscal and generational imbalance measures by 
integrating these measures into existing country budget reports. It provides brief 
examples of how fiscal and generational imbalance measures could help policymakers to 
define the feasible set of policy choices and the trade-offs involved in selecting from 
among them.  
                                                 
15   The deficit constraint requires each Member State to maintain annual deficits at 3 percent of GDP or 
less. Each member state is also required to maintain a total debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent or less.  
These constraints were specified in the original Maastricht treaty of the European Union.      
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This chapter also attempts to quantify the size of the long-term fiscal challenges 
confronting EU countries by reporting estimates of fiscal imbalances (FI) for 23 EU 
countries. The FI estimates suggest sizable gaps between the fiscal shortfalls reported 
under traditional backward-looking debt and deficit measures and those implied by 
forward-looking fiscal imbalance measures.  
The chapter concludes by suggesting that European countries need to undertake a third 
transition – to step back from the current broad provision of social insurance programs 
and allow greater scope for individual determination and private provision of these 
services. Introducing this important element in structural reforms by encouraging 
significant reductions in public spending commitments appears to be the only 
economically feasible way of addressing future fiscal challenges. The alternative of 
increasing taxes and imposing additional regulatory restrictions on member countries to 
preserve the status quo in social protection programs is likely to prove counterproductive.  
3.2 Unfunded  Obligation  Measures 
Concern about fiscal sustainability arising out of the current demographic structure in 
developed countries has spurred interest in developing forward-looking measures of fiscal 
policy. Several alternatives exist for depicting the future course of federal budget 
balances. The first and most obvious measure is a projection of future total government 
revenues, expenditures and the annual gaps between the two. Although future projections 
of this type are reported in the official budgets of many countries, the projections are 
usually limited to the next 5 or 10 years. For example, the annual budget reports of the 
UK Treasury (HM Treasury, 2006) adopt a 5-year time horizon – with the horizon 
advancing by 1 year every year. The same is true of the official budget reports of many 
other EU countries.
16  
Given the obvious inadequacy of such short-term budget projections for designing long-
term policy reforms, several measures have been proposed by budget practitioners and 
academic economists. They include (i) simply extending the time horizon of traditional 
deficit and debt measures, (ii) accrual accounting, (iii) generational accounting, and (iv) 
fiscal and generational imbalances. This section provides a discussion of their strengths 
and weaknesses. 
Traditional Measures – Government Deficits and Debt  
Traditional short-term deficit and debt measures of the national fiscal stance are grounded 
in Keynesian macroeconomic theory that considers the gap between revenues and 
expenditures as providing a fiscal impulse that could be calibrated for macroeconomic 
stabilization over business cycle time horizons. Given the need for greater spending on 
welfare programs during economic downturns and the wide prevalence of progressive 
income taxation, annual budget deficits naturally move countercyclically. Discretionary 
elements of revenues and expenditures could be used, however, to enhance these 
countercyclical movements to yield even larger macroeconomic impulses to dampen 
business cycles and stabilize the pace of economic activity and growth. A large and 
                                                 
16   See federal budget reports, for example, of Denmark National Bank (2005), General Administration 
of the Treasury of Belgium (2005), Ministry of Finance, Sweden (2005), and several other EU 
countries.      
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growing literature has attempted to measure the economic impulses from discretionary 
fiscal policy using annual deficits as the key measure of fiscal impulses provided by 
government policies (Galí and Perotti, 2003; Alesina and Perotti, 1995).  
Fiscal policymakers and budget practitioners have an abiding interest in maintaining these 
definitions and tools for exercising short-term operational control over government 
budgets. Hence, if short-horizon fiscal measures prove inadequate for analyzing long-
term fiscal sustainability and structural reform issues, the simplest solution is to extend 
the time horizon over which traditional deficits and debt are projected. One proposal is to 
project and report government revenues, expenditures, and surpluses/deficits over the 
next 50 or 75 years under alternative economic and demographic assumptions. These 
measures can be calculated for both the general government as a whole and for 
subprograms that are financed out of dedicated revenues—such as retirement and health 
programs. 
Accrual Accounting Measures 
For most EU countries, future outlay increases on retirement and health benefits are 
already built into fiscal systems, and they imply growing annual deficits. Hence, the 
evaluation of a country’s fiscal stance should explicitly recognize those costs as 
additional debt owed by the government. One way of doing so is to adopt accrual 
accounting, which would include a summary measure of future payment obligations net 
of assets accrued from past transactions – called “unfunded accrued obligations.” Accrual 
accounting considers the government’s financial obligations and assets that have been 
“earned” or “booked” based on events that have occurred through the current period 
whether or not the funds associated with those events have been paid or received as yet.  
In the context of government finances, there could be considerable uncertainty and 
controversy about what constitutes an obligation-triggering event. A common example is 
that of public pension programs that link benefits payable in the future to current or past 
labour force participation, earnings, or tax payments. However, when social transfers 
scheduled under today’s laws may be altered by changing those laws, it remains unclear 
whether past employment, tax payments, or other such events are by themselves 
sufficient to trigger future benefits and, therefore, whether those events justify inclusion 
in “unfunded accrued obligations” on a par with contractual (deeded) debt owed by the 
government. 
This problem could be resolved by distinguishing the information provision role of 
budget measures from the liability recognition function that is usually associated with 
budget accounting and reporting. Fulfilling the former need not imply the latter, and this 
difference should be made transparent. The objective under the former is to characterize 
the stance of current fiscal policy without implying any additional recognition of 
liabilities that are on a par with outstanding explicit debt.  
Hence, as a “budget measure,” the inclusion of accrued obligations in accounting for the 
government’s financial condition would reflect the future implications of existing 
policies. Under this assumption, if maintaining current policies would result in future 
transfers based on past triggering events, those accruals should be included in measuring 
the government’s total financial obligations under current laws. Similarly, events that 
would trigger larger future government receipts under today’s policies would increase the 
government’s total accrued assets.      
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The liabilities created by some government programs may already be evaluated under 
accrual accounting – for example, the budget costs of loans and loan guarantees, 
insurance and underwriting costs, and so on. Several developed countries have adopted 
accrual accounting for their government budgets although only a couple of them have 
adopted such accounting comprehensively (New Zealand and Sweden).
17 Accrual 
accounting could be broadly applied to public pension and other programs that imply 
future government net payment obligations but are excluded from traditional debt and 
deficit measures. 
Generational Accounting 
Generational accounting reorganizes government budget information and implements 
actuarial estimates of the lifetime fiscal treatment of current and future generations 
(Auerbach et al., 1991, 1994). Each generation’s resources include those it earns, inherits, 
and receives from the government as transfer payments net of taxes. Generational 
accounting calculates the last of these three elements on a prospective basis for each 
living generation. It also calculates the generational account for future generations based 
on the government’s overall budget constraint – which specifies that the government must 
pay for all the public goods and services it provides. As such, generational accounting 
helps to assess the government’s net financial commitments to current generations under 
current fiscal policies and, by implication, the net fiscal burden those policies would place 
on future generations.
18  
Generational accounting employs an ex post perspective in analyzing the long-term 
sustainability of current fiscal policy. Allowing PV_Pc to represent the present value of 
total government purchases of future public goods under current policies (subscripted by 
c), PV_Lc to represent the total present value of prospective lifetime net tax payments (tax 
payments minus transfer receipts) by living generations under current policies, PV_Fh to 
represent the total lifetime net taxes of future-born generations under a hypothetical 
policy (subscripted by h) for achieving budget balance, and NWc to represent the 
government’s current financial net wealth, the government’s ex post intertemporal budget 
constraint could be specified as  
PV_Pc ≡ NWc + PV_Lc + PV_Fh .       ( 3 . 1 )  
Equation (3.1) says that making future net payments to current generations under current 
policies and assuming that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is balanced – 
as it must be ex post – reveals, by construction, the hypothetical net payments required for 
future generations. Note that the objective of this exercise is to discover the total 
                                                 
17   For example, New Zealand applies accrual accounting to its budget process and fiscal management, 
adhering to the standard principles of generally accepted accounting practice (Richardson, 1996); 
Canadian provincial governments shifted from cash to accrual accounting methods during the 1980s 
(Hillier, 1996); Germany’s Länder have instituted pilot programs to explore new budget accounting 
conventions including accrual based budgeting (Lüder, 2002); Sweden has introduced accrual 
accounting and reporting without extending the same to its appropriations process (Swedish National 
Financial Authority, 2001); the United Kingdom adopts accrual accounting for government agencies 
and is extending such accounting to broader government operations in stages (International 
Federation of Accountants, 1995). Recent changes introduced by the Government Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) require state governments in the United States to report “other post-
employment benefits” (which include health care benefits) under accrual accounting. 
18   Ricardian motives that effectively extend the time horizon beyond one’s own lifetime are found to be 
empirically inoperative—at least in the case of the United States.      
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hypothetical payment that must be imposed on future generations as a whole to deliver ex 
post budget balance.
19 
Imposing existing fiscal policies on current newborns throughout their lifetimes yields 
their generational account. Its ratio to the present value of their lifetime earnings, where 
earnings are projected using an assumed rate of productivity growth, yields a lifetime net 
tax rate for current newborns. Imposing the (hypothetical) residual unfunded obligation, 
PV_Fh, exclusively on future generations (assuming an equal productivity-growth-
adjusted distribution per capita of the total hypothetical burden across all future 
generations) implies a hypothetical lifetime net tax rate on those generations – again 
under the assumed rate of labor productivity growth and labor earnings.  
Current fiscal policy is considered to be balanced and sustainable if, given (i) government 
spending commitment, PV_Pc, (ii) government net financial assets, NWc, and (iii) lifetime 
net tax rates estimated under current fiscal policies for today’s newborns (based on their 
net payments under current policies), the hypothetical total payment from future 
generations,  PV_Fh (that balances the government’s intertemporal budget constraint 
specified in equation 3.1) implies the same lifetime net tax rate for future generations.
20 
Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 
Fiscal and generational imbalance measures are an offshoot of generational accounting. 
They are designed to parsimoniously capture the most important elements of generational 
accounting with an eye toward simplicity and policy relevance. The fiscal imbalance 
measure is the present value of government financial shortfalls projected to occur 
throughout the future under the assumption that current policies remain unchanged. 
However, unlike generational accounting’s distinction between the fiscal treatment of 
living and future generations, the FI measure projects all (including future) generations’ 
net payments under current policies. In other words, it views the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint from a “current policy” (ex ante) perspective. Although 
the government’s budget (equation (3.1)) would remain unbalanced under such a fiscal 
treatment of future generations, that is precisely the point of the calculation – to measure 
the size of the total imbalance built into current fiscal policies. 
The FI measure equals the present value of prospective lifetime net payments (taxes 
minus transfers) to living and future generations plus the present value of projected 
government purchases and minus the government’s current net financial assets. Thus, 
FI = PV_Pc – PV_Lc – PV_Fc – NWc       (3.2) 
Because it is the government’s budget choices that are being evaluated, present values are 
calculated using the government’s opportunity cost of funds – the interest rate expected to 
prevail on the longest-term government bonds. 
FI measures can also be calculated for government subprograms that exclusively provide 
transfers to private individuals (old-age retirement benefits, for example) and are financed 
out of dedicated revenues (a payroll tax, for example). The revenues and expenditures of 
such programs are attributable to particular generations.  
                                                 
19   Present values are calculated by using an interest rate reflecting private agents’ (average) opportunity 
cost of investment. 
20   Technical details about generational accounting methods are available in Gokhale et al. (1997).     
  65
FIs = PV_Ls,c – PV_Fs,c – NWs , c       (3.3)  
Here, the subscript s indicates a generic “social security” program that conforms to the 
financing conditions described above.  
Generational imbalance (GI) measures the contribution of past and living generations to 
FI. The motivation for the GI measure is the same as that for generational accounting—to 
analyze the intergenerational redistribution of resources that current fiscal policies would 
bring about if they were maintained throughout the lifetimes of current generations. GI 
represents the simplest decomposition of FI. It is alternatively called the “closed-group 
unfunded obligation” where the term “closed-group” refers to past and living generations. 
That is, GI is derived by subtracting the government’s total unfunded obligations under 
current policies on account of future generations from FI.
21 However, whereas FI can be 
calculated for the entire government and for subprograms having the features described 
earlier, the GI measure can be easily calculated only for such subprograms.
22  
The significance and policy relevance of GI measures are not well appreciated, even 
among budget practitioners. Many believe that GI is similar to the unfunded accrued 
obligation concept and is relevant only to “fully funded” pension programs – such as 
those offered by private employers.
23 However, the GI measure is also relevant and useful 
within the context of a “pay-as-you-go” public pension system. It indicates the amount of 
total outstanding obligations arising under current policies on account of past and living 
generations. Obligations arising from past generations’ transactions with the government 
and from the past transactions of living generations are incorporated in the government’s 
accumulated net financial assets. Also included in GI are future net payment obligations 
under current policies triggered by past transactions involving living generations and 
future payment obligations that would be triggered under current policies by future events 
involving living generations. 
The size of GI reveals the amount of benefits living generations may, under current 
policies, expect to receive from a government program in excess of their past and future 
expected taxes or contributions toward funding them. This measure remains policy-
relevant because it represents a net (expected) wealth gain for living generations. Not 
only are such fiscal-policy-induced wealth gains directly policy-relevant, they also hold 
the potential to influence those generations’ economic choices – their consumption and 
labor force participation. Hence, analyzing the potential behavioral implications of the 
current fiscal stance requires a measure of the public provision of net benefits to living 
                                                 
21   The FI and GI concepts correspond to the accounting concepts of open-group and closed-group 
unfunded obligations, respectively.  The open-group unfunded obligation refers to government 
obligations to all individuals regardless of their cohort affiliation (that is, their birth dates) – whether 
in the past or in the (infinite) future.  Limited-horizon open-group obligations are also calculated by 
excluding the net obligations arising after a specific (future) date.  Closed-group obligation measures 
include the net obligations to a subset of individuals – for example, those born before a certain date.  
However, all past net payments and future net obligations to such individuals are included in the 
calculation 
22    Calculating GI for the entire government would require making strong assumptions about the 
intergenerational distribution of benefits from government public goods and services provision – 
such as defense, international diplomacy, domestic security, judicial services, and so on.  
23   Private sector firms that offer pension benefits to employees may be subject to regulations about 
funding adequacy. That requires measurement of existing funding levels for comparison with 
regulated thresholds, and accrual accounting is normally used to provide the benchmark for 100 
percent funding.     
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generations. Note that this measure is also forward-looking – and fundamentally different 
from the traditional backward-looking debt and deficit measures. 
3.3 Evaluating  Unfunded  Obligation  Measures 
Long-term Projections of Revenues, Expenditures, and Annual Deficits 
Time series of annual budget cash flow projections – revenues, expenditures, deficits, and 
debt – have some advantages but also have a few shortcomings: Their advantage lies in 
clearly exhibiting the time profile of future revenue shortfalls given projected 
discretionary and aging-related spending. Such projections are useful for showing how 
quickly large financial shortfalls are likely to emerge under current policies. For example, 
Figure 3.1 shows a nominal revenue time series and two alternative nominal expenditure 
time series. Under the Expenditures-I alternative, moderate deficits accrue during the first 
decade and then rise rapidly as a result of aging-related expenses. Under the Expenditure-
II alternative, however, the gap between revenues and expenditures is very small during 
the first ten years, but it expands more rapidly thereafter compared to the Expenditure-I 
alternative. The difference in the timing and accrual rates of aging-related deficits 
constitutes useful and policy-relevant information. 
One obvious shortcoming of such time profiles of nominal revenues, expenditures, and 
deficits is that they do not place current and future dollars on a level playing field. 
Although future nominal deficits appear to be larger, their real values may not be as large 
if projected inflation plus real interest rates are high. 







2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055
Percent of GDP
Expenditures - I Receipts
Expenditures - II
 
Second, nominal deficits and debt levels do not appear to hold significant and stable 
relationships with other economic variables of interest—namely, interest rates, currency 
values, inflation, productivity growth, etc. Hence, strict fiscal rules based on deficits and 
debt may not be sufficient to ensure fiscal stability and long-term sustainability. Third,     
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some countries could follow policies that maintain or even reduce explicit deficits and 
debt levels while simultaneously increasing prospective deficits (the so-called “one-off” 
measures). Such policies would alter the timing of deficit accruals but are unlikely to be 
associated with any measurable regularity in real fiscal impulses. 
The reason for drawing such a conclusion is that a particular time series of government 
net cash flows may be associated with myriad ways of arranging the sizes and timing of 
different taxes and expenditures – each of which may generate different expectations 
among the public about whether they are temporary or permanent, and each of which 
could be associated with different distributions of fiscal burdens among private agents 
situated differently in their life-cycle stages. Hence, a particular time series of deficits and 
debt may be associated with wildly different real underlying fiscal policies – that is, a 
given time series may be associated with different real flows and distributions of 
consumption, saving, investment, and output, and different levels of real interest rates, 
inflation, and exchange rates. These differences in real economic outcomes would emerge 
primarily because each distinct policy would exert differential effects on different 
subgroups of individuals—distinguished, especially, with regard to their life-cycle stage.
24 
To provide a simple example, consider a strictly pay-as-you-go expansion of a public 
pension program. Retiree benefits are increased immediately and permanently by €X each 
year and those increases are financed by additional receipts of €X each year sourced from 
workers’ payrolls. Figure 3.2 shows stylized profiles of public pension benefits and wage 
earnings by age. Those profiles show that the policy of pay-as-you-go pension increases 
would benefit older generations and the payroll tax increases would impose additional 
financial burdens on younger workers. By construction, however, there would be no 
change in the time series of the projected difference between total annual receipts and 
outlays as a result of this policy change. 
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24   For a related discussion see Gokhale (2004).      
  68
One could argue that showing the government’s future funding shortfall in terms of total 
receipt and outlay time series would capture such a policy change as an upward shift in 
both series. However, other policies could be implemented that would maintain both the 
projected levels of revenues and expenditures and the gap between them (annual deficits), 
yet exert real economic effects by redistributing resource across generations. Consider 
Figure 3.3, which shows stylized profiles by age of payroll tax and consumption tax 
payments. Because the consumption tax profile is flatter and extends across older 
individuals, a permanent pay-as-you-go structural tax change – that is, an annually 
revenue-neutral switch from consumption to labour income taxes – time would 
accomplish a sizable redistribution of tax burdens and wealth across generations. 














As in the case of the pay-as-you-go expansion of public pensions, this policy also 
provides a windfall benefit to current older generations but reduces the lifetime resources 
of younger and future generations.
25 However, such a policy change would be invisible to 
Figure 3.1’s fiscal measure – the time series of projected revenues, expenditures, and 
deficits. If propensities to consume out of resources of older generations are different 
(say, higher) than those of younger generations, permanent redistributive policy changes 
of this type would very likely exert real economic effects – affecting saving, capital 
formation, interest rates, and eventually inflation and exchange rates. 
The above discussion suggests that when policymakers enact diverse fiscal changes 
designed to alter the time profiles of expenditures and revenues to reduce short-term 
deficits, only some of those policies may be reflected in traditional cash-flow measures 
                                                 
25   Generally, a reduction of consumption taxes would make all existing assets more valuable because 
the consumption financed through their sale would now face a lower tax rate. Much of the immediate 
increase in asset values arising from this policy would benefit existing older generations who hold 
most of the country’s wealth.      
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such as deficit and debt levels, or time series of total expenditure and revenue levels as 
shown in Figure 3.1. The net result of such policies may be larger or smaller deficits and 
debt levels over time, but also erosions or increases in national saving and capital 
formation independent of the impact on short- and long-term deficits and debt levels. 
Because Figure 3.1 does not fully reflect the impact of all policy changes, it remains a 
poor guide for decision makers and should be complemented with additional information. 
In the words of Auerbach and Kotlikoff, “…conventional deficit measures may cause 




As mentioned earlier, accrual accounting “books” obligations and assets based on 
triggering events through the current period. Since the objective of accrual accounting for 
the budget would be to characterize current policy, future benefits based on past births, 
labor force participation, earnings, and tax payments (as is common in the case of public 
pensions) should be counted among government obligations. Even in the case of health 
care benefits, future payments based on projected cost growth may be included to get a 
fuller estimate of the government’s financial obligations under current policies.  
Proposals to adopt accrual accounting for measuring the government’s intertemporal 
budget balance are generally motivated by the attractive symmetry of applying the same 
accounting rules to the government as are applied to private companies when evaluating 
their pension and other obligations. However, the government as an economic entity is 
sufficiently different from private entities to warrant a different accounting standard. In 
particular, private entities can potentially fail and terminate at any time, whereas the 
government is infinitely lived, at least in principle. Moreover, unlike private entities, 
governments possess the sovereign power to levy taxes.  
The purpose of accrual accounting for private firms is to reveal the extent of funds that 
must be set aside to meet contractual deferred liabilities – pensions and health coverage 
for retired employees, etc. Most such liabilities are created from past employee 
performance and are measurable because they are determined by applying explicit benefit 
formulas. In contrast, the objective of long-term government budget accounting is to 
evaluate the sustainability of current tax and spending rules – not to evaluate total 
liabilities if the “government fails.” Given its power to levy taxes, the government need 
not necessarily set funds aside each time it enacts laws that create additional future 
payment obligations. Applying accrual accounting to government liabilities could, 
therefore, create the impression that the government’s future obligations to pay pension, 
health, and welfare benefits somehow are contractual obligations – or liabilities – that can 
never be reduced.
27 
                                                 
26   See Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). They make the case that deficits and national debt are not 
theoretically well grounded fiscal concepts and that their values over time reflect little more than the 
particular accounting conventions used for labeling different government transactions as taxes and 
transfers versus loans and repayments of principal plus interest.  These arguments are amplified in 
Kotlikoff (1989). 
27   Discussions about federal financial reporting standards in the United States go into great detail about 
precisely defining liability recognition criteria and the nature of events that trigger a recognizable 
federal liability.  Such discussions are obviously driven by concerns that if the reporting standards 
were to adopt broader definitions of triggering events and liability recognition criteria, the public     
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Moreover, accrual accounting measures are also (partially) backward looking because 
they include only those future fiscal flows (taxes and transfers) that would result from 
past triggering events. Given that governments are infinitely lived in principle, however, 
it does not appear legitimate to ignore future obligation-triggering events – labor force 
participation, earnings, tax-payments, etc. – if current policies are continued.
28 Indeed, if 
accrued net obligations are positive but continuing current fiscal policies would generate 
net future receipts, reporting accrued net obligations would indicate a large positive net 
liability position even though current policies may be sustainable. 
Generational Accounting 
Generational accounting’s actuarial (as opposed to accrual) approach includes an 
evaluation of future government obligations and resources triggered by future obligating 
events. This method provides a comprehensive perspective for evaluating current fiscal 
policy. However, its ex post perspective on the government intertemporal budget 
constraint implies that concepts associated with generational accounting such as 
“generational balance” involve subtle thought experiments that are difficult to 
communicate. Those experiments involve hypothetical and nonimplementable policies – 
of treating all future-born generations differently compared to the treatment of living 
generations under existing fiscal policies. In addition, generational accounts are 
calculated from the perspective of private individuals rather than of the government’s 
financial constraint. That makes generational accounts difficult to integrate with existing 
budget reports, which usually include short-term projected annual aggregate cash flows 
(revenues, expenditures, and budget deficits) and total outstanding net debt. 
Generational accounts are calculated and used as complementary indicators of fiscal 
policy in several countries. They are reported in considerable detail in most generational 
accounting studies – for individual age-sex cohorts (Auerbach et al., 1999). Generational 
accounting also reports the generational lifetime fiscal burdens that would prevail under 
policy adjustments for achieving a sustainable fiscal policy. Alternatively, it reports the 
“menu of pain” – policy changes that would be required to restore sustainability. 
However, the key information about the sustainability of current policies often becomes 
obscured by the focus (and often confusion) associated with the multiplicity of numbers 
included in most generational accounting reports.
29  
Fiscal and Generational Imbalances 
Fiscal Imbalance. The FI measure assumes continuation of current policy (including 
scheduled future changes in current laws) throughout the future. Thus it involves no 
complicated thought experiments or hypothetical future policies. It provides a summary 
measure of total budget shortfalls – the sum of accrued shortfalls to date and prospective 
                                                                                                                                               
might come to view those liabilities as contractual and immutable rather than simply legal—that is, 
based on the laws prevailing when the payment comes due (which may be different in the future 
relative to current laws).  For example, see Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (2004).  
28   Including the obligations from future triggering events would convert the accrued obligation measure 
into the “closed-group unfunded obligation” measure.  See Gokhale and Smetters (2003) for details.  
29   For example, generational accounts are supposed to represent each cohort’s lifetime net fiscal burden 
under current policies.  However, when the meta-message is that current policies are not sustainable, 
the value of focusing on the accounts as reported becomes diluted.  Generational accounts have been 
subject to several other criticisms in the fiscal policy literature. See Cutler (1993), Diamond (1996), 
and Haveman (1994).     
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shortfalls under current policy evaluated without a time limit. It is a comprehensive 
measure of the government’s fiscal position because it spans the entire future without 
limit and includes the totality of government’s operations. The FI measure is also easy to 
communicate: It is the amount of additional resources that the government must have on 
hand today, invested at interest, in order to continue current policies indefinitely. 
Alternatively, FI equals the additional amount of net receipts or cost savings that the 
government must obtain through future policy adjustments.
30 
Many practitioners express doubts about calculating and reporting fiscal imbalances 
through the infinite future. Their main objection is that future projections are uncertain 
and the degree of uncertainty increases the further forward budget projections are carried. 
Hence, most agencies that report FI base them on projections truncated after 25, 50, or 75 
years into the future.
31 Although these objections appear valid, arguments favoring 
infinite-horizon calculations seem to be stronger. First, setting any specific limit on the 
projection horizon implies, at best, the assumption that the government budget is in 
balance beyond that horizon. However, if current policies would result in large 
imbalances persisting beyond the projection horizon, truncating the horizon would be 
equivalent to ignoring future uncertainty – exactly the opposite of most recommendations 
about how to deal with future uncertainty. A better approach would be to report those 
imbalances under the best available economic assumptions and projections in addition to 
the imbalances calculated under a truncated projection horizon.  
Second, truncating the horizon usually leads to the “rolling-window” problem. Reforms 
implemented to achieve budget balance through a predetermined time horizon would be 
thrown off balance by the mere passage of time and relatively quickly.
32 If future 
imbalances are large and growing – as is likely to be the case in countries with rapidly 
aging populations – it would necessitate repeated reforms to pull the government’s 
finances back into balance to avoid escalating fiscal deficits.  
The most important but often least appreciated reason for adopting infinite-horizon 
calculations is that truncated budget projections would introduce a bias in policymaking. 
The bias can be described using a simple example of a reform proposal to establish 
“social security” personal accounts. Suppose such accounts were created by diverting a 
portion of existing wage taxes (assumed to be dedicated to the program) for investment in 
private securities. In exchange for allowing individuals to invest a part of their payroll 
taxes in personal accounts, they would have to agree to actuarially fair reductions in their 
future social security benefits. “Actuarially fair” means that for every euro of payroll 
taxes deposited in personal accounts, future benefits worth one euro in present value 
would be surrendered, where present values would be calculated using the government’s 
long-term borrowing rate and average mortality factors. 
                                                 
30    Finally, unlike traditional measures of deficits and debt, this measure is not subject to change 
because of the way certain government receipts and outlays are labeled – as taxes and transfers, 
respectively, or borrowing and repayment of principal with interest, respectively.  
31   However, both the Social Security and Medicare Trustees in the United States have been reporting 
infinite-horizon measures of those programs’ financial shortfalls – precisely the “fiscal imbalance” 
measure.  They also report “generational imbalances” for both programs. The 2003 Technical 
Advisory Panel that makes recommendations to the Trustees of Social Security and Medicare has 
endorsed both measures as providing useful additional information.  
32   This is a well-recognized phenomenon in the context of U.S. Social Security program which was 
reformed in 1983 to achieve balance through 2058. Now, however, the program faces a sizable 75-
year shortfall because the new horizon includes financial shortfalls between 1959 and 2080.      
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Under such a reform, the government’s financial position is clearly unchanged – the loss 
in tax revenues is exactly matched in present value by a reduction in future benefit 
commitments. However, if a truncated estimate of government’s fiscal imbalance were 
used, it would show a worsening in the government’s financial position: Revenue losses 
during the short term would be counted when evaluating the government’s position, but 
reductions in benefit payments accruing beyond the truncated horizon would be excluded. 
Hence, a truncated calculation of fiscal imbalance would bias policymakers toward 
rejecting a personal accounts reform of public pensions even though it would leave the 
government’s true financial position unchanged.  
This example could be carried one step further. If the public pension system is initially 
financially unsustainable, it could be improved through the reform described earlier: The 
government could offer a personal accounts reform wherein future benefits are reduced 
by more than dollar-for-dollar in present value. Some individuals may agree to the 
exchange of smaller future benefits for personal accounts that they would own and 
control. Implementing such an exchange would imply a larger reduction in future 
government outlay commitments compared to the immediate reduction in wage tax 
receipts. However, again, the reduced revenues in the short term would be included under 
a truncated projection horizon, but the larger decline in future obligations would be 
excluded. Thus, focusing exclusively on a truncated FI measure would bias policymakers 
to reject a reform that could potentially improve the government’s financial condition.  
This example also provides the final rationale for adopting an infinite-horizon fiscal 
imbalance measure in preference to truncated-horizon measures. The FI measure 
facilitates an apples-to-apples comparison of different policy options. If two budget 
reform options are financially equivalent in present value terms but one (option A) 
involves higher costs in the short term compared to the other (option B), policymaking 
would be biased in favor of option B if the evaluation were based on a truncated 
projection horizon. Alternatively, reform option A might be financially sounder than 
option B, but the latter might involve larger short-term financial gains and larger long-
term costs. If the long-term costs remain hidden under a truncated projection horizon, 
policymakers may be biased in favor of option B. These considerations are likely to be 
quite important in the EU and EMU context because of the many differences in member 
countries’ endowments, fiscal policies, and demographic profiles. Hence, long-term fiscal 
surveillance should be based on comprehensive and policy-neutral fiscal measures, and 
evaluations of fiscal options should use metrics that allow apples-to-apples comparisons 
among available choices. 
Generational Imbalance. In general, the generational imbalance measure can be 
calculated only for programs not involving pure public goods and that are fully or 
partially financed out of dedicated government receipts. Provided that it can be 
implemented, the generational imbalance measure shows the amount of transfers that past 
and living generations may expect to receive under current policies in excess of their past 
and future tax payments toward funding them. Thus, excluding the contribution of future 
generations to the fiscal imbalance yields the generational imbalance measure (see 
Gokhale et al., 2003 for details).  
Most European countries have pension and health care programs that are partly financed 
out of dedicated taxes. Excess outlays over dedicated revenues are financed out of 
transfers from the general budget account. Although such programs are usually 
considered to be “in balance” by definition, the fiscal imbalance measure can be used to     
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show the extent to which the general government is obligated to cover future financial 
shortfalls in dedicated revenues compared to benefit payments under current fiscal 
policies. In such cases, GI calculated using just dedicated taxes would indicate the extent 
to which past and living generations’ net benefits are responsible for creating general 
government obligations for financing the program.
33 
GI calculations provide information that is complementary to FI. The FI measure tells us 
how much additional resources must be raised to restore a sustainable fiscal policy. But 
FI cannot indicate which among the myriad ways of raising the necessary resources might 
be preferable. However, because GI provides information about how a given policy 
would change the net benefits of living and future generations, it can help in selecting 
from alternative policies. 
Essentially, GI would inform policymakers about the trade-offs involved in raising 
resources from current versus future generations for achieving fiscal sustainability. For 
example, suppose FI = €2,000 billion and GI = €1,600 billion. This implies that past and 
living generations account for €1,600 of the total FI of €2,000, and future generations 
account for €400 billion.
34 Policymakers could choose to enact tax and benefit changes 
that reduce GI to €600 billion and reduce future generations’ contribution to FI to – €600 
billion. Such a policy would reduce FI = GI + (FI - GI) to zero. Or policymakers could 
adopt an alternative combination of taxes and benefits that imposed a larger additional 
burden on living generations and a smaller additional burden on future generations – for 
example, by reducing GI to €400 billion and (FI - GI) to –€400 billion. 
Hence, adopting the combination of FI and GI as indicators of the overall financial 
condition and generational stance, respectively, of current fiscal policies would provide a 
powerful tool for evaluating the available policy alternatives based on their impact on 
today’s versus future generations. 
3.4  General Considerations of Fiscal and Generational Imbalance Measures 
for EU Countries 
Adoption of measures such as FI and GI need not imply that those amounts are 
immutable liabilities of the government.
35 Instead, they should be viewed as policy 
guideposts – designed to help in implementing appropriate changes to future fiscal 
                                                 
33   Alternatively, both FI and GI could be calculated by allocating both dedicated and general taxes 
according to the generations that pay those taxes.  This calculation would reveal the part of (zero-
valued) FI that past and living generations contribute and the part future generations would 
contribute under current policies.  Note that even if FI = 0, by definition because of funding from of 
general revenues, GI (and FI - GI) need not also equal zero.  
34   Note that if FI < GI, current policies would award living generations net benefits that exceed the total 
fiscal imbalance, implying that future generations would pay taxes on net.  
35   Concern that the public would view the adoption of such measures as recognition that they stand on a 
par with outstanding government debt – as immutable government liabilities – appears to be a chief 
reason cited by those opposing their adoption.      
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policies – including future taxes, pensions, and other government outlays – with the aim 
of restoring a sustainable fiscal outlook.
36  
Second, it is obvious that FI and GI are static measures. Adopting FI and GI for 
estimating country fiscal positions is only the first step in policy formulation within the 
EMU context. Obviously, static country-specific estimates are insufficient in the context 
of a monetary union among countries that are currently undergoing economic transitions 
and are, by definition, in disequilibrium. Even without any policy changes – were that 
possible – demographic transitions at differential rates would engender inter-EU-country 
and international capital flows and labor migrations. Those flows and future policy 
adjustments may invalidate the economic and demographic assumptions on which FI and 
GI calculations are based. Nevertheless, the static FI and GI estimates constitute useful 
information in the formulation of future policies because they indicate the extent of 
pressure generated by the current fiscal stance that would induce private sector 
adjustments. If maintained and allowed to grow, large fiscal and generational imbalances 
may imply larger future taxes and higher interest rates and may cause larger private sector 
adjustments in capital and labor flows.  
FI and GI numbers presented in terms of billions (or trillions) of euros are not easily 
comprehensible. To provide a reference for comparison, it is useful to calculate them as 
ratios of GDP or the wage tax base out of which they would have to be financed. Since FI 
and GI refer to present values of future fiscal flows, it is appropriate to use the present 
values of GDP or the present value of the wage tax base when forming such ratios. These 
ratios would show the additional percentage of future GDP or wages that must be devoted 
to restore a balanced fiscal policy. Using alternative taxes or expenditures as a reference 
base – such as total public plus private consumption, personal plus corporate income, 
social transfers, etc. – would show the size of the fiscal adjustment required for achieving 
a balanced policy in terms of those economic flows. Such measures would provide 
broader understanding of the trade-offs involved under alternative combinations of future 
fiscal adjustments.  
An important characteristic of FI is that, like a corpus of outstanding debt, it grows larger 
over time because of accruing interest costs: Hence, a nonzero FI represents fiscal 
disequilibrium and would necessitate future policy adjustments (See Gokhale and 
Smetters, 2003 for details). In addition, fiscal policies that imply FI ≠ 0 are unsustainable 
because the ratio of FI to the present value of GDP (or some other income or tax base) 
also grows larger over time.
37  
Finally, FI and GI could be decomposed according to the contributions of alternative rates 
of population aging and alternative fiscal structures adopted by EU member countries. 
The motivation for this lies in past experience: The SGP – focused on short- and medium-
term objectives – was revised in 2005 to take account of country-specific economic 
features. The same need is likely to arise if and when the current constraints force further 
consideration of longer-term structural adjustments to facilitate convergence toward a 
balanced fiscal stance across EU countries. Reporting the contributions of demographics 
                                                 
36   It is implicit in this discussion that establishing a sustainable fiscal outlook is desirable because it 
would boost the performance of the private sector by reducing expectations of future benefits, 
thereby increasing private saving and work efforts. 
37   This result is due to the normal condition of a dynamically efficient economy where the interest rate 
exceeds the growth rate. For the U.S. context, see Abel et al. 1989.  See Gokhale and Smetters 
(2006) for more details.     
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and country-specific fiscal structures to long-term fiscal imbalances would reveal the 
feasibility and desirability of adopting differential adjustments by different EU member 
nations. 
Although it was argued earlier that the FI measure would be comprehensive only if 
calculated over the infinite horizon, doing so in the European context proved impossible 
given the limited amount of data available at the time of preparing the estimates. That is 
because low fertility in EU countries and low net external immigration cause projected 
populations to implode over time for several EU countries. Hence, the FI measures 
reported in Section 3.5 below are calculated over a finite horizon—through the terminal 
year of population projections available from Eurostat, 2051.
38 
3.5  Fiscal Imbalance Estimates for EU Countries 
Overall Fiscal Imbalance and Its Decomposition by Sources – Demographics and 
Budget Policy 
This section presents FI estimates for 23 EU countries calculated using data available at 
the time of writing.
39 These estimates should be regarded as provisional because there 
remains considerable scope for improving the underlying inputs. They are used here 
mainly to complement the accounting and reporting framework being proposed. 
Supplementing existing budget reports with FI and GI indicators would reveal the long-
term implications of current EU members’ policies and the sources of differences among 
them. Notwithstanding the scope for improving the estimates, however, the numbers 
reported here are based on detailed country-specific data and capture underlying inter-
country demographic and fiscal policy differences. 
To reveal those differences, FI is first calculated for the average EU economy defined 
with reference to four dimensions: demographics, productivity, budget allocations, and 
generational policy. An “EU demographic benchmark” is constructed by averaging all 
countries’ projected populations – separately by year, age (16 and older), and gender—
between 2004 and 2051.
40 The EU demographic benchmark contains about 16 million 
people.
41  
The “EU productivity benchmark” is constructed by calculating a population-weighted 
geometric mean of annual labor productivity growth rates (output per hour worked) 
across EU countries. Country-specific labor productivity growth rates are calculated by 
using annual geometric average growth rates during the recent past – between 1996 and 
2004.  
                                                 
38    As noted earlier, truncating the projection horizon at 2051 implies that a fully apples-to-apples 
comparison of policy options would not be feasible because cost and benefits of alternative policies 
beyond 2051 would be excluded from the calculations.  However, adopting such long horizon 
measures is still better than truncating the horizon after just five or ten years.  
39   Cyprus and Hungary are excluded because data on their annual labor productivity growth are not 
available.  
40    Although the terminology employed is “EU benchmark,” it should be understood that the 
calculations include just 23 countries.  See the previous footnote.  
41   Calculations regarding the construction of the “EU benchmark” and other calculations described 
below are available from the author upon request.     
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Similarly, harmonized general government taxes and expenditures are averaged to derive 
the “EU budget allocation benchmark.” This benchmark consists of population-weighted 
averages of harmonized taxes and spending per capita.
42 Table 3.1 shows general 
government revenues, expenditures, surpluses/deficits, and debt figures for the base year 
of the calculation (2004) for the 23 EU countries included in the calculations and shows 
the corresponding averages across those countries. The totals are calculated using data on 
detailed revenue and expenditure categories taken from the Eurostat database.  
It should be noted that the total revenue column in Table 3.1 includes “imputed social 
contributions”, which represent unfunded obligations on account of social transfer 
guarantees provided by some countries—guarantees that are not supported by explicit 
transactions for funding them. The motivation for including those imputed revenue items 
was to avoid over-representing current fiscal deficits and retain comparability of fiscal 
cash flows across EU countries. 
Finally, profiles by age and gender of various harmonized taxes and transfer payments 
per capita are averaged across all EU countries using age- and gender-specific population 
weights. Unfortunately, data on tax and transfer profiles are not available for all EU 
countries. Hence, the estimates reported below are based on available partial data used to 
construct the “EU cohort-distributive benchmark”.
43  
Putting all four dimensions together yields an EU benchmark economy. As shown below, 
this construct enables a decomposition of country-specific fiscal imbalances into their 
demographic, productivity, and fiscal policy (budget allocation and cohort-distribution) 
components. Replacing the EU benchmark value of one of the components – either one of 
demographic, productivity growth, budget allocation, or cohort-distribution profiles – 
with its value for a specific country and recalculating FI would show that component's 
contribution to the FI of the country in question. Replacing all of a particular country’s 
features (and rescaling to match the country’s population size) would show the overall 
contribution of all components. 
The purpose of such a set-up is to enable a detailed surveillance of country-specific 
differences in fiscal imbalances by distinguishing between those arising from 
demographic and fiscal policy differences. Knowledge of these differences is likely to 
prove useful when judging and negotiating long-term fiscal reforms. Agreement on an EU 
benchmark construct would provide a common reference point against which to evaluate 
each country’s fiscal stance and the sources of difference. It would provide a common 
metric, permitting an apples-to-apples comparison of each country’s fiscal position. 
 
 
                                                 
42   An alternative method would be to use simple averages across countries of their per capita taxes and 
transfers.  That would imply placing equal weight on each sovereign nation’s budget allocation. 
However, the resulting allocation would not correspond to a “representative” EU budget allocation. 
Implementing the alternative allocation results in a slightly smaller estimate of the “EU benchmark” 
economy’s Fiscal Imbalance because countries with the largest individual FI values receive smaller 
weights. 
43    This terminology is adopted for lack of a better one. Obviously, generational policy is also 
influenced by changing budget allocations – and not just by changing the age-gender distributions of 
particular taxes and transfers. Additional information is available from the author upon request.     
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Fiscal Imbalance Estimates and Components for EU Countries 
The EU benchmark FI is calculated by using the methodology and data described earlier. 
The population projections used for distributing 2004 budget aggregates by age and 
gender, as described above based on projections taken from Eurostat through the year 
2051. Future taxes, transfers, and general government spending on public goods are 
estimated for the EU benchmark by applying an average labor productivity growth factor 
of 0.24 percent per year. This average is calculated by taking a population-weighted 
geometric mean of average growth in output per hour worked for each of the 23 EU 
members between 1996 and 2004. The calculations use data on output per hour worked as 
reported by Eurostat.  
A fixed and constant real rate of discount is used for discounting projected fiscal flows 
back to the year 2004. The inflation-adjusted discount rate is calculated as the interest rate 
on long-term government bonds minus average expected inflation. Long-term budget 
transactions spanning 50 or more years should be discounted using the government’s 
opportunity cost of funds over a similar term. However, the longest-term interest rates 
available are on 10-year government bonds. The geometric mean of annual rates 
calculated over the period 1996–2005 and across all 23 EU countries (using data available 
from Eurostat at the time of writing this chapter) equals 5.39 percent per year. Average 
expected inflation is calculated as the geometric mean of inflation rates across all EU 
countries from 1997 through 2005 (according to data availability). The resulting rate 
(3.01 percent) is subtracted from the nominal interest rate on government bonds to obtain 
a real discount rate of 2.38 percent.
44  
Figure 3.4 shows FI estimates for 23 EU countries and for the EU benchmark case 
calculated for the base year – 2004.
45 The EU-benchmark economy’s overall Fiscal 
Imbalance is estimated at €1,971 billion. Of this, outstanding debt amounts to €282 
billion, and the present value of prospective fiscal shortfalls equals €1,690 billion. Note 
that the EU benchmark economy constructed is only one twenty-third as large as the sum 
total of the 23 EU economies included in the calculations. Figure 3.5 shows that FI for the 
EU benchmark equals 8.3 percent of the present value of GDP projected through the year 
2051. 
Figure 3.4 also shows that, in euro terms, Germany (€9,263), France (€9,111), Italy 
(€5,054), and the United Kingdom (€7,666) contribute the largest fiscal imbalances. 
However, relative to the present value of GDP, the largest imbalance ratios prevail for 
Malta (12.8 percent of GDP, although Malta has the smallest fiscal imbalance in euro 
terms) and Greece (10.9 percent of GDP). Estonia (3.2 percent of GDP), Ireland (3.4 
percent of GDP), Lithuania (3.8 percent of GDP), and Latvia (4.9 percent of GDP) are 
among those with the smallest fiscal imbalances as a percent of the present value of their 
                                                 
44   FI estimates under country-specific long-term interest rate differences are not calculated because 
capital mobility over time may be expected to erase existing interest rate differentials on long-term 
government debts.  Any residual differences would reflect country-specific government default risks, 
which are likely to be minor.  The calculation’s details are available from the author upon request. 
45   The estimates shown in Figure 3.4 use only one year’s revenues and expenditures for making future 
projections.  Since 2004 was neither a recession year nor a year of particularly strong growth, the 
estimates are unlikely to be influenced by extreme cyclical variability of fiscal cash flows. If 
projections of short-run budget forecasts had been available, the resulting FI estimates would have 
been more accurate because such projections usually incorporate expected changes in future fiscal 
flows due to policy changes that have already been enacted.       
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respective GDPs. The present discounted values of EU member nations’ projected GDPs 
are shown in Figure 3.8. 
Figure 3.6 shows the demographic component of FI. It shows the excess imbalance 
resulting from replacing a particular country’s demographic structure with the EU 
benchmark demographic structure. The figure reports this excess as a percent of the FI 
estimated for the EU benchmark case. Thus, positive numbers indicate demographic 
features that increase budget shortfalls under current (EU benchmark) fiscal policies – 
either population aging that is more rapid due to increases in longevity, or a larger than 
average baby-boom generation approaching retirement, or a baby-boom generation that is 
closer to retirement than under the EU benchmark case, or a recent relatively more rapid 
decline in fertility that reduces the number of tax-paying workers.  
Figure 3.6 suggests that despite their large FI estimates – in both absolute euro terms and 
as percentages of the present value of GDP – population aging is not more rapid than 
average in the case of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. This result may appear 
surprising, but it must be noted that these large countries contribute significantly to the 
“average” demographics of the EU benchmark. On the other hand, France’s 
demographics causes a 5 percent increase in FI relative to the EU benchmark FI. The 
largest FI-increasing influence of demographics appears in the cases of Ireland and Malta, 
whereas Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia appear to have younger projected populations or 
slower population aging through 2051. 
Figure 3.7 shows the budget allocation components of FI for EU member states. As 
mentioned earlier, this experiment replaces a particular country’s harmonized tax, 
transfer, and spending components with those of the EU benchmark case. Figure 3.7 
shows that the budget-allocations of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom 
contribute significantly toward high FI values. However, Denmark and Luxembourg 
appear to be following “budget allocation” policies with the largest prospective fiscal 
impact in terms of generating high FI values. Most of the new entrants into the EU appear 
to be following budget allocation policies consistent with reducing fiscal imbalances.  
Similar experiments are not implemented here for the productivity and cohort-distribution 
components because the required data are unavailable. In the case of productivity, a 
straightforward replacement of a member country’s productivity growth rate would not be 
appropriate because a higher productivity rate would generally reduce the projected levels 
of future means-tested social transfer programs and may be associated with higher 
revenues in a nonlinear manner. Implementing this experiment requires careful 
calibration of the response of welfare expenditures to changes in productivity growth – 
that is not feasible given data availability.
46 
Adequate information is also not available for estimating the impact of country-specific 
cohort-distribution policies. However, the experiments described earlier of isolating the 
demographic and budget allocation components provide the basic framework for isolating 
these components as well. Finally, estimating GI measures is also not feasible given that 
                                                 
46   This observation may cast doubt on the validity of constructing the EU productivity benchmark as 
described in the text.  However, that appears to be the best, if not the only, alternative.     
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institutional details about financing arrangements for various subprograms are not 
available (to the author).
47  
The Impact of Delaying Fiscal Adjustments 
It is easy to show that FI grows larger over time if the initial FI value is positive (see 
Appendix A in Gokhale and Smetters, 2003). That is because of accruing interest on the 
current FI – similar to that on a corpus of outstanding debt. When FI is calculated over a 
finite projection horizon, the addition of another year’s budget surplus or shortfall at the 
end of the horizon also influences next year’s FI estimate. Table 3.3 shows estimates of 
FI for EU countries through the year 2010. Each estimate covers a rolling period of 47 
years – 2004 through 2051 for the FI reported under “2004”; 2005 through 2052 for the 
FI reported under “2005”; and so on. These calculations are based on extending each EU 
member nation’s demographic projections for a few additional years beyond 2051. 
Table 3.3 shows that FI (calculated over a 47 year horizon) for the EU benchmark case 
grows from €1,971 billion in 2004 to €2,489 billion by 2010 if current policies and long-
term projections remain unchanged through that year. The increase in FI from one year to 
the next generally implies an increase in the cost of future fiscal adjustments because the 
resources available to pay for the shortfalls, the present value of GDP, generally grow at a 
slower rate.  
Table 3.3 shows that with each passing year, about one-third of the increase in FI arises 
from advancing the terminal year of the projection horizon by an additional year. The 
remainder of the increase in FI arises from accruing interest. This indicates the 
shortcoming of adopting a finite projection horizon for capturing the cost of postponing 
fiscal adjustments. Were policymakers to adopt fiscal adjustments to reduce fiscal 
imbalances as measured under a limited time horizon, a positive fiscal imbalance would 
re-emerge in the very next year and grow larger over time.
48  
Take the case of France. The French government reported a deficit of 2.9 percent of GDP 
– that is, €49.6 billion – in 2005.
49 According to Table 3.3, however, the change in the 
French FI for 2005 equals €368.2 billion – an order of magnitude larger than the reported 
fiscal deficit for 2005. Similar remarks apply to current reporting on many other EU 
countries’ fiscal stance based on traditional deficit and debt measures. Table 3.4 
compares the reported annual public balances (Eurostat) with FI accruals for 2005 taken 
from Table 3.3. In the case of some EU countries, a surplus public balance indicates an 
improving fiscal condition, but the FI accrual is positive pointing to the opposite 
conclusion. Thus, depending on backward-looking fiscal measures such as deficits and 
debt would cause policymakers to draw incorrect conclusions about their country’s 
evolving fiscal condition.  
 
 
                                                 
47   However, see Gokhale and Smetters (2006) for examples based on calculations for U.S. Social 
Security and Medicare programs.  
48   These calculations were made after extending the official (Eurostat) population projections beyond 
2051. Details regarding the methods used are available from the author upon request. 
49   Indicateurs de progrès de l’économie française (2006).     
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A Proposal for Integrated Reporting of Short- and Long-term Budgetary Conditions 
Even after taking account of the new SGP’s constraints, each EU country retains 
considerable sovereignty over its fiscal policies. For sure, each EU member country 
retains full control over the accounting and reporting of national budget information. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to fulfilling SGP-related budget reporting for long-term 
fiscal policy surveillance, the budget reports of all countries would benefit from the 
introduction of a few additional features.  
Both short-term budget projections and the long-term implications of current fiscal 
policies should be included in the reports. The FI measure appears to be the easiest to 
integrate into most existing budget reporting frameworks because it is essentially a 
“budget measure” and comprehensively incorporates forward-looking fiscal information 
(as discussed earlier). For social transfer (and possibly other) programs with independent 
and dedicated financial resources, it is also easy to integrate presentations of both fiscal 
and generational imbalance measures into existing budget reports.  
Many existing short-term budget reports divide the overall budget summary table into 
“current” and “capital” accounts. Table 3.2, for example, shows a prototype budget report 
containing “current” and “capital” accounts followed by additional information on long-
term sustainability measures – that is, the implications of continuing current policies 
through the long-term projection horizon of several decades (if not through the infinite 
time horizon).  
The FI figures for each year beyond the base year show FI as of the corresponding future 
year. As discussed earlier, if the initial FI is positive, future years’ FI figures will grow 
larger over time. In addition, FI grows larger even as a percentage of the present value of 
GDP. The components of each year’s change in FI could also be included. In the case of 
finite-horizon estimates, the total change in FI across years would include those arising 
from accruing interest and the addition of another year at the end of the projection 
horizon. As discussed earlier, such information would be useful for policymakers to 
appreciate the cost of postponing fiscal reforms.  
This could be followed by reports of the financial implications of current policies for 
independently financed subprograms, and a final subsection could include FI and its 
revenue and expenditure components for the rest-of-government sector. This subsection 
would “close” the account by reporting intra-government liabilities and net liabilities to 
the public (net outstanding debt). Supplementary tables could break out the overall fiscal 
imbalance into its demographic, budget allocation, and cohort-distribution components – 
as described in earlier sections.  
Comparison with Sustainability Measures Proposed by the Ageing Working Group 
The Working Group on Ageing Populations (AWG) recommends a two-stage approach to 
assessing the sustainability of long-term finances (Economic Policy Committee, 2001). 
Its assessment of sustainable public finances takes the SGP’s fiscal constraints as a 
starting point. The objective is to evaluate prospects for compliance with EMU 
requirements – avoiding excessive deficits and keeping debt levels below 60 percent of 
GDP. The SGP requires that EU Member States maintain a “close to balance or surplus” 
position over the medium term (three to five years) but not over a longer term. However,     
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if followed, this would result in de facto sustainability in a simple and transparent manner 
(Balassone and Franco, 2000). 
The arguments provided in this chapter, however, suggest that such an approach would be 
inadequate. The problem is that a short-term and “short-sighted” view of the implications 
of current policy – over the next three to five years – does not provide sufficient and 
relevant information to policymakers. One can envision a situation where policies are 
enacted to ensure compliance with the SGP’s constraints, only to soon discover that the 
job is not yet finished – indeed, the problem may have grown larger as the budget 
window moves forward and the opportunity to save resources in the meanwhile with a 
more vigorous adjustment is lost. 
Defining sustainability as a non-violation of predetermined levels of deficits and debt is 
simply not useful because (as discussed earlier) those indicators alone do not fully reveal 
the budget and real economic implications of alternative ways of achieving fiscal 
sustainability and economic convergence. The simple projections of future debt and 
deficit levels also do not comprehensively reveal the sources of economically meaningful 
imbalances – not just in overall budgets, but also in terms of net payments to different 
sub-groups, such as young, old, and future generations. The traditional fiscal metrics do 
not permit answers to several important questions such as: How decision makers rank 
alternative policies that result in the same – say, slightly lower – debt and deficit 
trajectories? Who benefits and who loses under each alternative, and what is the likely 
impact on the economy? Obviously, policymakers should be provided ways for 
answering such questions but traditional measures and a short-horizon focus would be 
insufficient. There appears to be no short cut to specifying sustainability in terms of 
comprehensive forward-looking measures as described earlier. More work is needed to 
complement existing theoretical developments with empirical information in order to 
improve the quality of long-term sustainability estimates. 
Another issue concerns the incorporation of future policy changes that have already been 
enacted. The calculations reported in this chapter are based on current (2005) levels of 
taxes, transfers, and government purchases. However, if cuts in pension benefits or 
revenue-increasing measures are already scheduled in the laws – information that is 
unavailable to the author at the time of writing – those policies should be incorporated 
into FI and GI calculations because they are consistent with the definition of “current 
policy.” A note of caution needs to be registered, however, that not all scheduled policies 
may be politically or economically feasible and some may be very unlikely. In addition, 
future policies may be incompletely specified – say, scheduled to terminate at a certain 
date with no indication of what would occur thereafter. Although such policy 
environments do exist, they make it difficult to implement long-range calculations of FI 
and GI measures. In such cases, providing ranges of FI and GI estimates under alternative 
policy projections would be more appropriate – and still better than fiscal reporting 
exclusively on the basis of traditional short-horizon measures.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter began by observing that EU countries are undergoing twin transitions: a 
demographic transition wherein the populations of most EU countries are aging and an 
economic transition resulting from the adoption of a single currency and associated 
adjustments in fiscal constraints and agreements. These processes are likely to impose 
severe and conflicting pressures on policymakers, on the one hand, to increase deficit 
spending to support expanding retiree cohorts and, on the other, to limit deficits and debt 
in order to continue expanding a heretofore successful process of monetary unification.  
This chapter proposes the adoption of an extended framework of budget accounting and 
reporting within the context of the SGP’s long-term fiscal policy surveillance 
requirement. Among the several available fiscal measures, this chapter argues for 
adopting fiscal and generational imbalance measures because they can potentially 
incorporate comprehensive and policy relevant information about the future implications 
of continuing current policies. The baseline FI and GI estimates can be supplemented 
with their demographic, budget allocation, productivity growth, and cohort-distribution 
policy components. The advantage of doing so is to present policymakers with tools for 
comparing inter-country differences in fiscal stances and for evaluating the feasibility and 
likely economic effects of alternative policy options.  
This chapter argues in detail why traditional debt and deficit measures can be potentially 
misleading as measures of a government’s fiscal stance. It also argues that accrual-
accounting approaches, although already adopted by several countries, are less 
appropriate for government entities than for private ones. Among generational accounting 
and fiscal and generational imbalances, the two latter measures appear simpler to 
communicate and can be more easily integrated into existing budget reports – as 
demonstrated through a prototype reporting template described in this chapter.  
This chapter also provides provisional estimates of fiscal imbalances for 23 EU countries 
and for the EU benchmark case under a projection horizon extending from 2004 through 
2051. Although they are based on provisional and incomplete data, they are likely to be 
reasonably accurate estimates of prevailing fiscal imbalances in EU member countries 
and of the sources of inter-country differences. The estimated fiscal imbalances are quite 
large for many EU countries. On average, EU countries face a Fiscal Imbalance of 8.3 
percent of the present value of GDP projected through 2051. That implies a considerable 
shortfall of resources to pay for social transfers and other general government 
expenditures during the next four or five decades. 
The estimates show considerable differences in underlying demographics and budget 
allocations that generate the country-specific FI values. In addition, the results show a 
much higher rate of accruing fiscal costs compared to public balances reported under 
traditional and backward-looking budget measures. Those accruals suggest the need to 
adopt fiscal adjustments to resolve outstanding EU fiscal imbalances sooner rather than 
later. 
Future fiscal adjustments would involve combinations of tax increases or reductions in 
social and other expenditures. On balances, it appears that EU countries need to undergo 
a third transition in order to facilitate a resolution of outstanding fiscal imbalances – one 
that results in a retrenchment in the existing system of social protections—if only because 
the current protections appear to be unaffordable. Attempting to redress existing fiscal     
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imbalances through yet higher taxes would exacerbate the already high tax rates that EU 
citizens are facing – 40 percent for the EU benchmark economy.  
Finally, one response to the fiscal measures proposed in this chapter is that different 
underlying assumptions may generate wide variations in estimates of fiscal and 
generational imbalances and in their ratios to GDP or tax bases. However, that does not 
constitute an argument against adopting such measures; instead, it suggests a reason to 
supplement them with estimates of the associated uncertainty. The usual response to 
uncertainty is to be “cautious” about embracing long-term measures. However, under 
rapid population aging and prospects of steep increases in the costs of social insurance 
programs, a policy of “wait and see” may be just as dangerous as it could deprive 
policymakers of key information on policy trade-offs and cause more delays in adopting 
fiscal reforms. Indeed, large changes in fiscal imbalances due to small changes in 
underlying economic assumptions (discount and growth rates, etc.) is more likely if the 
underlying long-term future fiscal shortfalls are larger rather than smaller. But if that is 
the case, it indicates the need for haste rather than caution in adopting the fiscal measures 
suggested herein.  
 
Table 3.1  Total Revenues, Total Expenditures, Budget Balances, and Consolidated Debt Levels (2004) - EU Countries and EU Average 
Millions of   Percent of GDP 
















Belgium  134,843 140,417  -5,574 272,874 288,089  46.8  48.7  -1.9  94.7 
Denmark  97,996 108,077 -10,080  84,000 197,222  49.7  54.8  -5.1  42.6 
Germany  880,780 1,038,040  -157,260 1,451,000 2,215,650  39.8  46.9  -7.1  65.5 
Greece  62,703 83,270  -20,567  182,702  168,417 37.2 49.4  -12.2  108.5 
Spain  293,926 325,095 -31,169 388,495 837,316  35.1  38.8  -3.7  46.4 
France  743,826 880,553  -136,727  1,069,165  1,659,020  44.8  53.1  -8.2  64.4 
Ireland  45,282 50,072 -4,791 43,743  147,569 30.7 33.9 -3.2 29.6 
Italy  564,912 657,167 -92,255  1,441,879  1,388,870  40.7  47.3  -6.6 103.8 
Luxembourg  10,461 11,696 -1,235  1,782 27,056 38.7 43.2 -4.6  6.6 
Netherlands  187,204 227,535 -40,331 256,924 488,642  38.3  46.6  -8.3  52.6 
Austria  104,181 118,255 -14,074 150,649 235,819  44.2  50.1  -6.0  63.9 
Portugal  37,945 65,668  -27,722 83,781  143,029 26.5 45.9  -19.4 58.6 
Finland  66,082 76,505  -10,423 67,270  151,935 43.5 50.4 -6.9 44.3 
Sweden  143,857 159,814 -15,957 144,066 282,014  51.0  56.7  -5.7  51.1 
United Kingdom  640,281 750,629  -110,348 684,776  1,733,603  36.9  43.3  -6.4  39.5 
Cyprus                        
Czech Republic  31,608 38,468 -6,860 28,069 87,205 36.2 44.1 -7.9 32.2 
Estonia  2,936 3,292  -357  486 9,043  32.5  36.4  -3.9 5.4 
Hungary                        
Lithuania  5,163 6,007  -844 3,522  18,083  28.6  33.2  -4.7  19.5 
Latvia  3,185 3,997  -812 1,547  11,157  28.5  35.8  -7.3  13.9 
Malta  1,558 2,084  -526 3,211 4,316  36.1  48.3  -12.2  74.4 
Poland  65,908 85,907  -19,998 94,578  203,711 32.4 42.2 -9.8 46.4 
Slovakia  8,315 13,434 -5,119 14,560 33,863 24.6 39.7  -15.1 43.0 
Slovenia  10,408 12,396 -1,988  7,697 26,146 39.8 47.4 -7.6 29.4 
EU Benchmark
*  180,146 211,234 -31,088 281,599 450,338  40.0  46.9  -6.9  62.5 
Note: 
* Population-weighted per capita values multiplied by EU benchmark population (= total EU population divided by 23). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Eurostat. 
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Table 3.2  Long-term Budget Reporting 
a) Budget Report - Country X (€ billion)
  
  2006  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Current  Budget        
Total  Current  Receipts        
Total  Current  Outlays        
Current Surplus(+) / Deficit(-)           
Capital  Budget        
Net  Investment        
Net  Borrowing        
Public Sector Net Debt - end of year           
 
b) Future Implications of Current Policies           
Fiscal Imbalance (Open-group obligations through year …) 
Annual Change 
Interest Accrual 
Shift in Projection Window 
 
Program 1: (Public Pensions) 
Fiscal Imbalance 
Generational Imbalance 
Present Value: Current Generations' Future Net Benefits 
Assets (Claims on Rest of Government) 
Present Value of Future Generations’ Net Benefits 
 
Program 2: (Unemployment Insurance) 
Fiscal Imbalance 
Generational Imbalance 
Present Value: Current Generations' Future Net Benefits 
Assets (Claims on Rest of Government) 
Present Value of Future Generations’ Net Benefits 
 
Rest of Government 
Fiscal Imbalance 
Net Debt Outstanding 
Present Value of Excess Future Outlays over Revenues 
Present Value of Future Outlays           
 
Present Value of Future Revenues 
Liability to Program 1 




Table 3.3  Annual Changes in Fiscal Imbalances: Interest Accruals and Shifting the Projection Window 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Country Measure 
€ billions  FI as percent of PV_GDP and 
annual change and components as percent of annual GDP) 
Fiscal  imbalance  1,971.1 2,050.9 2,133.2 2,218.1 2,305.6 2,395.8 2,488.6  8.3  8.6  8.9  9.3  9.6  10.0  10.4 
Annual  change  - 79.8 82.3 84.9 87.5 90.2 92.8  - 17.6 18.0 18.4 18.8 19.3 19.8 
Interest  accrual  - 46.9 48.8 50.8 52.8 54.9 57.0  - 10.3 10.7 11.0 11.4 11.7 12.1 
EU 
Benchmark 
Shift in projection 
window  - 32.9 33.5 34.1 34.7 35.3 35.8  -  7.3  7.3  7.4  7.5  7.5  7.6 
Fiscal  imbalance  853.8  886.5  920.1  954.7  990.2  1,026.9  1,064.6 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.3 
Annual  change  - 32.6 33.6 34.6 35.6 36.6 37.7  - 11.3 11.6 11.9 12.2 12.5 12.8 
Interest  accrual  - 20.3 21.1 21.9 22.7 23.6 24.4  -  7.0  7.3  7.5  7.8  8.0  8.3  Belgium 
Shift in projection 
window  - 12.3 12.5 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.2  -  4.3  4.3  4.4  4.4  4.5  4.5 
Fiscal  imbalance  753.5  781.6  810.6  840.5  871.3  903.2  936.0 7.8 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.3 9.6 
Annual  change  - 28.1 29.0 29.9 30.8 31.8 32.9  - 14.2 14.6 15.1 15.5 16.0 16.4 
Interest  accrual  - 17.9 18.6 19.3 20.0 20.7 21.5  -  9.1  9.4  9.7 10.1 10.4 10.8  Denmark 
Shift in projection 
window  - 10.2 10.4 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.4  -  5.2  5.2  5.3  5.5  5.6  5.7 
Fiscal  imbalance  9,263.4  9,605.9  9,957.5 10,318.2 10,688.3 11,067.8 11,456.9  9.2  9.5  9.9  10.2  10.6  11.0  11.4 
Annual  change  - 342.5 351.5 360.7 370.1 379.5 389.1  -  15.4  15.8  16.2  16.6  17.0  17.5 
Interest  accrual  - 220.5 228.6 237.0 245.6 254.4 263.4  -  9.9  10.3  10.6  11.0  11.4  11.8  Germany 
Shift in projection 
window  - 122.1 122.9 123.7 124.5 125.1 125.7  -  5.5  5.5  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.6 
Fiscal  imbalance  1,470.4  1,539.2  1,610.7  1,685.0  1,762.3  1,842.5  1,925.8 10.9 11.4 11.9 12.5 13.1 13.7 14.3 
Annual  change  - 68.8 71.5 74.3 77.2 80.2 83.3  - 39.8 40.5 41.1 41.7 42.3 43.0 
Interest  accrual  - 35.0 36.6 38.3 40.1 41.9 43.9  - 20.3 20.7 21.2 21.6 22.1 22.6 
Greece 
Shift in projection 
window  - 33.8 34.9 36.0 37.1 38.3 39.4  - 19.6 19.7 19.9 20.1 20.2 20.3 
Fiscal  imbalance 2,044.7  2,129.9  2,217.0  2,306.1  2,397.1  2,490.1  2,585.1 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.8 
Annual  change  - 85.2 87.1 89.1 91.0 93.0 95.0  - 10.1 10.3 10.4 10.7 10.9 11.2 
Interest  accrual  - 48.7 50.7 52.8 54.9 57.1 59.3  -  5.8  6.0  6.2  6.4  6.7  7.0  Spain 
Shift in projection 
window  - 36.5 36.4 36.3 36.1 35.9 35.7  -  4.3  4.3  4.3  4.2  4.2  4.2 
     
 
Table 3.3 (continued) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Country Measure 
€ billions  FI as percent of PV_GDP and 
annual change and components as percent of annual GDP) 
Fiscal  imbalance  9,111.0  9,479.2  9,858.9  10,250.6  10,654.6  11,071.1  11,500.5  9.7 10.0 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.6 12.0 
Annual  change  - 368.2 379.7 391.7 404.0 416.5 429.3  -  22.0  22.5  23.0  23.5  24.0  24.6 
Interest  accrual  - 216.8 225.6 234.6 244.0 253.6 263.5  -  13.0  13.4  13.8  14.2  14.6  15.1  France 
Shift in projection 
window  - 151.4 154.1 157.1 160.0 162.9 165.9  -  9.0  9.1  9.2  9.3  9.4  9.5 
Fiscal  imbalance  599.7  639.3  681.1  725.2  771.6  820.4  871.6 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.8 
Annual  change  - 39.6 41.8 44.1 46.4 48.8 51.2  - 25.9 26.3 26.7 27.1 27.5 27.9 
Interest  accrual  - 14.3 15.2 16.2 17.3 18.4 19.5  -  9.3  9.6  9.8 10.1 10.4 10.6  Ireland 
Shift in projection 
window  - 25.4 26.6 27.9 29.1 30.4 31.7  - 16.6 16.7 16.9 17.0 17.2 17.3 
Fiscal  imbalance  5,054.0 5,224.2 5,398.2 5,576.0 5,757.7 5,943.5 6,133.4  9.7  10.1  10.4  10.8  11.1  11.5  11.9 
Annual  change  - 170.2 173.9 177.8 181.8 185.8 189.9  -  12.3  12.7  13.1  13.5  13.9  14.4 
Interest  accrual  - 120.3 124.3 128.5 132.7 137.0 141.5  -  8.7  9.1  9.5  9.9  10.3  10.7  Italy 
Shift in projection 
window  - 50.0 49.6 49.3 49.0 48.7 48.4  -  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.7  3.7 
Fiscal  imbalance  101.7  106.6  111.6  116.8  122.1  127.7  133.4 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.4 
Annual  change  - 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8  -  17.5  17.8  18.1  18.4  18.7  19.0 
Interest  accrual  - 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0  - 8.8 9.0 9.3 9.5 9.8  10.0  Luxembourg 
Shift in projection 
window  - 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7  - 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.9 8.9 9.0 
Fiscal  imbalance  2,556.3 2,655.2 2,757.3 2,863.1 2,972.4 3,085.5 3,202.4  9.0  9.4  9.7  10.0  10.4  10.8  11.1 
Annual  change  - 98.8  102.2  105.7  109.3  113.1  116.9  - 20.0 20.5 21.0 21.5 22.0 22.5 
Interest  accrual  - 60.8 63.2 65.6 68.1 70.7 73.4  - 12.3 12.7 13.0 13.4 13.8 14.2  Netherlands 
Shift in projection 
window  - 38.0 39.0 40.1 41.2 42.3 43.5  -  7.7  7.8  8.0  8.1  8.2  8.4 
Fiscal  imbalance  967.1 1,005.1 1,044.2 1,084.3 1,125.5 1,167.8 1,211.2  8.5  8.8  9.1  9.5  9.8  10.1  10.5 
Annual  change  - 38.1 39.1 40.1 41.2 42.3 43.4  - 16.1 16.5 16.9 17.2 17.6 18.0 
Interest  accrual  - 23.0 23.9 24.9 25.8 26.8 27.8  -  9.7 10.1 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.6  Austria 
Shift in projection 
window  - 15.0 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6  -  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.5  6.5 
     
 
Table 3.3 (continued) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Country Measure 
€ billions  FI as percent of PV_GDP and 
annual change and components as percent of annual GDP) 
Fiscal  imbalance  703.4  730.1  757.7  785.9  814.9  844.7  875.3 10.1 10.5 10.9 11.3 11.7 12.1 12.6 
Annual  change  - 26.8 27.5 28.3 29.0 29.8 30.6  - 18.6 19.1 19.5 20.0 20.4 21.0 
Interest  accrual  - 16.7 17.4 18.0 18.7 19.4 20.1  - 11.6 12.0 12.4 12.9 13.3 13.8  Portugal 
Shift in projection 
window  - 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5  -  7.0  7.0  7.1  7.1  7.1  7.2 
Fiscal  imbalance  819.7 852.2 885.8 920.6 956.5 993.6  1,031.9  9.6  9.9  10.3  10.7  11.1  11.5  12.0 
Annual  change  - 32.5 33.6 34.7 35.9 37.1 38.3  - 21.2 21.7 22.2 22.8 23.3 23.8 
Interest  accrual  - 19.5 20.3 21.1 21.9 22.8 23.6  - 12.7 13.1 13.5 13.9 14.3 14.7  Sweden 
Shift in projection 
window  - 13.0 13.3 13.7 14.0 14.3 14.6  -  8.5  8.6  8.7  8.9  9.0  9.1 
Fiscal  imbalance 1,214.6  1,264.1  1,315.5  1,369.1  1,424.7  1,482.5  1,542.6 7.3 7.6 7.8 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.1 
Annual  change  - 49.5 51.5 53.5 55.6 57.8 60.0  - 17.4 17.9 18.3 18.8 19.4 19.9 
Interest  accrual  - 28.9 30.1 31.3 32.6 33.9 35.3  - 10.1 10.4 10.7 11.0 11.4 11.7  Finland 
Shift in projection 
window  - 20.6 21.4 22.2 23.1 23.9 24.7  -  7.2  7.4  7.6  7.8  8.0  8.2 
Fiscal  imbalance 7,666.1  8,009.6  8,366.4  8,736.9  9,121.6  9,520.7  9,934.5 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.2 
Annual  change  - 343.5 356.7 370.5 384.7 399.1 413.8  -  19.5  19.9  20.3  20.7  21.1  21.6 
Interest  accrual  - 182.5 190.6 199.1 207.9 217.1 226.6  -  10.3  10.6  10.9  11.2  11.5  11.8 
United 
Kingdom 
Shift in projection 
window  - 161.1 166.1 171.4 176.7 182.0 187.2  -  9.1  9.3  9.4  9.5  9.6  9.8 
Fiscal  imbalance  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Annual  change  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Interest  accrual  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  Cyprus 
Shift in projection 
window  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Fiscal  imbalance  514.0 538.6 564.1 590.5 618.0 646.5 675.9  8.6  9.0  9.5  9.9  10.4  10.9  11.4 
Annual  change  - 24.6 25.5 26.5 27.5 28.5 29.5  - 27.6 28.2 28.7 29.3 29.8 30.3 
Interest  accrual  - 12.2 12.8 13.4 14.1 14.7 15.4  - 13.8 14.2 14.6 15.0 15.4 15.8 
Czech 
Republic 
Shift in projection 
window  - 12.3 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.7 14.1  - 13.9 14.0 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 
     
 
Table 3.3 (continued) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Country Measure 
€ billions  FI as percent of PV_GDP and 
annual change and components as percent of annual GDP) 
Fiscal  imbalance  41.0  43.9  47.1  50.5  54.1  58.0  62.2 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.6 4.9 
Annual  change  - 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.2  -  31.1  31.9  32.9  33.8  34.6  35.5 
Interest  accrual  - 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4  -  10.3  10.5  10.8  11.1  11.5  11.8  Estonia 
Shift in projection 
window  - 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8  -  20.8  21.4  22.0  22.6  23.2  23.7 
Fiscal  imbalance  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Annual  change  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Interest  accrual  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  Hungary 
Shift in projection 
window  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fiscal  imbalance  89.5  95.4  101.7  108.5  115.7  123.4  131.5 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.3 5.6 
Annual  change  - 5.9 6.3 6.8 7.2 7.7 8.1  -  31.5  32.2  33.0  33.7  34.5  35.2 
Interest  accrual  - 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9  -  11.3  11.5  11.8  12.1  12.4  12.7  Lithuania 
Shift in projection 
window  - 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.2  -  20.2  20.7  21.2  21.7  22.1  22.5 
Fiscal  imbalance  68.1  72.3  76.8  81.6  86.7  92.0  97.7 4.9 5.2 5.6 6.0 6.3 6.8 7.2 
Annual  change  - 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.6  -  36.5  37.2  38.0  38.7  39.4  40.1 
Interest  accrual  - 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2  -  13.9  14.2  14.5  14.8  15.2  15.6  Latvia 
Shift in projection 
window  - 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.5  -  22.6  23.0  23.4  23.8  24.2  24.6 
Fiscal  imbalance  18.7 19.3 19.9 20.5 21.1 21.7 22.4 12.8 13.1 13.4 13.7 14.0 14.4 14.7 
Annual  change  - 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7  -  13.5  14.0  14.4  14.9  15.5  16.0 
Interest  accrual  - 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  -  10.4  10.8  11.3  11.7  12.2  12.7  Malta 
Shift in projection 
window  - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  - 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 
Fiscal  imbalance  3,162.9 3,386.9 3,626.6 3,882.8 4,156.1 4,447.3 4,757.0  9.0  9.7  10.4  11.2  12.0  12.9  13.8 
Annual  change  - 224.0 239.7 256.2 273.3 291.2 309.7  - 104.4 106.1 107.7 109.3 110.8 112.2 
Interest  accrual  - 75.3 80.6 86.3 92.4 98.9  105.8  - 35.1 35.7 36.3 36.9 37.6 38.4  Poland 
Shift in projection 
window  - 148.7 159.1 169.9 180.9 192.3 203.8  -  69.3  70.4  71.4  72.3  73.1  73.9 
     
 
Table 3.3 (continued) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Country Measure 
€ billions  FI as percent of PV_GDP and 
annual change and components as percent of annual GDP) 
Fiscal  imbalance  390.7 415.7 442.3 470.5 500.4 531.9 565.1  8.7  9.3  9.9  10.6  11.3  12.0  12.8 
Annual  change  - 25.1 26.6 28.2 29.8 31.5 33.3  - 70.9 72.0 73.1 74.2 75.2 76.1 
Interest  accrual  -  9.3  9.9 10.5 11.2 11.9 12.7  - 26.3 26.8 27.3 27.8 28.4 29.0  Slovakia 
Shift in projection 
window  - 15.8 16.7 17.7 18.6 19.6 20.6  - 44.6 45.2 45.8 46.3 46.8 47.2 
Fiscal  imbalance  197.2 207.7 218.7 230.1 242.0 254.4 267.3  8.7  9.2  9.6  10.2  10.7  11.2  11.8 
Annual  change  - 10.5 11.0 11.4 11.9 12.4 12.9  - 39.1 39.7 40.3 40.8 41.4 41.9 
Interest  accrual  - 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.8 6.1  -  17.4  17.9  18.3  18.8  19.2  19.7  Slovenia 
Shift in projection 
window  - 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8  -  21.7  21.8  22.0  22.1  22.1  22.2 
 
 
Table 3.4  Comparing Public Balances and Accruing Fiscal Imbalances in EU Countries for 2005 (€ billions) 
  Public 
Deficit  FI Accrual   Public 
Deficit  FI Accrual       Public 
Deficit  FI Accrual 
Belgium -0.3 32.6    Luxembourg  0.6  4.8    Estonia  -0.2 3.0 
Denmark  -10.2  28.1   Netherlands  1.5  98.8   Lithuania  5.4  5.9 
Germany 74.0 342.5    Austria  3.7  38.1    Latvia  0.1  4.2 
Greece  8.2  68.8   Portugal  8.8  26.8   Malta  0.0  0.6 
Spain  -10.0  85.2   Finland  -4.1  32.5   Poland  0.2  224.0 
France 49.6  368.2    Sweden -8.4  49.5    Slovakia  6.1  25.1 
Ireland -1.6  39.6    UK  64.5  343.5    Slovenia  1.1  10.5 
Italy 58.1  170.2    Czech  Rep.  2.6  24.6    EU benchmark 10.6 79.8  
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 Total  FI  Debt  FI-Debt     Total  FI  Debt  FI-Debt 
Belgium  854 273 581   Sweden  1,215 144 1071 
Denmark  754 84 670   UK  7,666 685 6981 
Germany  9,263 1451 7812   Cyprus     
Greece  1,470 183 1288   Czech  Rep.  514 28 486 
Spain  2,045 389 1656   Estonia  41 1 41 
France  9,111 1069 8042   Hungary     
Ireland  600 44 556   Lithuania  90 4 86 
Italy  5,054 1442 3612   Latvia  68 2 67 
Luxembourg  102 2 100   Malta  19 3 16 
Netherlands  2,556 257 2299   Poland  3,163 95 3068 
Austria  967 151 817   Slovakia  391 15 376 
Portugal  703 84 620   Slovenia  197 8 190 
Finland  820 67 752    EU 
bench’k 
1,971 282 1690 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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 Total  FI  Debt  FI-Debt     Total  FI  Debt  FI-Debt 
Belgium  5.9 1.9 4.0   Sweden  7.3 0.9 6.4 
Denmark  7.8 0.9 6.9   UK  6.4 0.6 5.9 
Germany  9.2 1.4 7.7   Cyprus  0.0    
Greece  10.9 1.4  9.5   Czech  Rep.  8.6 0.5 8.1 
Spain  5.4 1.0 4.4   Estonia  3.2 0.0 3.1 
France  9.7 1.1 8.5   Hungary     
Ireland  3.4 0.3 3.2   Lithuania  3.8 0.1 3.6 
Italy  9.7 2.8 7.0   Latvia  4.9 0.1 4.8 
Luxembourg  5.1 0.1 5.0   Malta  12.8 2.2 10.6 
Netherlands  9.0 0.9 8.1   Poland  9.0 0.3 8.8 
Austria  8.5 1.3 7.2   Slovakia  8.7 0.3 8.4 
Portugal  10.1 1.2  8.9   Slovenia  8.7 0.3 8.3 
Finland  9.6 0.8 8.8 
 EU 
bench’k  8.3 1.2 7.1 
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  PV_GDP 
(€ billions)     PV_GDP 
(€ billions)     PV_GDP 
(€ billions) 
Belgium  14,435   Netherlands  28,326   Hungary   
Denmark  9,653   Austria  11,401   Lithuania  2,375 
Germany  101,130   Portugal  6,985   Latvia  1,387 
Greece  13,530   Finland  8,580   Malta  146 
Spain  37,851   Sweden  16,682   Poland  34,970 
France  94,327   UK  118,870   Slovakia  4,470 
Ireland  17,435   Cyprus     Slovenia  2,271 
Italy  51,949   Czech  Rep.  5,987   EU  bench’k  23,891 
Luxembourg  1,982   Estonia  1,292      
 







The excellent chapter by Jagadeesh Gokhale tries to answer the crucial question on how 
the EU countries should cope with ageing populations in the euro area characterised by 
centralised monetary policy and decentralised fiscal (economic) policies. The author 
draws on his extensive research in the area of intertemporal allocation of resources and its 
implications for the design of sustainable pension policies. 
This issue is highly topical in the face of population ageing in the coming decades 
worldwide and especially in Europe. In particular, the reform of the EUs fiscal 
framework, the Stability and Growth Pact underscores the importance of appropriately 
catering for long-term sustainability concerns also in the medium-term budgetary policy-
making process. In more practical terms, the chapter focuses on fiscal imbalances 
measures. A similar measure, though with some differences, is regularly used in the EUs 
analysis of long-term fiscal sustainability (called the S2 sustainability gap indicator; see 
European Commission, 2006).  
With regard to the results in the chapter, it should be noted that the chapter's estimated 
fiscal imbalance of some 8% of GDP (about 7% points due to implicit debt and about 1% 
point due to explicit debt), is considerably higher than the Commission's estimate of 3½% 
of GDP (according to the so-called S2 sustainability gap indicator consistent with 
respecting the intertemporal budget constraint of the government over an infinite 
horizon). An important source of difference could be the assumption of ‘current policies’. 
Gokhale appears to assume that the tax/benefit structure of age and gender remains 
unchanged over time (a preliminary assumption that may need to be modified). The 
Commission’s data allows splitting the projected increase in the pension expenditure ratio 
in the EU. While the old-age dependency effect is very strong, reflecting the projected 
strong increase in the old-age dependency ratio (doubling in the period to 2050), this is to 
a considerable degree offset by a notable decrease in the benefit ratio (i.e. average 
pensions in relation to GDP per worker) and also to some extent by lower take-up ratio 
(see again European Commission, 2006).  
This results from the fact that the EUs long-term budgetary projections explicitly model 
the institutional settings in each Member State with respect to pensions. In many cases, 
this implies that public spending on pensions on average will rise slower than average 
income in the future, due to pension system reforms aimed at exactly containing spending 
pressures arising from an increased number of older people. 
The impact of reforms is very important in the EU fiscal surveillance. In particular, with 
the reform of the SGP, the medium-term objectives for the government budgetary 
position should fulfil a triple aim: (i) provide a safety margin with respect to the 3% of 
                                                 
*   The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and are not attributable to the European 
Commission.      
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GDP deficit limit; (ii) ensure rapid progress towards sustainability; and, (iii) taking 
account of the first two, allow room for budgetary manoeuvre and in particular public 
investment. The MTOs should furthermore be revised when a major reforms that improve 
fiscal sustainability have been undertaken, or at least every four years. It would be an 
advantage if fiscal indicators reflected the long-term budgetary impact of major reforms 
and the design of fiscal imbalance indicators therefore was made in such a way that they 
displayed this desirable property. 
The fiscal imbalance measure proposed in the chapter could actually underestimate the 
sustainability challenge. Indeed, if there is a fiscal imbalance after the last year (i.e. 
2051), or, if there is an ageing impact also beyond that year, this would not be captured 
by the measure. This would, as for example in the mainstream US Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) calculations, give rise to the ‘rolling window’ problem; when the horizon is 
extended, an additional imbalance is added. Fiscal indicators for assessing the long-term 
sustainability of public finances should gainfully reflect the size of the fiscal challenge, or 
imbalance over the long-term. The design of fiscal imbalance indicators could therefore 
be made in a way so that they avoid possible underestimation of the size of the challenge 
by opting for an infinite horizon rather than an ad hoc cut-off point, as indeed highlighted 
in the chapter. 




The Measurement of the Underlying 
Budgetary Position and Discretionary 
Fiscal Policy     
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4.   
 
Budget Balances Decomposed: Tracking Fiscal Policy in Austria 




4.1   Introduction and Motivation 
The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) stipulate that budget 
balances in EU countries should be balanced over the business cycle, since this would 
allow automatic stabilisers to work properly in cushioning cyclical fluctuations and to 
create some room for discretionary policy. Hence, in order to act in accordance with the 
intention of the SGP, governments should avoid pro-cyclical policies in recessions and 
strive for budgetary consolidation during economic booms; in other words, governments 
should behave counter-cyclically and react symmetrically to output fluctuations. This 
“ideal” notwithstanding, there is some evidence that fiscal policy behaved more pro-
cyclically than counter-cyclically in the past decades. Thus the question arises to which 
extent a fiscal policy regime change is or would have been necessary in order for 
governments to comply with the spirit of the European fiscal rules.  
In order to analyse this issue for a country – as we do for Austria in this chapter – one has 
to assess whether discretionary fiscal policy has actually offset or reinforced the operation 
of automatic fiscal stabilisers, whether there have been significant transitory variations in 
the fiscal position unrelated to business cycle fluctuations, and what the behaviour of the 
underlying (“core”) fiscal position over time has been. The variability of the latter reflects 
discretionary measures not related to the cycle, such as permanent consolidation 
measures, measures aiming at distributional and allocative/structural goals or effects of 
macroeconomic shocks, demographic changes, etc. 
The economic cycle affects a government’s fiscal position – this is all but new. 
Correcting budget balances for the effects of the business cycle in general gives a better 
measure of the policy-related part of the budget and reduces the simultaneity bias that 
may arise as budgets and economic growth interact. The conventional approach relies on 
adjusting the budget balance for the impact of the automatic stabilisers, i.e. decomposing 
the budget balance into two components: the cyclically adjusted balance and the 
automatic stabiliser component (or cyclical component). Adjusting the budget balance for 
the impact of the automatic stabilisers is only appropriate, for example, for predicting the 
room for discretionary stabilisation policy measures in an economic slowdown, given a 
threshold for the general government deficit (since in this case the cyclical component 
should indeed be limited to effects of the automatic stabilisers). If, however, the aim is to 
analyse the policy behaviour related to macroeconomic developments, the adjustment 
                                                 
*   The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Federal 
Ministry of Finance, Austria and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. We are grateful to Jonas Fischer 
for helpful comments.     
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should also include discretionary fiscal measures that have been a normal feature of a 
country’s stabilisation policy (Boije, 2004).  
On closer inspection, however, the cyclically adjusted budget balance contains several 
components that capture different dimensions of fiscal policy, such as a core balance 
describing the underlying fiscal position; a component reflecting discretionary fiscal 
policy responses to the business cycle that can move either pro- or counter-cyclically with 
the output gap; and a residual component capturing all remaining shocks to the fiscal 
position, reflecting transitory changes in the fiscal position due to non-stabilisation-
oriented discretionary policy and/or macroeconomic shocks.
50 Disregarding these latter 
aspects could provide an explanation for the sometimes quite substantial variations of 
cyclically adjusted balances during the cycle.  
Following an approach suggested by Jaeger (1998) and expanded by Brandner and 
Diebalek (2000), we track fiscal policy behaviour over time by decomposing the observed 
budget balance (as a percentage of GDP) into four unobserved components: (1) a core 
balance, (2) an automatic or built-in fiscal stabiliser component, (3) a component 
reflecting discretionary fiscal policy responses to the business cycle, and (4) a component 
reflecting all other transitory shocks to the fiscal position.  
By means of an unobserved components (UC) model, we provide an estimate of a core 
balance for Austria. For this purpose we analyse the relationship between the budget 
balance and the cyclical development of the Austrian economy by looking at the impact 
of both automatic stabilisers and discretionary policies aimed at output stabilisation – 
with particular attention to the latter.
51 By doing this, we can assess whether fiscal policy 
in a broader sense was pro- or counter-cyclical or reacted asymmetrically in up- or 
downturns. Moreover, by looking at disaggregated data, we can answer the question 
whether the pro-cyclicality / counter-cyclicality was related primarily to the expenditure 
or the revenue side.  
In section 4.2 we discuss some related literature before we move on to explain the 
methodology chosen in section 4.3. Section 4.4 is devoted to the discussion of the main 
results of our study; in section 4.5 we draw some conclusions.  
4.2   Related Literature 
The behaviour of fiscal policy over the business cycle has received increasing attention 
from researchers in recent years. The conventional wisdom is that fiscal policy should be 
counter-cyclical, stabilising economic growth around potential. In a recession, this would 
call for higher deficits, while in a boom a contractionary budget would help dampen 
cyclical upswings and prevent the economy from overheating. This “ideal” 
                                                 
50   Galí and Perotti (2003) conceptually split the cyclically adjusted budget balance into a “systematic” 
or “endogenous” component (a component that reflects changes in structural spending or revenues in 
a systematic way in response to changes in the actual or expected cyclical conditions of the 
economy; corresponding to γ in section 4.3) and in a “non-systematic” or “exogenous” component 
(that captures changes in the budget variables that do not correspond to systematic responses in 
cyclical conditions, but are instead the consequence of exogenous political processes of 
extraordinary non-economic circumstances; corresponding to what we name core balance in this 
paper). 
51   Further research will focus on the analysis of the “driving forces” of the core balance.      
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notwithstanding, evidence of pro-cyclicality in fiscal policy has been uncovered in a 
number of studies.  
Galí and Perotti (2003) show that EMU countries’ fiscal policies seem to have been 
significantly pro-cyclical in the pre-Maastricht period. In the post-Maastricht period, 
however, EMU countries’ fiscal policies appear to be more counter-cyclical. According to 
Galí and Perotti, the behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy during recessions turned 
from being somewhat pro-cyclical to becoming counter-cyclical. EMU countries seem to 
have been lagging behind non-EMU countries since they pursued largely pro-cyclical 
policies during the recession of the early 1990s and changed their behaviour only in the 
early 2000s. Galí and Perotti base their study on both a panel estimate and individual 
country regressions. With respect to Austria, interestingly, they find a mildly counter-
cyclical fiscal policy before Maastricht (a feature that is in contrast to all other EMU 
countries) and a stronger counter-cyclicality in the post-Maastricht period.  
Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) find pro-cyclical policies for the last three decades, at least 
for the EU. According to Hallerberg and Strauch, discretionary measures have tended to 
undermine automatic stabilisers while taxes have fluctuated counter-cyclically in a 
conventional manner. On the expenditure side, they find that public investment displays a 
consistent pro-cyclical pattern. The latter was also found by Alberola et al. (2003).  
Buti et al. (1997), too, state that contractionary fiscal policies prevailed during recessions 
and that fiscal discipline was lacking during the expansionary periods as deficits persisted 
during mild phases of expansions and only abated at the peaks. They conclude that the 
deterioration during expansions was much more marked than the strengthening of fiscal 
discipline during recessions, as the debt ratio grew sharply in the 1980s and the first half 
of the 1990s. 
Pro-cyclicality of fiscal behaviour in the EMU countries has also been observed by the 
IMF (2004). Based on a method very similar to Galí and Perotti (2003), the study shows 
that the degree of pro-cyclicality reflects, inter alia, country-specific budgetary 
institutions, structural characteristics, such as the sensitivity to real disturbances, and 
inherited fiscal positions. According to this IMF study, pro-cyclical fiscal impulses turn 
out to be more pronounced in good times (loosening) than in bad times (tightening), 
which points to the difficulty of resisting pressures to increase spending or cut taxes in 
the face of revenue windfalls. The study, however, also finds that the European fiscal 
framework appears to have led to some reduction in pro-cyclical fiscal behaviour in 
EMU, owing to a more counter-cyclical policy stance in bad times that was not balanced 
out by sufficient deficit reduction in good times. 
Also the European Commission (2001) comes to the conclusion that between 1970 and 
2000 the deficits of EU countries did not fall during favourable cyclical periods, i.e. that 
the effects of the automatic built-in stabilisers were offset by countries’ discretionary 
fiscal policies, namely by tax cuts and, in particular, by expenditure increases, which 
necessitated a tightening during economic downturns. 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) detect that in Latin American countries – in sharp contrast to the 
industrial economies – fiscal policies have been pro-cyclical, and particularly so in 
recessions. For industrial countries they find asymmetries insofar as budget surpluses 
increase during good times; during bad times, however, the fiscal response to changes in 
output growth is much larger. In their view, for industrial countries this is consistent with     
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the idea that recessions are economically and/or politically more costly than output 
booms, and that the fiscal policy response to them is accordingly stronger. But it is also 
consistent with the idea that some elements of the fiscal structure, such as unemployment 
compensation, are relatively insensitive to the business cycle at high levels of economic 
activity, but become larger in deep recessions. 
As pro-cyclicality contrasts with the stabilisation function of fiscal policy, a number of 
explanations are offered for these results, including conflicting policy goals, information 
problems (real-time data problems), complexity of decision-making and implementation 
lags. Talvi and Vegh (2000) offer a model rationalising pro-cyclical fiscal policies 
primarily in developing countries but also in the industrialised world – for countries with 
a large variability of the tax base in general. If the latter is the case, tax smoothing would 
require large deficits to be run in economic downturns, and high surpluses in upswings. 
But finance ministers may be tempted to avoid large surpluses knowing that they will 
nurture political pressures to spend public monies, and prefer to run a pro-cyclical policy. 
Tornell and Lane (1999), on the other hand, argue that the degree of political competition 
increases during upswings. After all, each group or power block competing for public 
resources knows that governments will not run surpluses during economic expansions, 
but that other groups will increase their appropriate share by an even greater amount. 
Therefore, they will compete more intensely for resources during expansions, and less so 
during recessions. As a consequence, fiscal policy becomes more pro-cyclical the more 
fragmented and open governments are to such pressures.  
Yet a range of literature also points to possible asymmetries in fiscal responses to 
recessions and upturns. Mayes and Virén (2004) find strong evidence of asymmetric 
cyclical behaviour of government deficits, with these asymmetries mainly relating to the 
cyclically adjusted deficit. Structural deficits increase when output shrinks, but structural 
deficits (structural surpluses) also tend to increase (decrease) when output expands. 
According to Mayes and Virén, the different cyclical effects show up in both revenues 
and expenditures. Revenues seem to be more sensitive to output growth in depressions 
than in booms. Thus, in booms, the revenue/trend output ratio remains more or less 
constant, while in depressions it decreases quite markedly. Expenditures seem to increase 
in depressions and decrease in booms. They conclude that from the viewpoint of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, the main problem appears to be behaviour in “good times” when 
discretionary action does not seem to help smooth the output growth path.  
Also the OECD (2003) concludes – on the basis of a panel estimate – that, overall, 
countries conducted pro-cyclical fiscal policies in cyclical upturns and counter-cyclical 
policies in downturns. However, sustainability problems associated with indebtedness 
seem to be a key determinant of whether the fiscal stance is pro-cyclical during 
downturns.  
Forni and Momigliano (2004), using real time data, find that fiscal policy was generally 
counter-cyclical during adverse economic periods. They conclude that fiscal policy was 
more counter-cyclical at the beginning of the 1990s than during the recent downturns.  
Balassone and Francese (2004), too, highlight that fiscal policies in OECD countries have 
been counter-cyclical mainly in downturns. While automatic stabilisers are left free to 
operate during downturns, during expansions their effect is compensated by discretionary 
loosening, which implies that budgetary balances are not improving in upturns.     
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Moreover, they show that overall elasticities (including the discretionary actions) are 
asymmetric with respect to upturns and downturns.  
Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) show that fiscal policies have not operated symmetrically 
over the business cycle as governments have been more prone to stimulate economies in 
downswings via expanding budgets than to restrict economic growth in upswings via 
tightening budget balances. 
In contrast to the above mentioned studies, Mélitz (2000) highlights that fiscal policy 
responds in a stabilising manner to the cycle; the automatic stabilisation through fiscal 
policy is, however, much weaker than generally perceived.
52 Moreover, while expansion 
raises tax receipts, it also raises government expenditures. Net stabilisation therefore only 
occurs because of a larger reaction of taxes than expenditures. His findings are in 
principle in line with Wyplosz (1999), who also shows the “same mildness” of the 
stabilising response to the cycle. According to Wyplosz’s estimates an extra percent of 
output above potential raises the primary budget surplus by 0.18 (Mélitz’s estimate, in 
contrast, amounts to about 0.10). This actually means weak automatic stabilisation in 
contrast to what is usually estimated (see van den Noord (2000), Girouard and André 
(2005)). Lane (2003) finds that current government spending tends to be mildly counter-
cyclical; however, the government consumption component of current spending, in 
particular wage government spending, is pro-cyclical. Hence, he concludes that the 
counter-cyclical behaviour of current government spending emanates from the behaviour 
of government transfers (automatic stabilisers) and/or debt interest payments. The most 
pro-cyclical component of government spending is government investment.
53 Hercowitz 
and Strawczynski (2004) – similar to Lane (2003) – find the deficit/GDP ratio to be 
counter-cyclical. According to their finding, this is mostly due to recessions whereas in 
expansions, the deficit/GDP ratio is essentially a-cyclical. 
In checking for the cycle dependency of cyclically adjusted figures of the European 
Commission (EC), Alberola et al. (2003) by means of a panel estimate conclude that the 
cyclical component seems to be overestimated, which means that the cyclically adjusted 
balances tend to be overestimated during downturns and underestimated during 
expansions. According to their findings, the overall impact seems, however, to be 
counter-cyclical in general. In their opinion this result might signal a problem with the 
computation of elasticities, which turn out to be too high; at the same time, the results 
could capture a systematic discretionary reaction of governments to developments in 
economic activity. But, as they state, it does not appear to be easy to disentangle the two 
possibilities from each other.   
The approaches taken for investigating the cyclical-related impact of fiscal policies (from 
built-in stabilisers as well as from deliberate policy decision) are quite heterogenous. 
Some studies analyse overall changes in the budget balance (primary or total), without 
distinguishing between discretionary actions and automatic stabilisers (e.g. Mélitz (2000), 
Balassone and Francese (2004), Tujula and Wolswijk (2004), Lane (2003), Mayes and 
Virén (2004), Fatás and Mihov (2001)) whereas others analyse changes in the cyclically 
                                                 
52   According to Wyplosz (2002) this mildly stabilizing response (coefficients of 0.1-0.2 instead of 
around 0.5) could be an effect of the extension of the sample period to include the 1990s, an atypical 
period of low growth and closing down of the deficit to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. It 
may also reflect the combination of the counter-cyclical automatic stabilizers, with an elasticity of 
0.5, with discretionary pro-cyclical actions. 
53   Also Alberola et al. (2003) confirm this result.     
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adjusted balances (e.g. Alberola et al. (2003), OECD (2003), Forni and Momigliano 
(2004)) or the impact on the level of cyclically adjusted primary balances (e.g. Galí and 
Perotti (2003)).  
4.3   A Stylised Framework 
Several techniques have been developed to estimate the variations of budget aggregates 
arising from the economic cycle.
54 The conventional approach (e.g. EC, OECD, IMF) to 
correct budget balances for fluctuations in economic activity starts from a notional 
decomposition of the observed budget balance  t b  into two (unobserved) components: the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance  t bs , often called "structural" balance, and a cyclical 
component  t ba  aimed at capturing the built-in stabilisers. To adequately estimate the 
cyclical component  t ba , various methods have been developed by international 
institutions such as the EC, the OECD, the IMF and the ECB. Within these approaches, 
the structural balance   t bs  is defined as the difference between the observed and the 
cyclical balance,  t t t ba b bs − = . Obviously, any other dimension of fiscal policy, even if it 
is related with the cycle, shows up in the structural component.  
However, if the focus is on the development of the underlying fiscal position (adjusted for 
all temporary impacts irrespective of whether they are “economy dependent or policy 
dependent”
55 (Braconier and Forsfält, 2004, p.4)) a direct calculation of the structural 
balance as a “long-run component” via specific filtering techniques (see Brandner et al., 
1998) may be more appropriate. If so, the effects of the built-in stabilisers as well as 
cyclically related discretionary measures are captured in the resulting "cyclical" 
component  t t t bs b ba − = .  
To analyse the issues raised, we set up a framework that allows distinguishing between 
several dimensions of fiscal policy, short-run vs. long-run, and active vs. passive. We 
start with a quite general decomposition  
t t t t t bd ba b ε μ + + + =        ( 4 . 1 )    
of the actual/observed balance  t b   into the core balance  t μ , two cyclically related 
components - namely  t ba  capturing the impact of the automatic stabilisers, and  t bd  
capturing the discretionary policy in response to the cycle - and a residual component  t ε  
reflecting all remaining (temporary) effects ("fiscal noise"). To be more precise, we 
specify 
a
t t t I ba ⋅ =α         ( 4 . 2 . 1 )    
d
t t t I bd ⋅ =γ         ( 4 . 2 . 2 )  
                                                 
54   However, all these techniques are subject to a number of methodological problems, notably defining 
trend/potential output – a shortcoming that unfortunately is also valid for our approach. 
55   I.e. pro- or countercyclical discretionary policy measures such as a temporary increase in the volume 
of labour-market programmes due to political decisions.     
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a
t I  and 
d
t I  are indicators for the cyclical developments which will be specified later on, 
and  t α  and  t γ  are the corresponding sensitivities/elasticities. The use of different 
indicators of the cyclical development is motivated by the fact that in general policy-
makers do not necessarily respond to variables economists have in mind.  
Inserting (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) in (4.1) constitutes our unobserved component model 





t t t t I I b ε γ α μ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =        ( 4 . 3 . 1 )  
links the observed balance to its components, while the state/transition equations  
1 1 + + + = t t t η μ μ    ) N(0,   iid ~ η σ ηt      (4.3.2) 
1 1 + + + = t t t ψ α α    ) N(0,   iid ~ ψ σ ψ t      (4.3.3) 
1 1 + + + = t t t ζ γ γ    ) N(0,   iid ~ ζ σ ζ t      (4.3.4)   
describe the dynamics of the states. In the estimation, the log-likelihood is constructed 
using the Kalman filter.
56 
Equation (4.3.2) specifies the core balance as a random walk, the innovations  t η  
capturing fiscal shocks that have a permanent or enduring impact on the level of the 
budget balance. Similarly, equations (4.3.3) and (4.3.4) set up the automatic sensitivity of 
the budget balance  t α  and the policy response  t γ  as random walks. While a positive 
(negative) sign of  t γ  typically indicates a counter-cyclical (pro-cyclical) reaction of 
discretionary fiscal policy, the sign is interpreted just the other way round in the case of 
expenditure variables. In principle, all three state equations could be generalised to 
include exogenous variables. We take (4.3.1)–(4.3.4) as a transparent, easy-to-use device 
to decompose budget balances.  
In the general representation (4.3.2)–(4.3.4) the states – and hence budget components – 
are assumed to move stochastically. If the estimation yields very small variances, this is 
an indication that the corresponding component is rather deterministic. In such a case, the 
model can be simplified by setting disturbances to zero (the states would then enter 
(4.3.1) as recursive coefficients).  
Since the focus of our interest lies primarily on the impact of the policy response to 
cyclical developments (rather than on the automatic stabilisers), we can estimate a 




t t t t I bs ε γ μ + ⋅ + =        ( 4 . 4 )   
and state equations (4.3.2) and (4.3.4). 
                                                 
56   Estimations have been carried out with RATS v6.     
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By taking the cyclically adjusted (primary) budget balance  t t t ba b bs − =  as calculated by 
the European Commission as dependent variables,
57 we refrain from estimating the 
cyclical component, which is thus  t
a
t t t GAP I ba ⋅ = ⋅ = α α . 
If, however, the discretionary policy response component and the automatic stabiliser 
component respond to the same cyclical indicator 




t t t t I b ε γ α μ + ⋅ + + = ) (   ,       (4.5.1)   
state equation (4.3.2) and  
1 1 ) ( ) ( + + + + = + t t t ξ γ α γ α  .    ) , 0 ( N   iid ~ ζ σ ζ t     (4.5.2) 
Whereas the actual budget balance is expressed as a ratio of nominal GDP, the core 
balance and the cyclically adjusted balances are expressed as ratios of nominal potential 
GDP (since cyclically adjusted balances should be interpreted as values of the deficits 
(surpluses) that would be observed if output were at some reference potential level). 
However, one should be aware of the fact that policy-makers, the public and international 
institutions such as the EC generally monitor the development of public finances relative 
to nominal GDP. Actual and cyclically adjusted budget balance figures as well as revenue 
and expenditure figures are taken from the AMECO database.  
The indicator 
a
t I  is always specified as the output gap. However, at the current stage of 
our research, the indicator 
d
t I  is specified as the output gap on the one hand and split up 
into 
+ d
t I  and 
− d
t I  on the other hand in order to capture upturns and downturns.
58  
4.4   Results  
Estimating the impact of the discretionary policy response to the cycle only (equation 
4.4), i.e. taking the cyclically adjusted total balance in % of potential GDP as dependent 
variable and the output gap as explanatory variable, gives a negative parameter value for 
γ  of a size of about -0.35 (see Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1). A negative value of 
this coefficient reveals a pro-cyclical impact of discretionary policy responses on cyclical 
developments.  
                                                 
57   The cyclically adjusted budget balance has been corrected for an estimated output gap 
(compositional effects are not taken into account), i.e. the budget balance figures are adjusted for a) 
the difference between actual output and estimated potential output (the output gap) and b) the 
difference between the actual unemployment rate and the estimated equilibrium unemployment rate 
(the unemployment gap).  
58   We intend to broaden the analysis to include the period t-1 expected real GDP growth rate of period t 
on which the respective budget draft in Austria is based. This projection is part of the regular 
economic outlook of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO). Even though growth does 
not represent an adequate proxy for cyclical conditions one has to bear in mind that politicians may 
just look at growth rates when taking discretionary decisions. Using real-time growth data moves the 
focus on the intentions fiscal policy makers had, when deciding discretionary measures, whereas the 
use of ex post output gap allows the assessment of the actual (or ex post) counter-/pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policies (Forni and Momigliano (2004)).     
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Figure 4.1  Results for the Total Balance  
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Table 4.1  Estimation Results 
    Dependent variable: cyclically adjusted balances (in % of potential GDP) 















var(ε)    0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00    0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
var(η)    0.86 1.15 0.79 0.84    0.95 1.04 0.74 0.85 
var(ξ)    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    .  .  .  . 
var(ξ
+)    . . . .   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
var(ξ
-)    . . . .   0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00 
             
F i n a l   s t a t e s :              
Core balance (μT)  -1.06 1.88 48.72  46.84    -1.06 1.87 48.69  46.83 
    (-0.35) (-0.04) (0.03)  (0.03)    (0.21) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Automatic stabilizer α 
*) 
(OECD/EC)  0.47 0.47 0.43 -0.04    0.47 0.47 0.43 -0.04 
Discretionary policy (γT)  -0.35 -0.37 -0.30  0.07   . . . . 
    (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)   . . . . 
          in upturns (γT
+)  . . . .   -0.42  -0.40 -0.43 0.00 
    . . . .   (0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) 
             
          in downturns (γT
-)  . . . .   -0.04  0.04  -0.11  0.12 
    . . . .   (0.42) (0.44) (0.23) (0.15) 
Notes: Sample period: 1976-2004; standard deviations in parenthesis 
*) Estimated by the OECD and used by the European Commission.     
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The comparison of this coefficient with the size of the overall budget sensitivity as 
estimated by the OECD and used by the EC (+0.47) leads to the conclusion that the 
overall impact of fiscal policy (summing up the automatic and discretionary components) 
was slightly counter-cyclical in Austria in the past.
59 Taking into account the fact that the 
overall budget sensitivity for Austria as estimated by the OECD was lower in earlier 
publications, this could indicate a slightly stronger counter-cyclicality of overall fiscal 
policy for recent years. 
Figure 4.1 also reveals that the core balance is slightly smoother than the cyclically 
adjusted budget balance. The driving forces of the core balance were major structural 
problems of the Austrian economy in the early 1980s; consolidation measures in the 
second half of the 1980s; a major income tax reform which came into effect in 1990; the 
implementation of long-term care benefits in 1993; the fiscal impact of EU membership 
in the mid-nineties; the implementation of further consolidation packages between 1995 
to 1997 in order to fulfil the Maastricht fiscal criteria in 1997; and another consolidation 
package in 2000/2001 to reach a balanced budget.  
The first result is confirmed when we use the alternative specification (4.5.1) and look for 
the “overall” budget sensitivity to the output gap, i.e. estimating the automatic and the 
policy response components in one go. A positive coefficient of 0.15 signals a slightly 
counter-cyclical behaviour overall.
60 Repeating the estimations with the primary budget 
balance gives nearly identical coefficients (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4).  
This finding contrasts with Galí and Perotti’s (2003) results. In their country estimates 
they find a slightly counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal response for Austria for the pre-
Maastricht period, which became stronger in the after-Maastricht period (but the 
coefficients are not statistically different from zero).  
A “pro-cyclical fiscal policy response” of the general government is, however, not much 
of a surprise; on the one hand it can be explained by the federal structure of government 
in Austria, consisting of the federal government, the nine provinces and the local 
governments (municipalities). The provincial and local governments’ fiscal policies have 
traditionally been aimed at balanced budgets – thus undermining the impact of the 
automatic stabilisers, in particular in downturns.
61 Thus, even if the federal government 
aims at counter-cyclical responses to cyclical developments, this ambition may be partly 
counteracted by the provincial and local governments’ fiscal strategy. 
Moreover, from the late 1970s to the end of the 1980s the federal government’s strategy 
was influenced by a budget rule termed the “Seidel formula” (see Katterl and Köhler-
                                                 
59   However, as stated by Alberola et al. (2003) (by means of a panel regression) such a result could 
also signal problems with the estimation of the budget elasticity. They actually find a negative and 
significant correlation between the output gap and the structural balance which they interpret as an 
overestimation of the cyclical component. Consequently, in downturns structural balances tend to be 
overestimated while they are underestimated in expansions.  
60   In order to filter out the effect of the interest expenditures we estimate the equations also with the 
cyclically adjusted and unadjusted primary balance as dependent variables.  
61   The resources of the provincial and local governments stem mainly from an elaborate tax sharing 
system and from federal transfers. The sub-levels mainly participate in cyclically sensitive tax 
revenues. Own sources of revenues are of less importance for the provincial governments, but of 
slightly more relevance for the local governments. Without any room for manoeuvre on the revenue 
side, the provincial and local governments in principle have to adjust their expenditures to the 
predetermined revenues (see Diebalek et al. (2005)).      
110 
Töglhofer, 2005), which set a threshold for the cash deficit of the federal government at a 
level of 2.5% of GDP.  
In a next step we ask whether cyclically adjusted spending and revenues (as a share of 
nominal potential GDP) react in a specific pro- or counter-cyclical manner. Our 
estimation results indicate a relatively strong pro-cyclical discretionary response of the 
cyclically adjusted revenues to the cycle (see Figure 4.5 and 4.6).  
Figure 4.3  Results for the Primary Balance 
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Figure 4.5  Results for the Total Revenues 
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Figure 4.7  Results for the Primary Expenditures 
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On the expenditure side, the relatively minor impact of the automatic stabilisers related to 
the unemployment transfers seems to be completely neutralised
62 (see Figures 4.7 and 
4.8).  
Next we check for an asymmetric cyclical behaviour in downturns and upturns, i.e. taking 
the cyclically adjusted (primary) budget balance as dependent variable and looking for 
                                                 
62   However, if the dependent variables are taken as ratios of the nominal GDP instead of potential 
nominal GDP we get a pronounced pro-cyclicality of the cyclically adjusted revenues and a 
pronounced counter-cyclicality of the cyclicality adjusted expenditures.     
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the discretionary fiscal policy impact in upturns (periods in which the real growth rate is 
above the potential growth rate) and downturns (periods in which the real growth rate is 
below the potential growth rate). It appears that in upturns a strong pro-cyclical 
discretionary policy impact dominates (however, the γ  coefficient is slightly smaller than 
the overall budget sensitivity estimated by the OECD for Austria),
63 whereas the pro-
cyclical impact in downturns turns out to be negligible. Hence, we can conclude that in 
Austria overall fiscal policy in downturns is counter-cyclical, whereas in upturns the 
working of automatic stabilisers is neutralised (see Figure 4.9). This is in principle in line 
with general findings based on panel regressions for OECD countries (such as those by 
OECD (2003), Balassone et al. (2004) or Forni and Momigliano (2004); these papers 
provide evidence for counter-cyclical behaviour in downturns and – at least the first two 
studies – pro-cyclicality in upturns.) 
Figure 4.9  Results for the Total Balance 
 
Finally we focus on the evolution of the core balances. Compared to the cyclically 
adjusted budget balances the core balances exhibits slightly less variability.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the variability of these reflect discretionary measures 
not related to the cycle, such as permanent consolidation measures, measures aiming at 
distributional and allocative/structural goals or effects of macroeconomic shocks, 
demographic changes, etc. Thus Figure 4.10 depicts major episodes of fiscal 
consolidation on the one hand and the introduction of expenditure measures aiming at 
further improving the Austrian welfare state on the other hand, as well as the impact of 
structural changes in the Austrian economy. 
For example, in 1984 Austria implemented a sizeable consolidation package, including 
the increase of the VAT rate and other indirect taxes as well as the contribution rate of the 
unemployment insurance scheme. Another big consolidation package was implemented 
                                                 
63   However, the coefficient is of the same size as the overall budget sensitivity calculated by the OeNB. 
Taking the OeNB’s value of the overall budget sensitivity would lead to the conclusion that the 
impact of the automatic stabilizers is completely neutralized in upturns. 
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in 1996-1997 in order to fulfil the fiscal Maastricht criteria. A further comparatively huge 
consolidation package was launched in 2000/2001 with the goal of bringing the general 
government budget to a close to balance position. While these events resulted in an 
improvement of the core primary balances, they also show up in the core revenue or core 
expenditure ratio, respectively, or in both, depending on the composition of the 
consolidation packages.  















































primary balance primary expenditures total revenues
 
The tremendous structural crisis that Austria faced at the beginning of the 1980s is also 
reflected in the development of the core primary balance. The worsening of the primary 
balance at the beginning of the 1990s was, however, caused, by the implementation of 
social policy measures, i.e. by extending the entitlement period for maternity leave 
payments from one to two years and in addition by implementing long-term care benefits 
without adequate financing measures. 
4.5   Conclusions  
Our estimation results so far highlight that, first of all, the overall effect of fiscal policy 
(the automatic stabilizer and discretionary policy component) in Austria has been slightly 
counter-cyclical. However, our estimates also indicate that discretionary policy in 
response to the business cycle has been pro-cyclical. Given the federal structure enabling 
the provincial and local governments to implement conflicting fiscal strategies, and given 
the fact that the central government budget was influenced (at least on average) by the 
rule that the cash deficit should not exceed the threshold of 2.5% of GDP, this result does 
not really come as a great surprise. Second, and more interestingly, there is the fact that in 
particular the revenue side seems to be prone to pro-cyclical responses whereas the 
relatively minor impact of the automatic stabilizers on the expenditure side seems to be 
completely neutralised. Finally – and this finding is generally in line with other studies – 
our estimates imply that during economic downturns the overall impact of fiscal policy 
seems to be counter-cyclical, whereas in periods of economic upturn the impact of 







The chapter by Peter Brandner, Leopold Diebalek and Walpurga Köhler-Töglhofer 
presents an unobserved component model that decomposes the budget balance into 
different components, namely a “core”-, an “automatic stabiliser”-, a “discretionary 
stabilization”- and a “residual” component. The method has been, for illustrative 
purposes, applied to Austrian budget data but the model is easily applicable to any 
country as the necessary budgetary data are readily available across countries. Indeed, the 
easy applicability is one of the key advantages of the approach. 
In terms of the results for Austria, they mainly confirm “conventional wisdom” in 
particular in that they indicate that discretionary fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical off-
setting some of the impact of the automatic stabilisers, especially in up-turns. Below I 
will concentrate my comments in this area and the implication of decomposing the 
cyclical part of the budget balance into a component related to the “automatic stabilisers” 
and a part related to “discretionary stabilisation.” This decomposition allows to study 
whether budget policies have been counter- or pro-cyclical over and beyond what can be 
ascribed to the automatic stabilisers. If pro-cyclical budget behaviour is observed, it may 
be of particular interest to know whether this “bad outcome” is due active government 
policies or whether it is events outside its control that is to blame? This distinction is 
important in the context of the application of the revised Stability and Growth Pact where 
the government's intent carries more weight than before the reform. Equally, it is an 
important distinction to make when assessing failures/accomplishments of the past budget 
behaviour with a view to draw conclusions on how to improve budget rules and 
institutions for the future. 
In this context I would like to make some comparisons between the authors 
decomposition and the most commonly alternative indicator used for the same purposes, 
namely the cyclically-adjusted budget balance: the CAB.
64 The CAB is the nominal 
budget balance adjusted with the (unobservable) estimated budget impact from the cycle. 
Several international institutions estimate CABs, notably the Commission, the ECB, the 
OECD and the IMF. Methods vary and the results differ on the margin across compilers 
but the basic approach is the same. I will first comment on what the author's 
decomposition and the CAB implies in relation to commonly used budget terms such as 
the “fiscal stance”, the “structural” budget balance, the “discretionary” policy component 
and the “fiscal impulse”. These budget concepts are useful to discuss various fiscal policy 
issues. However, lacking alternatives, the concepts are often captured by using the CAB 
across the board. 
                                                 
*   The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and are not attributable to the European 
Commission. 
64   The CAB is usually estimated as: CAB = nominal budget balance to GDP – budget sensitivity to the 
output gap * output gap.     
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As a starting point, Figure 4.11 provides a two-dimensional decomposition of the budget 
balance. Vertically, the budget balance is decomposed into factors which are economy-
induced and those which are policy-induced. Horizontally, a distinction is made factors 
with a temporary impact on the budget as opposed to those which have a permanent 
impact.  
Figure 4.11  Determinants of the Actual Budget Balance 







Square A would thus includes factors related to the temporary state of the economy at 
given tax and expenditure rules. An example would be unemployment benefit 
expenditures and temporary higher/lower tax revenues due to tax bases being temporarily 
higher/lower than their trend values or tax elasticities being temporarily higher/lower than 
normal. Square B, includes, for example, temporary higher expenditures due to 
discretionary stabilisation policy measures. Square C would capture, for example, how 
potential GDP and demographic trends affect the budget balance permanently, while 
square D includes the impact on the budget from permanent changes to tax and 
expenditure rules.
65 
On this basis a comparison of the coverage of the authors decomposition can be made to 
the coverage of the CAB in relation to the different budget concepts. This is done in 
Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2  What Do the Different Budget Indicators Capture? 
 
Budget Concept  Determinants of budget 
balance in Figure 4.11 
Corresponding best to 
which component in 
authors decomposition: 
Use of CAB 
(or primary CAB) 
Structural budget balance 
(level) 
C+D  Core component  CAB (B+C+D) 
Fiscal stance (change)  B+C+D  Discretionary component  
(B) 
Change CAB (B+C+D) 
Discretionary policy 
(change) 
B+D Discretionary  component 
(B) 
Change CAB (B+C+D) 
Fiscal impulse (change)  A+B+C+D  (n.a. change nominal 
balance) 
(n.a. change nominal 
balance) 
 
Let me go through the concepts in turn. First, if the aim is to capture the permanent 
budget trend all temporary influences should be taken out. This would correspond to the 
concept of a “structural budget balance” (C+D). The core component in the authors’ 
model would then seem most suitable to capture this. When the CAB on the other hand is 
                                                 








D     
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used for this purpose policy induced temporary factors (box B) are not netted out. In fact, 
this distinction is increasingly recognised and for example the Commission now regularly 
net out "one-off budget measures" from the CAB and labels this as the “structural budget 
balance.” 
Second, the “fiscal stance” relates to whether the budget balance, over and beyond the 
impact of the automatic stabilisers, contribute or not to smooth the cycle. This would 
imply netting out the cyclical economy induced component and look at boxes B+C+D. 
Using the authors model the "discretionary component" would probably be used to assess 
the fiscal stance. However, the change in the CAB would be better designed for this 
purpose. While it is straightforward that boxes B and D should be included in a measure 
of the fiscal stance it may be less clear with box C which takes into account economy 
induced permanent changes. Ultimately it depends on the precise question to be analysed.  
Lastly, if the interest is to identify the impact of discretionary policy decisions, then 
temporary and permanent economy-induced budget components should not be taken into 
account (thus look at B+D). Here it is worth noting that if the CAB is used for this 
purpose it would include also economy induced permanent changes (box C) while the 
discretionary component in the authors model would not capture policy induced 
permanent changes (box D). The overall point here is that it is important to be precise in 
what is the objective of the analysis and what the indicator used actually captures. 
Conceptually at least, the authors "core component" would be better than the CAB when 
assessing the structural budget balance while the change in the CAB would be best 
designed to capture the "fiscal stance" as understood here. To study the "discretionary 
policy" response of the government the model looks better designed from a conceptual 
perspective than the change in the CAB.  
It is also worth looking a bit closer at some aspects related to what is actually meant by 
"discretionary policy" when using budget indicators.
66. One issue relates to budget rules 
across layers of government. For example, say that a local government (where most of 
government consumption takes place) runs deficits to cover for higher expenditures, 
albeit they are forbidden to borrow, but that they are bailed out by the central level 
through additional grants. This could be regarded as a discretionary measure by the 
government (box B above), given that a separate decision was taken to this end, but it 
could also be regarded as “semi-automatic” if it is common practice (box A above). 
Clearly, how it is counted may make a difference in the policy assessment. Another issue 
relates to the benchmark used for what is “neutral policy” and then in particular the 
indexation of expenditures. CAB calculations based on trend GDP estimates use as 
implicit benchmark that expenditures develop in line with potential GDP. If some 
expenditures, such as welfare expenditures, are instead indexed to nominal GDP the 
difference between the two growth rates would not be included in the "cyclical part" and 
thus be counted as non-cyclical. In fact, to the extent that expenditures are actually 
indexed, to say inflation, these items could be labelled “automatic destabilisers”! Overall, 
it is the non-indexation of expenditures which provides most of the cyclical stabilisation 
from the budget. 
My last comment relates to the budget balance itself: observable and the base for most 
budget indicators. Further work to decompose the nominal balance in sub components 
allowing better to analyse different budget behaviour is of course very useful to make 
                                                 
66   See also Boije and Fischer (2006).     
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assessments better. Nevertheless, in a setting where the objective is to give short term 
policy advice based on the latest figures, it should be reminded that the large volatility 
and uncertainty lies with the revisions to the nominal balance, from the initial estimated 
to the final outcomes some years later,
67 and that this uncertainty by far outweighs any 
difference from using alternative approaches to estimate the cycle or the cyclical 
component of the budget. However, looking at longer historical time series the issue is 
quite different and the authors approach will hopefully soon be tested and used also for 
additional countries. 
                                                 
67   See for example Gordo and Nogueira Martins (2007).     
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5.   
 
The Dynamic Behaviour of Budget Components and Output – the 
Cases of France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain 





In recent years, we have witnessed a worldwide swing towards fiscal profligacy. In the 
European Union, this has come somewhat as a surprise as the Maastricht Treaty and 
afterwards the Stability and Growth Pact seemed to have put in place a set of fiscal rules 
that guarantee the sustainability of public finances. The difficulty in applying the Pact, 
first to Portugal and later on to France and Germany, has been followed by a more 
widespread breach of the 3% deficit limit in several EU countries. A revised version of 
the Pact was adopted in March 2005, and takes a more flexible approach in terms of 
curbing excessive deficits over a longer period of time, and pays more attention to 
sustainability of public finances. As part of the Lisbon Strategy, considerably more 
attention is given to the composition of budget adjustments with a view to promoting 
economic growth. 
A variety of political and economic factors probably underlie the observed rise in public 
deficit and debt ratios. We try to uncover any underlying past trends behind the 
development of public finances that may contribute to explaining recent budgetary 
outlook in France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain. While the first three countries were 
subject to several steps of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Spain on the other hand could 
be seen as an example of more vigorous fiscal management. We are particularly 
interested in the underlying causes of the breach of the Pact’s rules by looking into 
adjustments in various budget components. At the same time, we look into how these 
adjustments contribute to the long-term growth prospects and outlook for the 
sustainability of public finances. 
To that end, we construct a model-based indicator of structural balance by combining 
insights from the growing empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy – modelled 
                                                 
*   We are grateful to Luís Costa, Arne Gieseck, Michael Thöne, Jürgen von Hagen, Jan in't Veld, 
seminar participants at the ECB (Frankfurt), at ISEG/UTL (Lisbon), at the 61st European Meeting of 
the Econometric Society (Vienna), and at the DG ECFIN workshop on Fiscal Indicators for EU 
Budgetary Surveillance (Brussels) for helpful comments and discussions. Valuable assistance of 
Renate Dreiskena with the data is highly appreciated. The opinions expressed herein are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem. Peter Claeys thanks the 
Fiscal Policies Division of the ECB for its hospitality. This research was supported by a Marie Curie 
Intra-European Fellowship within the 6
th European Community Framework Programme. UECE is 
supported by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal), financed by ERDF and 
Portugese funds.     
120 
with structural VARs – with statistical methods for cyclically adjusting fiscal balances. 
Our approach innovates on extant evidence in using a mixture of short and long-term 
restrictions to identify economic and fiscal shocks in a small-scale empirical model in 
economic growth and fiscal variables. This allows for permanent shocks to determine 
trending behaviour of output and fiscal variables à la Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
Discretionary fiscal adjustments are captured by filtering out the fiscal balance for 
cyclical reactions of budget items, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  
The quantitative indicator that we obtain is best seen in the light of the growing 
theoretical literature on the qualitative effects of fiscal policy. Dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models with nominal rigidities search for a rationale for fiscal stabilisation 
policies. At the same time, these New Keynesian models attribute quite some importance 
to both supply and demand side effects of fiscal policy adjustments. Our indicator is 
consistent with such a distinction. We take a first step by restricting attention to overall 
expenditure and revenues, but more elaborate models might incorporate refinements in 
the compositional adjustments of budget balance. In contrast to statistical models for 
adjusting fiscal balance, our economic indicator of structural balance has some attractive 
practical properties. Uncertainty is explicitly quantified, and theoretical assumptions can 
be explicitly tested. Also, the end-of-sample problem is reduced. The model is not 
necessarily more demanding in terms of data availability. 
The main result of our study is that both pre-EMU consolidations and expansions in 
recent years are mainly based on revenue changes. The derailing of public finances comes 
from tax reductions being implemented in good economic times. As total revenues 
apparently remain constant, spending cuts are not implemented. As a consequence, 
deficits show up again when economic boom turns into bust. The easy way out of deficits 
is to reverse previous tax cuts, leading to a ‘ratcheting up’ of spending over the next 
economic cycle. This procyclical bias in fiscal policies has not been eliminated with the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Governments still implement bad policies in good times. 
These policy reversals have negative economic effects. We find fiscal policy to have 
minor supply but large demand effects. Procyclical policies unnecessarily induce 
macroeconomic fluctuations. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.2, we briefly review 
some recent fiscal developments in the EU, notably for the cases of France, Germany, 
Portugal, and Spain. Our structural VAR approach towards disentangling these 
developments, and the derivation of the fiscal indicator, is discussed in section 5.3. 
Section 5.4 reports our empirical results, and section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
5.2   The Recent Fiscal Imbalances in the EU 
The fiscal framework of EMU has been considered a means for implementing fiscal 
consolidation. However, recent developments in several Euro Area countries raise the 
question as to whether fiscal sustainability is endangered, in view of rising deficits and 
debts at a moment when the effects of ageing populations will have a further burdening 
effect. In 2005, Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDP) have been carried out for both 
France and Germany, while yet another EDP was launched for Portugal. There are also 
ongoing procedures for Greece and Italy, while several other EU Member States face a     
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situation of excessive deficit.
68 Recent developments cannot be seen without taking into 
account past actions and trends in public finances.
69 We focus attention on the evolution 
of public finances since 1970 in the countries that initially ’sinned’ to the Pact (France, 
Germany and Portugal). 
We report in Figure 5.1 the general government balance, and its breakdown in revenue 
and expenditure ratios. A simple visual inspection shows that expenditure and revenue 
ratios have been following an increasing trend notably in France, Portugal and Spain. But 
with revenues lagging the expenditure rises, there has been a continuous deficit bias. 
There were some good reasons in 1991 to embark on consolidation by enshrining the 3% 
deficit target in the criteria for EMU-entry. The Maastricht rules have been effective in 
constraining further buoyant expenditure rises. Less than commensurate rises in revenue 
intake have led to persistent albeit gradually declining deficits. Since the start of EMU, 
fiscal positions have started to slip away again. As to the reasons for the breach of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, further expenditure rises in France and Portugal seem to 
blame, whereas in Germany large revenue reductions unmatched by expenditure cuts 
have pushed the deficit beyond the 3% threshold. Spain, on the other hand, stands out for 
its balanced budget over recent years, which is the result of a sustained reduction in 
expenditures since 1993 that has levelled off in recent years. We consider Spain as an 
example of more prudent fiscal behaviour. 



















































Note: Left-hand scale – revenue or spending / right-hand scale – deficit.  
                                                 
68    The other countries that faced an EDP are the Netherlands, Slovakia, Poland, Malta, Hungary, 
Cyprus and the Czech Republic. For further details see the EC web site at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/procedures_en.htm. 
69   Afonso (2005) questions the sustainability of public finances in most EU countries.     
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Source: AMECO database, updated on 4 April 2005. The shaded area indicates the start of EMU. 
These budget developments cannot be separated from economic conditions. The balance 
can slip out of the control of fiscal authorities by higher than expected expenses on 
unemployment benefits and transfers, or less than budgeted revenues, owing to automatic 
stabilisers. Figure 5.2 compares some measures of the output gap and cyclically adjusted 
balances computed by the European Commission and the OECD, as well as a trend series 
retrieved from directly applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter on the raw series.
70  
The start-up of the EDPs to these countries seems justified on account of worsening 
structural balances. In all countries, economic conditions improved considerably at the 
onset of EMU and the overall deficit was notably reduced as a result. But the reversal of 
positive output gaps laid out the structural weakness of the balance in France, Germany 
and Portugal. Expenditures exceed average revenues over the cycle. In contrast, Spain 
presents an entirely different picture. The budget has been brought close to balance, and 
is even in slight surplus. A constant spending share has been matched by gradually rising 
tax revenues. 
                                                 
70   The smoothing parameter has been set at 6.25, adjusting with the fourth power of the observation 
frequency ratio to the annual frequency of the data (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002).     
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Figure  5.2  Output Gap, Cyclically Adjusted Net Lending, Spending and Revenue   
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5.3   A SVAR Model for Gauging Fiscal Indicators 
There are a variety of reasons for which the cyclically adjusted balance does not properly 
reflect discretionary shifts under the control of the government. Its use in assessing fiscal 
balances is therefore debatable. Some problems are related to the properties of the 
econometric filters that are being used.
71 More importantly, we believe fiscal policy 
contributes to the size of economic fluctuations. And it does so by adjusting a variety of 
spending and revenue items. Recent general equilibrium theories of fiscal policies 
provide a rationale for real economic effects of fiscal policies, and stress the prevalence 
of its supply-side consequences over short-term demand effects. This is all the more 
important for the assessment of the new Stability and Growth Pact. We develop an 
indicator of discretionary fiscal policy stance that builds on the recent empirical literature 
on the effects of fiscal policy using structural VARs, and combine this with evidence on 
the cyclical behaviour of government budget. Next to its favourable properties, the 
indicator is best seen as a first step in verifying recent theories of fiscal policy as well as 
giving an instrument for assessing the quality of fiscal adjustments. 
Fiscal Indicators 
The notion of structural balance is based on the premise that total output fluctuates 
around some unobserved trend that depends on the long-term potential growth path of the 
economy. In combination with some assumptions on the cyclical behaviour of fiscal 
policy, this allows deriving a cyclically adjusted balance. Common practice at the 
European Commission, IMF or OECD regards the determination of cyclical variation in 
output and the cyclicality of the budget as two distinct problems. 
First, the output gap usually comes from some trend-extraction procedure with a 
statistical filter applied directly to real output. This decomposition in trending and 
cyclical components is usually done with a band-pass filter. Alternatively, the output gap 
is calculated as the distance from actual to potential output where the latter is based on a 
production function for the aggregate economy.
72 Second, a bottom-up approach is 
adopted for the derivation of the cyclical elasticities of the budget. The output elasticities 
of government revenues are based on the taxation structure of each main sub-item
73 – in 
some cases accounting for collection lags – and the elasticity of the tax bases to output. 
The spending elasticity is of relatively minor importance, as only the spending on 
unemployment benefits is adjusted for the cycle. Other budget components are assumed 
to be cyclically insensitive. Table 5.1 gathers the elasticities from OECD for the major 
budget categories in the countries we study.
74 As in most other European countries, the 
                                                 
71   Figure 5.2 already illustrates that differences between the various methods are certainly not minor. 
72   The European Commission backs up a Hodrick-Prescott based decomposition with results from the 
production function approach (European Commission, 1995). The OECD uses only the production 
function method (Giorno et al., 1995). The IMF has no uniform strategy but the production function 
method prevails for industrialised countries (IMF, 1993). Many other approaches abound. Methods 
that use a Beveridge-Nelson decomposition or track output developments with unobserved 
components are less common.
 Blanchard (1993) asks what the primary surplus would have been, had 
the unemployment rate remained the same as the previous year. Chouraqui et al. (1992) compare 
different moving benchmarks. Cohen and Follette (2000) use spectral analysis to isolate low 
frequency changes in fiscal policy. 
73   The OECD adjusts only social contributions, corporate, personal and indirect taxes. 
74   Girouard and André (2005) update the elasticities in a previous OECD study by van den Noord 
(2002).     
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cyclical elasticity of total net lending varies around 0.50. Most of the variation in the 
budget comes from procyclical corporate and personal taxes. 
Table 5.1  OECD Output Elasticities of Various Budget Items  
 France  Germany  Portugal  Spain 
Total  spending  -0.11 -0.18 -0.05 -0.15 
Corporate  tax  1.59 1.53 1.17 1.15 
Personal  tax  1.18 1.61 1.53 1.92 
Indirect  tax  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Social security contributions  0.79  0.57  0.92  0.68 
Net  lending  0.53 0.51 0.46 0.44 
Source: Girouard and André (2005). 
Quite some uncertainty surrounds the computation of structural balances in this two-step 
procedure. Depending on the skewness of the distribution of the moving-average weights 
in the filter that is being applied and the phase of the economic cycle, trend output is 
biased towards actual values especially towards the end of the sample. Another problem 
is posed by structural breaks. Windfall revenues or unexpected spending are entirely 
included in the structural balance if they have no economic effects. Filters distribute the 
effects of a break forward and backward on the trend. But this problem is not limited to 
statistical methods. Even if we use the production function or consider a deterministic 
trend a reasonable approximation to potential output, incorporating shifts remains a 
problematic issue. The production function approach moreover suffers from plenty of 
assumptions that make cumulative uncertainty rather large.
75 The various assumptions on 
budget elasticities are not as crucial for the cyclically adjusted balance, but are 
nevertheless not less problematic. Implicitly, it is assumed that average budget elasticities 
have a time-invariant linear relation to changes in the economy. We return to these 
difficulties in a sensitivity analysis in section 4.4. 
Towards an Economic Indicator of Fiscal Policy 
The main difficulty in interpreting the structural balance is the absence from economic 
arguments to underpin the trend/cycle decomposition. There is an implicit assumption in 
the filtering methods on the frequency of the business cycle and hence on trend output 
under average economic conditions. And while the production function approach builds 
upon economic foundations, the dynamics are nonetheless driven solely by the longer-
term effects of investment feeding back on changes in the capital stock.
76 
Macroeconomic models that allow for cyclical fluctuations around some steady-state 
trending growth path can be found in the growing class of Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models with nominal rigidities. These models have by now been 
extended to include fiscal policy. In the initial Real Business Cycle models, there are only 
supply-side effects of fiscal policy that transmit through wealth effects and the 
labour/leisure choice (Baxter and King, 1993). Micro-founded models based on sticky 
prices provide a rationale for stabilisation policies, but even in the New Keynesian type of 
models of fiscal policy, the supply side effects still tend to dominate demand side effects 
of fiscal policy management (Linnemann and Schabert, 2003). A larger role for demand 
side effects of fiscal policy is only found in models that introduce some further 
                                                 
75    These assumptions relate to its functional form, the presence of returns to scale, technological 
progress, the utilisation rates of production factors and the use of auxiliary estimates. 
76   Potential output is nevertheless assumed exogeneous in the production function approach.     
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imperfections via ‘Rule of Thumb’ consumers or a fraction of liquidity constrained 
consumers (Galí et al., 2005; Bilbiie et al., 2006). The latter models come also closer to 
replicating the results of the growing empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy. 
The main result of studies that use the VAR-counterparts to DSGE-models is that they 
can indeed recover significant effects of fiscal expansions on output. These are more in 
line with a positive ‘Keynesian’ effect on consumption, albeit the eventual multiplier is 
strongly reduced. The identification of fiscal policy is fraught with difficulties, 
however.
77 First, the implementation of announced changes in government policies is 
subject to lengthy and visible political negotiations that are anticipated in private agents’ 
behaviour. As a consequence, fiscal shocks need not affect fiscal variables first. This is a 
problem of the shock being non-fundamental (Lippi and Reichlin, 1994). Second, 
decisions on fiscal policy affect different groups in the public via a range of different 
spending and tax instruments. There exists no ‘standard’ fiscal shock: every political 
discussion considers the trade-off between a range of possible taxation and spending 
adjustments. The means of financing and the adjustment in expenditures and revenues 
wrap empirically relevant effects of different budget components in an aggregate fiscal 
shock without considering the path of public debt. Most studies focus on total spending or 
revenues, and find small and positive effects of government spending on consumption, 
but prolonged negative effects of higher taxation. Only a couple of studies consider the 
dynamic behaviour of some particular budget components.
78 Third, these identification 
problems are only exacerbated by the automatic reaction of fiscal aggregates to economic 
variables.  
The seminal contribution of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) lies in using a semi-structural 
VAR that employs external institutional information on the elasticity of fiscal variables to 
output. Cleaning out the automatic cyclical reaction of the total fiscal balance leaves 
shifts to the cyclically adjusted balance as discretionary fiscal shocks. Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) additionally impose some timing restrictions on the economic effects of 
discretionary policy. These timing assumptions avoid to some extent anticipation effects 
but would not capture these completely if implementation lags are important. Subsequent 
studies have mainly attempted to verify the original approach of Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) with a variety of techniques and usually tend to confirm their findings.
79 
However, the empirical literature has hitherto ignored the supply and demand channels of 
fiscal policy that are at front-stage of the theoretical DSGE models. Such effects are only 
implicitly acknowledged in these VAR studies. Changes in tax revenues, for example, are 
usually found to have lasting effects on output. There are nevertheless two other strands 
of the empirical fiscal policy literature that attribute a role to supply side variables. First, 
the literature on non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy would argue that fiscal 
                                                 
77   A full discussion of the problems in identifying the effects of fiscal policy is provided in Perotti 
(2005). 
78   Ramey and Shapiro (1998) look into the sectoral reallocation effects following shocks. A particular 
role in the transmission of fiscal policy shocks is also played by the labour market. A couple of 
papers compare the effects of consumptive government purchases to increases in public employment 
(Finn, 1998; Pappa, 2005; Cavallo, 2005). Perotti (2004) and Kamps (2004) examine the output and 
labour market effects of government investment. 
79   Mountford and Uhlig (2002) retrieve different types of fiscal shocks among those that conform to 
some a priori sign restrictions on the entire impulse response or variance decomposition of fiscal 
variables. Canova and Pappa (2002) select only those shocks that satisfy formal sign restrictions on 
the conditional cross-correlation of the responses to the orthogonalised shocks of the variables in the 
model.     
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consolidation might have positive consequences on output. The composition of the fiscal 
adjustment thereby plays an important role (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). The effects of 
consolidation on agents’ expectations on the future economic outlook – measured by 
asset markets’ reaction (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990) – suggests a role for permanent 
wealth and supply-side effects of fiscal policy. Second, most VAR studies have so far 
ignored the literature on the long-term growth effects of fiscal policies. The main 
message of the endogenous growth models that have been developed is that higher 
taxation unambiguously reduces output, but that these losses may be offset by using the 
proceeds for productive spending items (Barro, 1990; King and Rebelo, 1990). These 
seminal models have been made more realistic by allowing endogenous responses of 
labour (Turnovsky, 2000). Typical tests of these growth models give empirical support to 
the role of spending and taxes to long-term growth (Kneller et al., 1999). It can be argued 
that additional government spending in catching-up countries such as Portugal and Spain 
had rather different effects than further expansions of the budget in France and Germany, 
for example. This provides an additional argument for including the former countries in 
our analysis. 
The examination of the growth effects is also of substantial policy interest. In the 
assessment of EU Member States’ policies under the revised Stability and Growth Pact, 
much attention is devoted to the quality of fiscal adjustments and the sustainability of 
public finances. The implementation of major structural reforms that raise potential 
growth – and hence have an impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances – 
can be considered grounds for temporary deviations of budget balance. There is thus need 
for a framework that assesses changes in fiscal instruments and distinguishes the short-
term demand from the longer run supply effects of such policies.  
Methodology 
We make a first step in setting up an empirical VAR model that allows for fiscal policy 
having distinct long- and short-term effects on output. The approach in this chapter rests 
on a combination of long-term restrictions and some assumptions on the short-run 
elasticities of budgetary items.
80 For the purpose of gauging a model-based fiscal 
indicator, we basically take shocks with permanent effects on output to drive long-term 
trends. Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), potential output is determined by so-called 
productivity or   technology shocks that permanently affect output. This can then be 
complemented with further assumptions on the short-term behaviour of fiscal policies. 
Shocks with transitory output effects are classified as either cyclical or fiscal, following 
the elasticity approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
                                                 
80   There are a few applications of fiscal VARs that use similar restrictions, and are mostly inspired by a 
practical interest in determining structural balances. See Bouthevillain and Quinet (1999), Dalsgaard 
and de Serres (2001) or Bruneau and De Bandt (2003) who all specify an SVAR model in output and 
the deficit ratio. They recover structural deficits from the contribution of fiscal shocks to the variance 
of deficits. Likewise, a measure of the gap is constructed from the contribution of supply shocks to 
output variations. Hjelm (2003) is closer to our model as he is interested in simultaneously 
determining potential GDP and the cyclically adjusted balance. He uses Cholesky ordered long-term 
restrictions in a model with output, employment and the budget balance to identify economic and 
labour market shocks. The cyclically adjusted balance then is that fraction of the budget balance that 
is not explained by business cycle shocks. This leaves only the supply and labour market shocks in 
determining structural balance, but no separate role for the government is stipulated.     
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We specify an empirical model of fiscal policy as a small-scale VAR in real output  t y  
and the expenditure  t g  and revenue side  t t  of the government budget. We can summarise 
the data properties in a VAR-model (5.1), ignoring for ease of notation any deterministic 
terms: 
t t X L B ε = ) (         ( 5 . 1 )  
where  t X  refers to the vector of variables [ ] t t t t g y , and  t ε  contains the reduced form 
OLS-residuals. By rewriting the VAR into its Wold moving average form (5.2), 
t t L B X ε
1 ) (
− =              Ω =
′
t tε ε .       (5.2) 
and imposing some structure on the relation between reduced form residuals  t ε  and 
structural shocks  t η  via the transformation matrix A (such that t t A η ε = ), we can write 
the model (5.2) as follows: 
t t t A L B L C X ε η
1 ) ( ) (
− = =            I t t =
′
η η .       (5.3) 
Any SVAR analysis needs to impose at least as much restrictions as contained in the 
matrix  A to identify the model. By imposing orthogonality of the structural shocks we 
have already six (i.e. the covariance matrix of OLS residuals ' AA = Ω ). Hence, we need to 
choose at least three more restrictions. The ones we employ are a combination of long 
and short-term restrictions. The latter shape the contemporaneous relations among the 
variables through a direct parameter choice on A. The former impose a long-term 
neutrality constraint on the effects of a structural shock  j  on some variable i. That is, the 
i,j-th element of the infinite horizon sum of coefficients, call it  ij C ) 1 ( , is assumed to be 
zero. This requires an indirect restriction in (5.3) on the product of the transformation 
matrix  A and the inverted long-run coefficient matrix
1 ) 1 (
− B . In other words,  
[][ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 = =
−
ij ij A B C .       (5.4) 
For the system consisting of government expenditures, revenues and output, we assume 
three structural shocks to drive output and fiscal variables. The supply shock (
q η ) drives 
the long-term trend rise in output and leads to the unit root behaviour of real output. This 
shock is isolated by assuming there are two further shocks in the model that both have 
temporary effects on output. I.e., we assume that [ ] 0 ) 1 ( 12 = C  and [ ] 0 ) 1 ( 13 = C  in (5.4). 
These shocks can be interpreted respectively as a generic business cycle shock (
c η ) 
capturing short-term fluctuations around the moving steady state equilibrium for output, 
and a fiscal shock (
f η ) with short-term ‘demand’ effects on output. In order to 
distinguish the business cycle shock from that to fiscal policy, we employ the elasticity 
approach advocated by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). We derive a shock to spending 
and/or revenues from which the cyclical effects have been removed. In other words, the 
shock with transitory effects on output – but unaffected by short-term variation in output     
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– is the fiscal policy shock and reflects discretionary changes in the fiscal policy stance.
81 
We take elasticities for government expenditures (γ ) and revenues (α ) with respect to 
output, and impose these values on the relation in A between the reduced form residuals 
for output (
y ε ) and spending (
g ε ) respectively revenues (
t ε ).
82 The fiscal shock thus 
includes discretionary decisions unrelated to the cycle. Moreover, any government policy 
that interferes with the workings of automatic stabilisers on a systematic basis is 
considered as a fiscal intervention. Unlike other VAR studies, we split an overall change 
in fiscal policy into a part that has a short-term economic effect (the fiscal ‘demand’ 
shock), and into shocks that may have potentially long-term growth effects (the ‘supply’ 
shock).
83 
One important limitation of the current version of the model is that we cannot tell apart 
the growth effects coming from ‘pure’ technology shocks from those deriving from tax 
and spending decisions. Our supply shock is thus a combination of all shocks with long-
term output effects. The negative effects of distortionary taxation or incentive-distorting 
spending show up in this shock, as well as the possibly positive effects of government 
investment. Instead, we isolate in the fiscal ‘demand’ shock only those changes in the 
discretionary budget stance that have temporary effects on output. A full-fledged analysis 
of the economic growth effects of fiscal policy would require additional restrictions.
84 
The current identification is sufficient though for the purpose of deriving a fiscal 






























= α γ A .       (5.5) 
We can not simply set to zero the elasticity γ  of government expenditures. 
Unemployment benefits move over the cycle in EU-countries, even if their contribution to 
variation in total spending is not large. The parameter γ  comes directly from the 
elasticities calculated by the OECD that we reported in Table 5.1. Instead of multiplying 
each revenue category by its cyclical elasticity and GDP share, we have subtracted the 
spending elasticity (row 2 in Table 5.1) – accounting for its share in GDP – from the 
elasticity of total net lending (row 7 in Table 5.1) so as to obtain the total elasticity of 
revenues  α . The coefficients do not sum to zero as the budget is assumed to be 
countercyclical. Table 5.3 summarises our parameter assumptions. 
                                                 
81   This is not a replication of the results in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) as they require additional 
short-term constraints on the timing of the effects whereas we consider long-term constraints. 
82    We therefore need to impose two different coefficients γ  andα  which results in one 
overidentifying restriction. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) instead net out the cyclically sensitive 
transfers from spending, and assume a zero elasticity on other spending categories. As the sensitivity 
analysis in section 4.4 demonstrates, this does not seem to affect our results. 
83   For this reason, we do not expect responses to our fiscal shock to be similar to those documented in 
the empirical literature. Our distinction is more consistent with the theoretical models of fiscal 
policy. 
84   We make some suggestions in the concluding section. We considered the effect of loosening the 
long-term constraint on either government spending or revenues. We could not reject longer-term 
effects of fiscal shocks, endorsing the hypothesis that supply side effects of fiscal policy decisions 
affect the ‘supply’ shock.     
132 
Table 5.2  Identification in the Long- and Short-term… 
 Long-run  restrictions 
effect of shock on 
Supply shock 
 
q η  
Business cycle shock 
c η  
Fiscal shock 
 
f η  
real GDP   •   0 0 
public spending  •   •   •  
public revenues  •   •   •  




q η  
Business cycle shock 
c η  
Fiscal shock 
 
f η  
y ε   •   •   •  
g ε   •   •   γ  
t ε   •   •   α  
 
Table 5.3  Parameters γ  and α  
 France  Germany  Portugal  Spain 
total spending γ   -0.11 -0.18 -0.05 -0.15 
total revenues α   0.58 0.59 0.47 0.49 
Source: author's calculations. 
Gauging the Fiscal Indicator 
The structural model then permits adopting a unified approach towards 
contemporaneously uncovering indicators of potential output 
* y  and the structural 
balance 
* d . Basically, total output and government expenditures and revenues can be 
decomposed into the contribution of each of the structural shocks. We take the stance that 
only supply shocks determine potential output 
*
t y  in the long term. Both fiscal shocks 
and supply shocks determine structural expenditure 
*
t g  and revenues 
*
t t .
85 Under this 










= .         ( 5 . 6 )  
This fiscal indicator 
* d  can be interpreted as reflecting the discretionary stance of the 
fiscal authority. From the decomposition of the budget, we can then analyse whether such 
changes usually occur via spending or taxation measures. 
This measure cannot directly be compared to the cyclically adjusted balances provided by 
the European Commission, the OECD or to those derived from some statistical filtering 
method. First, the output gap we derive need not correspond to the fluctuations around a 
smooth trend on some assumption on the frequency of the business cycle. The economic 
shocks that drive potential output reflect changes in productivity – that may derive from a 
variety of sources – and might vary over time. Our approach is best seen in the line of 
                                                 
85   Ultimately, the sustainability of fiscal policy is determined by the overall fiscal balance as well as 
potential output growth. Alternatively, one may view structural fiscal policy as depending on the 
decisions of fiscal policy makers only (Bruneau and De Bandt, 2003).     
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papers that investigate the role of nominal versus technology shocks in economic 
fluctuations (Nelson and Plosser, 1982; King et al., 1991; Galí, 1992). 
Second, the variation in the structural balance is different from that in traditional two-step 
methods.
 This discrepancy owes to the definition of structural balance. This is perhaps 
best illustrated with an example. Consider a tax cut, for a given level of government 
spending and exogenous output. This would lead to a deficit, ceteris paribus. If fiscal 
policy indeed has real economic effects as the empirical literature suggests, then the tax 
cut temporarily boosts output. As a consequence, tax revenues will increase and spending 
on unemployment benefits decrease, and the budget surplus will rise. The traditional 
measure for cyclical adjustment takes out all cyclical variation, also the one induced by 
fiscal policy, which leads to an overstatement of the structural balance. In our approach, 
we control for this economic effect of the tax cut. The SVAR-model excludes that part of 
the variation in GDP due to discretionary fiscal measures whereas the conventional 
models take total output variation into account. But our approach goes even one step 
further. Imagine that the tax cut also raises potential output in the long term. This widens 
the gap between actual and potential output at the moment the fiscal shock occurs. 
Structural balance would be improved as the increased tax base (now, and in the future) 
makes the fiscal position more sustainable. Similar arguments can be made for the effects 
of spending. As a consequence, our indicator of structural balance does not necessarily 
display a smaller variation than traditional indicators. This will particularly be true if (a) 
the indicator is mainly driven by fiscal or supply shocks; or (b) if the underlying 
economic shocks we retrieve are more volatile than what conventional output gap 
measures suggest. 
Our model-based indicator has some favourable properties in comparison to more 
conventional measures. First, the long-term constraints hold the promise of imposing 
fewer contentious restrictions on the short-term effects of the fiscal shocks. Any 
anticipation effect and the contemporaneous reactions of fiscal balances to economic 
conditions are not constrained. Second, the simultaneous determination of a measure of 
cyclical output and fiscal balance is internally more coherent. While the method is 
definitely more complex, total uncertainty is quantified. We impose a minimal set of 
economic restrictions and the validity of these assumptions can be discussed. As the 
empirical model is also consistent with recent DSGE models of fiscal policy, these 
assumptions can be tested. Sensitivity analysis can make clear the weakness of the model 
in some specific direction. Moreover, progress in theoretical models of fiscal policy can 
lead to further refinements of the approach. Third, by adopting an economic – and not a 
statistical – method, the end-point problem of filters is eliminated. The indicator gives 
timely information on changes in the fiscal stance.
86 Finally, our indicator is also more 
relevant for the assessment of fiscal policy. Our measure indicates better the change in the 
stance of fiscal authorities, also with a view to growth effects and long-term 
sustainability. 
At the same time, the econometric approach suffers from some weaknesses. First, 
extensions are difficult as the method is rather data demanding – at least in the time series 
dimension. The annual frequency of the data may lead to some difficulties in the 
identification of business cycle shocks, for example. Second, the gains of loosening the 
constraints of short-run effects of fiscal policy have to be set off against some additional 
                                                 
86    The inclusion of structural breaks remains problematic, however. But in contrast to statistical 
methods, the economic consequences of one-off fiscal events are modeled in our approach.     
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complications (Sarte, 1999). While both short- and long-term restrictions are sensitive to 
the exact parameter values imposed, substantially more uncertainty surrounds the 
estimates of the long-term inverted moving average representation in (5.2), especially in 
the short samples that we use (Christiano et al., 2006). The basic problem is that no 
asymptotically correct confidence intervals on  ) 1 ( C  can be constructed. Faust and Leeper 
(1997) prove that there are no consistent tests for the significance of the long-term 
response. Specifying a priori the lag length of the VAR or choosing the horizon at which 
the long run effect nullifies can solve this problem. One may also check the consistency 
of some short-term restrictions with the long-term behaviour of the model, as in King and 
Watson (1997). Third, there is a possibly large set of underlying shocks from which we 
extract only a few. As discussed above, we extract a generic supply and cyclical shock, as 
well as a fiscal shock. This necessarily involves a debatable linear aggregation over 
shocks. If each shock affects the economy in qualitatively the same way the shocks may 
be commingled. This is particularly acute for the analysis of fiscal policy, as different 
expenditure and revenue categories may indeed have different longer run effects on 
output that are not distinguishable from technology shocks but moreover have similar 
short-term responses. Fourth, a problem may also occur of high frequency feedbacks. We 
observe fiscal policy only at an annual frequency. We assume the structural shocks to be 
orthogonal but if there are mid-year revisions of the budget, this may muddle both 
economic and fiscal shocks. This only stresses the problem of correctly identifying the 
timing of shifts in fiscal policies. Finally, a major assumption underlying the VAR-model 
is parameter constancy. The conclusions of VARs are highly sensitive to the presence of 
structural breaks. Especially for fiscal policy, there is evidence of non-linear effects (see 
Giavazzi et al., 2000, for instance). We therefore run some stability tests on the VAR-
model. 
5.4 Empirical  Analysis 
Data 
All data are annual and come from AMECO.
87 This database covers the longest available 
period since 1970 up till 2004 for which fiscal data are available for France, Germany, 
Portugal and Spain. Fiscal data and output are deflated by the GDP-deflator and are 
defined in first differences of log-levels. In many studies, the fiscal data are scaled to 
GDP, but this clouds inference. As economic shocks affect both fiscal variables and GDP, 
this leads to a spurious negative correlation between the deficit and these shocks. 
Moreover, we are primarily interested in distilling a fiscal indicator on the basis of the 
historical decomposition of output. For the same reason, we do not concentrate on the 
effects of fiscal policy on private output but use total output instead. We also ignore 
possible cointegration between overall expenditures and revenues, which derives from the 
intertemporal budget constraint.
88 This implies that parameter estimates may no longer be 
efficient albeit still consistent. However, inference on the short-term results of the VAR 
would hardly be affected by non-stationarity of the data (Sims et al., 1990). 
                                                 
87   Details are in Appendix 5.A. A program containing the RATS-code for the SVAR model is available 
from the authors upon request. 
88   For such an analysis, see Claeys (2004).     
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Data are defined following ESA-95 nomenclature. Definitions for the French budget 
changed in 1978. We linked the former series (going back to 1970) to the ESA-95 series 
and include an impulse dummy for this data break. We treat the effects of German 
Reunification in 1991 in a similar way. We further condition the models on these 
deterministic terms. Before estimating the structural model, we want to check for possibly 
other breaks in the VAR. We follow the method of Bai et al. (1998) and apply the 
sequential sup Quandt-Andrews likelihood ratio test on the VAR model. Sample size 
forces us to consider a single break date only, as the optimal search concentrates on the 
central 70% of the sample and consequently leaves too few degrees of freedom for 
examining multiple breaks. We correct for a possible change in volatility before and after 
the break date. As in Stock and Watson (2003), we weigh each period’s residuals by their 
average volatility. The lag length in the VAR is henceforth set to one year (following the 
Bayesian Information Criterion). 
Table 5.4 reports the results. For Germany, we could detect a further break in the data in 
1976, related to the large increase in social spending under the Brandt government. For 
France, Portugal and Spain in contrast, we find a significant break date that is seemingly 
related to the Maastricht consolidations, albeit the confidence bounds are rather large and 
span nearly the entire nineties. It is nevertheless suggestive of the change in the conduct 
of fiscal policy under the effect of the Maastricht rules. Due to this imprecision, we 
refrained from explicitly modelling these shifts with additional dummy variables. 
Table 5.4  VAR Break Date Test (Bai et al., 1998) 
France Germany  Portugal  Spain 
1992*** [1989,1996] 1976*** [1974,1978] 1997*** [1995,2001] 1998*** [1996,2003]
Notes: *** denotes significance of the break date at 1%; break date is Sup-Quandt break date, years in 
brackets are the confidence interval at 33% (Bai, 1997). 
 
The Transmission Channels of Fiscal Policy 
We first discuss some general results of our small scale model, and assess the properties 
of output and fiscal series, and the role of the various structural shocks. The following 
paragraphs discuss the fit of the model in terms of impulse response functions and the 
forecast error variance decomposition.
89 We have summarised all results in Figures 5.3 
and 5.4. This prepares the ground for an analysis of the fiscal indicator in section 5.4. 
The effect of productivity shocks is to lift up real output permanently (Figure 5.3). The 
speed of accumulation is rather fast: after five years, the major part of the shock has 
worked out. In Germany, this happens even faster. The sampling uncertainty around the 
effect is large, but given the large bounds we have used, the significance of most impulse 
responses after some years is actually surprising. To what extent are these supply shocks 
driven by fiscal developments? In France and Portugal, these shocks go hand in hand with 
positive long-term effects on total expenditures and revenues as well. This effect is also 
strongly significant.
90 The difference between revenues and spending responses is not 
                                                 
89   Impulse responses follow a one standard shock, and are plotted over a 10 year horizon with 90% 
confidence intervals, based on a bootstrap with 5000 draws. 
90   As the long-term elasticity of both spending and revenues is larger than unity, this looks like a 
‘Wagner’ style government expansion owing to economic growth.     
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significant, hence it is not obvious that this leads to a build up of public debt. In Germany 
and Spain on the contrary, revenues do not change significantly, but government 
expenditures shrink considerably, leading to large accumulated surpluses at a horizon of 
10 years. 
But whether the causality runs from fiscal policy to productivity growth, or vice versa, is 
not obvious. Recall that the supply shock contains productivity shocks that may emanate 
from the private as well as the public sector. The significant co-movement of spending 
and revenues suggests that fiscal ‘supply’ shocks are an important source of the overall 
productivity shock.
91 If these relations are positive (the case of France and Portugal), this 
implies higher spending or tax revenues have contributed to economic growth. In the 
opposite case (Germany or Spain), a reduction of spending – and less so a lower tax 
burden – would trigger higher potential output growth. But there are a few alternative 
explanations. Positive economic shocks that enlarge the tax base would – for a given tax 
rate – automatically lead to a larger revenue intake owing to automatic stabilisers. For 
reasons of political economy, this could lead the government to directly spend the 
proceeds of the treasury. This expansion of the budget could consequently get locked in 
and lead to a permanent rise in government expenditure. This mechanism would work for 
both permanent and cyclical shocks, if we assume that the government does not 
systematically react in different ways to permanent or transitory economic shocks. This 
allows us to get some insight in the importance of the private versus public productivity 
shocks. The fiscal responses to cyclical shocks, which include business cycle shocks with 
transitory output effects that are not related to fiscal policy, can give some indication. 
Surprisingly, the effects of cyclical shocks on output are hardly significant and indicate 
the small size of temporary economic fluctuations.
92 As a consequence, there is not 
always an obvious simultaneous rise in tax revenues. In Germany and Portugal, 
government revenues do rise in response to a positive output gap, and this effect remains 
permanent. Moreover, in both countries government expenditures tend to rise as well. 
This gives some support for the ‘ratcheting up’ effect on spending. In France or Spain 
instead, government spending does not react in a significant way and tax revenues even 
tend to decline. 
If we consider in some more detail the two countries in which catching-up phenomena 
may be expected to be important, we cannot clearly distinguish between the two 
alternative explanations. Both in Spain and Portugal is the reaction of fiscal variables to 
temporary and permanent shocks similar. This downplays the importance of productive 
fiscal policy contributing to economic growth. A comparison of the impulse responses 
shows that only a minor effect would be left in the case of Portugal. Evidence on Spanish 
public finances presents a slightly different picture. Positive supply shocks are 
accompanied by a strong decrease in total spending, and this effect is much more 
pronounced than the reduction in spending after a cyclical shock. 
In France and Germany instead, the reaction of fiscal variables to permanent shocks is 
opposite to the reaction to business cycle shocks and supports the view that fiscal 
variables driving long-term growth in both countries. That spending and revenues go up 
                                                 
91   We considered the effect of loosening the long-term constraint on either government expenditures or 
revenues in extensions of the structural VAR model in 5.3. We could not reject longer-term effects 
of fiscal shocks, endorsing the hypothesis that supply side effects of fiscal policy decisions are part 
of the ‘supply’ shock. 
92   This is a likely consequence of the annual frequency of the fiscal data.     
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after a positive supply shock, whereas there is a non-significant response or a decline 
following cyclical shocks, would suggest a larger role for productive public spending in 
France instead. Evidence for Germany rather seems to indicate a too large size of 
government. We find that revenues and spending go up permanently after cyclical shocks, 
but positive supply shocks tend to be associated with reductions in spending. 
Figure  5.3    Impulse Responses (response to a 1 standard deviation shock, 
bootstrapped responses with 5000 draws) 
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Figure 5.3 (continued) 
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The fiscal shock then regards all discretionary policy interventions on spending and/or 
revenues that are not systematically related to the cycle and have only temporary effects 
on the economy. These discretionary fiscal shocks have somewhat prolonged effects on 
output. There is a lot of uncertainty around this effect and none of the responses is really 
significant. We scale the impulse responses in Figure 5.3 such that they always display     
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positive output effects. We do not find the typical result of small positive Keynesian 
effects on output in all countries. In Germany and Spain, a typical Keynesian response 
would follow upon demand boosting deficits. In France and Portugal on the other hand, 
fiscal contractions would lead to positive short-term effects on output instead. Such 
different responses likely depend on the composition of the fiscal adjustment or other 
structural parameters in the respective economies, but cannot be further examined in the 
current model. 
The different responses of spending and revenues to both economic shocks might indicate 
a delicate issue in the identification of policy. If fiscal policy reacts in a systematic way to 
economic shocks by changing its discretionary use of spending and/or revenues, this 
simultaneity blurs the distinction between the economic and the fiscal shock. This might 
be the case in France and Spain where tax revenues decrease after positive temporary 
output shocks, for example. But another indication is given by the rise in spending in 
economic booms in Germany or Portugal. It indicates policies that react in a discretionary 
way so as to repeal the use of automatic stabilisers. The fiscal indicator captures these 
policy biases. Our discussion will show how important this policy bias is for 
understanding fiscal trends in EU countries. 
What does this imply for the contribution of fiscal policies to output variation (Figure 
5.4)? Supply shocks account for at least 50% of total variance in output at all horizons, 
and this goes up to 90% in Portugal and Spain. For the latter countries, this was perhaps 
to be expected given their strong economic growth over the last two decades. Most of the 
variation in output is thus caused by productivity shocks even at short horizons. As we do 
not separately identify private and public supply shocks, we cannot really quantify the 
relative magnitude of both channels. But as pointed out above, we think that productive 
spending or revenues has contributed to some extent to the variance of output. The 
demand effects of fiscal policy in France and Germany are at least as large as those of 
supply effects. In Portugal or Spain instead, only a minor role is played by discretionary 
fiscal policy. The contribution of cyclical fluctuations to variations in output is negligible, 
as was to be expected from the results on the impulse responses. 
What factors can account for these results? The large role played by fiscal policy in 
explaining output variation is not inconsistent with previous findings in the literature for 
large EU countries (De Arcangelis and Lamartina, 2004), but seems on the higher side of 
the range usually found. If we take the result at face value, it would suggest that the 
temporary demand effects of fiscal policy are probably much larger than the supply 
effects in the long-term. This would imply that both RBC and New Keynesian models are 
missing some aspects of fiscal transmission. But as we cannot precisely quantify the 
importance of the latter shocks, we would not want to claim validation of any of the 
theoretical models with our approach. This result nevertheless reveals that models of 
fiscal policy need to attribute important roles to both demand and supply side effects.     
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We think that the reason for the large contribution of fiscal policy is to be found 
elsewhere. To the extent that automatic stabilisers reduce the volatility of economic 
fluctuations, the tendency of governments to reduce taxation and/or rise spending in a 
procyclical way only adds to short-term output fluctuations and brings about aggregate 
macroeconomic instability. This policy volatility can moreover have negative effects on 
the long-term growth prospects of the economy.
93 The unwinding of previous taxation 
decisions goes against the principle of ‘tax smoothing’. The procyclicality of budgets 
implies negative supply-side effects. This explains the surprisingly low contribution of 
cyclical fluctuations. 
Before going deeper into the past trends in fiscal policy, we want to check our model on 
some other aspects too. We compute the output gap based on the historical decomposition 
of the output series as actual minus potential output (y-
* y ). In Figure 5.5 (top left 
panel),
94 we have repeated for comparison the output gaps of the European Commission, 
OECD and the one obtained by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter. There is a rather close 
correspondence between these measures and our supply shock based gap for France and 
Germany. Given that we have used the OECD elasticities only for distinguishing shocks 
with transitory effects on output, this is all the more remarkable. The smooth gap for 
Portugal and Spain underlines the importance of supply relative to demand shocks in both 
countries. This might indeed be expected given the strong economic catch-up that both 
countries have experienced. We believe that potential output tracked much closer actual 
output developments in these countries. The usual statistical filtering methods are not 
adequate to capture this trend behaviour over small samples. Cyclical fluctuations are 
therefore rather minor. We provide some further robustness checks in the Appendix 
5.B.
95 
Overall, in all countries, there definitely was an improvement in economic conditions at 
the start of EMU. We find that economic conditions have worsened in both France and 
Germany in recent years. We nevertheless find the crisis in Germany to have set in 
somewhat earlier and to be more prolonged. As cyclical fluctuations are not large, we do 
not find much economic slack in recent years in Spain or Portugal. 
                                                 
93   We are certainly not the first study to document that European countries have not left automatic 
stabilisers to work, but instead have overturned these in a procyclical way. We do show however the 
macroeconomic instability that results as a consequence. With other models, Alesina and Bayoumi 
(1996) showed how fiscal policy at the US state level rather contributes to macroeconomic 
instability, and how fiscal rules have been useful in constraining discretion. Similar cross-country 
evidence is provided by Fatás and Mihov (2003b). 
94   We plot all series over the period 1980-2004 only. 
95   A rough indication on the robustness of our output gap measure can also be given by the dates of 
peak and troughs in the business cycle. We plot in Appendix 5.B the first difference of the output 
gap against the chronology of peak to trough turning points of the growth cycle provided by the 
Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). These calculations are based on monthly industrial 
production series. Our measure matches the changes in the output gap in all countries.     
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Figure 5.5   SVAR-indicator of Output Gap, Structural Net Lending, Expenditure and 
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The Fiscal Indicator 
We are now ready to discuss the indicator of discretionary fiscal stance. In general, the 
measure is more volatile than the measures derived with conventional methods (see 
Figure 5.5, bottom left panel). In many instances, our measure leads the smoothed 
measures in the direction of change. The fiscal indicator is usually smaller than the 
cyclically adjusted deficit. This reflects the definition of the structural balance, by which 
we take out the automatic stabilisers and the induced stabilisation effects caused by fiscal 
policies. In addition, fiscal policy also affects permanent output and therefore the 
structural fiscal position fluctuates around balance. 
The indicator is also much more volatile. This follows from the major contribution of 
supply and fiscal shocks to the variation in output, spending and revenues (Figure 5.4). 
As we discuss below, one of the causes of this strong volatility – apart from the dominant 
supply side shocks – is the procyclical bias that characterises fiscal policymaking that 
induces extra variation, especially so in government revenues.  
We may then expect our fiscal measure to coincide with some episodes of fiscal laxness 
or retrenchment. We consider the budget to undergo a strong expansion (contraction) 
when the cyclically adjusted primary balance falls (increases) by at least 2 percentage 
points of GDP in one year, or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last two 
years. This is the measure proposed by Alesina and Ardagna (1998). In Table 5.5, we 
gather those fiscal years in which a strong expansion or adjustment has occurred in our 
dataset (see Afonso, 2006).  
At first sight, the correspondence is rather close. Comparing the changes in Figure 5.5 
(bottom left panel) to the years in Table 5.5, we detect all events that the Alesina-Ardagna 
measure also suggests. For example, we find the budgetary cost of Reunification on 
German public finances to have been large. The Maastricht rules have also led to 
considerable fiscal retrenchment in France and Spain. There are a few events in 
Portuguese fiscal policy over the eighties that we do not date exactly. But we do find a 
switch between contraction and expansion starting in 1982-83. The Alesina-Ardagna 
measure does not pick up all expansions and contractions that we find, however. Some of 
these episodes correspond to well known changes in the fiscal stance (e.g. the ‘Mitterand’ 
budgets in France 1981). Another major expansion in France in 1992 follows upon a 
string of expansionary budgets. Spain equally undergoes major expansions in the early 
eighties and nineties (1981 and 1993 respectively). Fiscal policy is also lax in Portugal 
(1990). Prolonged contractions occur over the eighties in France, Germany and Spain too. 
Table 5.5  Large Fiscal Expansions and Contractions 
 Expansions  Contractions 
France -  1995-96 
Germany 1990-91  1982-83 
Portugal 1980-81  1982-83,  1986,  1992 
Spain -  1995-96 
Source: Adapted from Afonso (2006), following the measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998). 
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Concentrating on the period just before EMU, we can see a substantial shift in 
discretionary policies towards structurally positive net lending ratios. This is perhaps least 
visible in Germany, but the initial conditions were probably not such as to urge a strong 
and prolonged consolidation for reaching the Maastricht deficit limit. A substantial 
consolidation had already taken place at the end of the eighties. In the other countries, the 
structural effort was more drawn out. France started consolidation already in 1993, while 
it gathered pace in Portugal and Spain only in 1995. This also confirms evidence in Fatás 
and Mihov (2003a). 
How has this consolidation been achieved? The right hand side panels of Figure 5.5 plot 
the growth rates of structural expenditures and revenues. These reveal that structural 
consolidations in the nineties have been based on a mixture of expenditure and revenue 
measures. But the combination of adjustments in the policy instruments has changed over 
time in a remarkably similar fashion in all countries. Initially, we see relatively moderate 
expenditure growth and in some cases even relevant spending cuts (Germany and 
Portugal). This strategy is reversed closer to the deadline of EMU. Tax increases start to 
bear the largest burden for bringing down deficits. Given the urgency of qualifying for the 
EMU criteria, taxes have seemingly been the easiest instrument to adjust. Notice the 
rather close match between the VAR-measure of structural spending and revenues and the 
(difference log of the) HP-trend on unadjusted total expenditure and revenues. The 
measures of OECD and AMECO display slightly lower growth rates. This owes again to 
our definition of the structural series. The efforts in reaching EMU led to the levelling off 
or even moderate declines in debt ratios. A plot of the structural fiscal indicator to the 
debt ratio shows how well the indicator captures these consolidations in debt (Appendix 
5.B). 
What went wrong then with the application of the Stability and Growth Pact in France, 
Germany and Portugal upon entry in EMU? The causes are again rather similar across 
countries. The increased tax revenues in the years prior to EMU led to a starting point of 
structural surplus. The persistence in these tax rises improved actual balances thanks to 
the favourable economic conditions at the time. But this has been exploited to increase 
expenditures in a commensurate way. Especially in Portugal, the expansion in 
expenditures seems to have held back an improvement in the structural position. The only 
exception here is Spain that further brought down expenditure, even in the presence of 
strong revenue increases. Simultaneously, the tax revenues that stream in during 
economic boom seem to have been undone by decisions to bring down tax rates in most 
countries. This considerably worsened the structural balance. As economic boom turned 
into bust again, the decline in revenues led to a substantial worsening of actual balances, 
pushing the deficit beyond the 3% threshold. However, the revenue declines have hardly 
ever been matched by sufficient cutbacks in government spending in the following years. 
Corrective measures in 2004 have improved the structural deficit. But the measures are 
mainly taken on the revenue side again, by undoing once more previous decisions to cut 
tax rates. To avoid further infringement of the budget rules, the adjustment in Germany 
and France has taken place via the route of tax rises during economic slack. This has once 
more reinforced the procyclical bias in fiscal policy-making. This also highlights the 
mechanism by which spending gets locked in, and causes a ‘ratcheting up’ in the size of 
government.     
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The overall situation seems less dramatic in Portugal, as revenue changes have been 
supported by equivalent spending decisions.
96 For Spain, the moderate decline in tax 
revenues in 2001 and 2002 was not entirely matched with spending cuts, leading to a 
slight deterioration of the structural indicator. The expansionary measures taken in 2004 
have led to a breach of a balanced structural budget for the first time since 1995. 
Unsurprisingly, the expansion of fiscal policies in all countries reflects itself in rising debt 
ratios in recent years (see Appendix 5.B). 
How useful is our indicator for assessing budgetary reform? We have argued above that 
aggregate spending or revenue measures contribute to long-term growth. Its contribution 
may perhaps be small relative to productivity rises in the private sector, and part of the 
effect could be swamped due to procyclical policies that induce macroeconomic 
fluctuations (and its consequent negative effects on growth). We do not believe this is the 
final word on the contribution of fiscal policy. A more detailed analysis of different 
spending/tax items could shed light on their specific growth enhancing effects. 
Some Sensitivity Analysis 
The results might be influenced by some particular parameter value that we have drawn 
from the OECD (Girouard and André, 2005) in order to distinguish business cycle and 
fiscal demand shocks. There are various reasons for considering these aggregate 
elasticities with some caution. 
First, elasticities are assumed to be time-invariant. These are not representative of the tax 
and spending structures that have prevailed in historical samples, however. In some 
countries, the expansion of the welfare state has led to gradually larger tax bases and 
dramatic changes in tax systems (Portugal and Spain). But even in France and Germany, 
time-variation cannot be neglected. Budget elasticities tend to move over the business 
cycle as well (Bouthevillain et al., 2001). Changes in elasticities also throw up a more 
subtle difficulty in the interpretation of the fiscal shocks that we have already discussed in 
section 5.4. On the revenue side, discrete policy changes involve decisions on the ratio of 
average to marginal tax rates and the breadth of tax bases rather than on total amounts.
97 
Only if changes in total revenue amounts coincide with these decisions, do we identify 
correctly shocks on the revenue side of the budget. Second, given the difficulties in 
identifying all channels through which changes in interest rates and inflation may 
impinge on various revenues and spending categories, the OECD simply abstains from 
adjusting interest payments for cyclical variation and assumes the net effect of inflation to 
be zero.
98 This only reinforces the argument in favour of our economic approach in which 
we specify a role for long-term and business cycle fluctuations. However, our use of the 
OECD numbers can be argued to be inconsistent as these have been derived under these 
methods. Finally, auxiliary assumptions on the various parts of the calculation of budget 
elasticities may cumulate into quite some uncertainty in the final estimates of elasticity. 
                                                 
96   One should notice that several one-off measures mask the true deterioration in the Portuguese or the 
Spanish budget in recent years. Under the revised Pact, the deficit net of one-off and temporary 
measures is considered. Our procedure does not necessarily consider the effects of such measures to 
be nil. 
97   Similar arguments can be put forward for various expenditure items. 
98    Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2004) argue that government revenues and expenditures are also 
affected by asset prices changes in ways not accounted for by standard cyclical-adjustment methods.     
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Our first robustness check on the elasticity parameters illustrates the effects of this 
uncertainty. We conduct a grid search on different values for γ  and α  that Girouard and 
André (2005) provide. Table 5.6 shows the wide range of net lending elasticity that is 
obtained by varying only the elasticity of wages to output two standard errors below and 
above its point estimate.
99 For all possible combinations of this revenue elasticity α  and 
for a given spending elasticityγ , we impose the identification scheme as in (5.5) on the 
VAR. For any of the parameter values in Table 5.6, we always find convergence to a 
result identical to that obtained with the point estimate of the elasticity.
100 The uncertainty 
about the elasticity does not seem to play a major role then, and this confirms the findings 
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Marcellino (2002). 
Table 5.6  Parameters γ  and α  
 France  Germany  Portugal  Spain 
0.53 0.51 0.46 0.44  Net lending 
[0.46, 0.61]  [0.39, 0.61]  [0.42, 0.50]  [0.38, 0.49] 
Total spending, γ   -0.11 -0.18 -0.05 -0.15 
Total revenues, α   [0.51, 0.66]  [0.46, 0.68]  [0.44, 0.52]  [0.43, 0.53] 
Source: Girouard and André (2005). 
One of the other interesting scenarios is the one in which we switch off the elasticities. By 
setting γ  and α  equal to zero, we assume that neither spending nor revenues react to the 
cycle. This consequently attributes a larger role to discretionary fiscal policies. The effect 
on the structural indicator depends however on the relative contribution of changes in 
taxes or spending to fiscal shocks. Figure 5.6 contrasts the structural indicator obtained 
with the OECD elasticities against the one with zero elasticities. The effect is only 
marginal. In most periods, the results are rather similar. This reflects again the prevalence 
of the supply relative to the temporary economic shocks. Oftentimes, there are more 
prolonged periods of moderate deviations. 
                                                 
99   The wage elasticity is used for calculating the elasticity of the income tax. See Girouard and André 
(2005) for an extensive discussion and a quantification of this uncertainty. 
100   The results of the impulse response analysis are largely unchanged. Effects are estimated slightly less 
precise, and the effects of the business cycle shock in Portugal are not clear.     
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Figure  5.6    Sensitivity Analysis: SVAR-indicators of Structural Net Lending   
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estimated elasticity from 5.7 elasticities OECD zero elasticity (no automatic stabilisers)
 
 
Fiscal policy might be more seriously biased against automatic stabilisers than our ‘zero-
elasticity’ scenario suggests. There is quite some evidence that in European countries, 
governments have been systematically overturning the working of automatic stabilisers 
(Galí and Perotti, 2003; Lane, 2003). The true expenditure and revenue elasticities may 
therefore be biased upward in comparison to observed elasticities. As a consequence, we     
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would attribute too much of the variation in fiscal policies to the economic cycle and too 
little to the offsetting systematic discretionary adjustments. 
To illustrate this phenomenon for Germany, France, Portugal and Spain, we follow Lane 
(2003) in estimating the output elasticity of the main budgetary items. I.e., we regress in 
(5.7) the main budget items on economic growth for the sample period 1970-2004, 
t i t i i t i Y d X d , , log log μ γ ω + + =    (5.7) 
where  t i X ,  is total spending, government investment, current spending (consumption and 
wage spending), or interest payments, and  t Y  is real output. Likewise, we estimate model 
(5.7) in which where  t i X ,  contains either total revenues, current revenues or (in)direct tax 
revenues. The estimates are also repeated for the decades 1970-1980, 1981-1990, and 
1991 to 2004, as we have reasons to expect quite some time-variation. Table 5.7 reports 
the results of an OLS estimation of (5.7), with a correction for first-order autocorrelation. 
Table 5.7  Budget Elasticities from OLS on Equation 5.7 


















Total spending  0.32  -0.47  0.38  -0.09 1.04*** -0.06 1.28*** 1.22***
Investment 1.46  -4.09  6.52* 6.13* 3.55** -1.84 5.06* 4.39* 
Current spending  -0.15  -0.07  0.34  -0.55* 0.73*** -0.21 1.00**  0.88***
Consumption spending  0.19 -0.26 0.63  -0.53* 0.98*** -0.24 0.53  1.30***
Wage spending  -0.16  -0.45  0.50  -0.08 1.04*** 0.03 0.40**  1.37***
Interest payments  -3.94*** -8.12*** -5.20** -0.41 0.68** 0.26 -0.49  0.92**
Total revenues  1.73*** 1.18  0.56  1.48*** 1.47*** 2.94*** 1.52*** 1.24***
Current revenues  1.86*** 1.16  0.81  1.97*** 1.46*** 3.31*** 1.48*** 1.19***
Total tax revenues  1.18*** 0.83  -0.08 1.47** 1.15*** 1.87*** 1.40*** 1.09***
Direct tax revenues  2.07*** 1.61  -0.14 3.12** 1.30*** 2.50** 1.17*** 1.28***
Indirect tax revenues  0.61** 0.81  0.02  0.54 0.94*** 1.08*** 1.57*** 0.87***


















Total spending  0.67**  -0.37  1.23** 1.46*** 0.03 -0.15 -0.45  0.33 
Investment 0.76  -1.39  5.35*** 2.67 -0.37 2.60 -4.09  2.83 
Current spending  0.76*** -0.16  0.96** 1.14*** 0.22 -0.27 0.22  -0.07 
Consumption spending  0.77*** 0.10  1.40*** 1.39*** 0.22 -0.10 0.29  0.26 
Wage spending  0.60**  -0.39  1.53*** 1.54*** 0.63 0.00  0.83* 0.33 
Interest payments  -1.39  -2.67  -2.35 0.48 -1.31 -0.17 -2.71  -4.56***
Total revenues  1.58*** 1.31  2.27** 2.59*** 1.36*** 0.71 1.36*** 2.95***
Current revenues  1.62*** 1.30  2.30** 2.90*** 1.42*** 0.71 1.36*** 3.05***
Total tax revenues  1.24*** 0.82  1.07  1.70*** 0.99** 0.35 0.78  1.81***
Direct tax revenues  1.36*** 0.96* 1.31  2.87*** 1.08* -0.26 2.35*** 1.43***
Indirect tax revenues 1.02*** 0.65 0.74* 1.04*** 0.91* 0.99 -0.87  2.15***
Note: */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % significance levels, respectively. 
The switch from small negative spending elasticities in OECD (Girouard and André, 
2005) to a strongly positive elasticity is very strong in Germany and Portugal, where it is 
significant for all budget items. Government investment is the most procyclical budget 
component. But the main category driving this result is – in absolute terms – government 
consumption. In Germany, a large role is also played by wage spending in the last decade. 
Fiscal spending expansions under positive economic growth are strongly concentrated in 
increased wage spending in Portugal. In contrast, Spain, and in particular France, have 
not been subject to a similar bias. No expenditure item – except for interest payments – 
shows significant signs of procyclicality.     
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We have argued before that the procyclical bias in fiscal policy is mainly due to reversals 
in taxes. We indeed confirm the procyclicality of revenues as in all countries, elasticities 
are significantly larger than the corresponding elasticities from OECD (see also Table 
5.1).
101 This is especially pronounced in the nineties in all countries, with the exception of 
Germany. The changes over decades are quite outspoken and hide quite some adjustments 
in tax systems. Only in Germany is the response of revenues procyclical in all sub-
samples. For France, Portugal and Spain, the elasticities in the seventies are not 
significant. This must be related to the development of tax systems in the latter two 
countries; the result for France seems more puzzling.
102 
These results show that latent policy pressures on spending or revenue bring about 
adjustments that usually reverse the effects of automatic stabilisers. The ‘actual’ 
elasticities incorporate all cyclical reactions, coming from the automatic adjustments via 
the underlying tax and spending structure and systematic interventions of fiscal 
policymakers. If we choose to impose the ‘actual’ elasticity in the VAR model (5.5), the 
interpretation of the fiscal shock is one that includes all discretionary interventions. The 
drawback of the approach is that our ‘cyclical’ shock is a mongrel reaction to economic 
conditions, in which we cannot tell apart the importance of systematic policy and the 
economic cycle. The difference in the structural indicator – obtained with the OECD 
elasticities – can then be attributed to the procyclical bias in fiscal policy.  
Table 5.8 summarises the elasticities that we have taken from Table 5.7 for the entire 
sample period for re-estimating the VAR. Figure 5.6 compares the structural indicator. 
We find convergence to the same solution as in the basic case: there are only some 
marginal differences for the case of Portugal. 
Table 5.8  Elasticities Imposed on Equation 5.5 
 France  Germany  Portugal  Spain 
Total expenditure, γ   0.32 1.04 0.67 0.03 
Total revenue, α   1.73 1.47 1.58 1.36 
Source: author's calculations. 
What does the insensitivity of the results to assumptions on the budget elasticities tell us? 
The forecast error variance decomposition reveals nearly equivalent roles for demand 
effects of fiscal policies and supply shocks in Germany and France, whereas supply 
shocks tend to dominate in Spain and Portugal. If we recover nearly similar fiscal policy 
shocks whether correcting for automatic stabilisers, setting them to zero or taking the 
systematic variation in fiscal policy into account, this is due to the little importance of 
cyclical economic shocks. This does not mean that the automatic stabilisers are irrelevant. 
The stabilising effects of the structure of the spending and taxation system will still work 
                                                 
101   If the government decides to raise tax rates in economic crises, this leads to a stronger than expected 
reaction of revenues in the following economic boom. 
102   The time variation in elasticities is also apparent from a recursive regression of 5.7. Coefficient plots 
are summarised in Appendix 5.C and further documents some of the problems with constant 
elasticities. We have not reported the elasticities of interest payments and investment, as these 
coefficients are much more volatile than those of other budget items. There are relevant breaks 
associated with major shifts in fiscal policy (e.g. German Reunification, democracy in Portugal and 
Spain). For most spending categories, we remark a modest decline over time in Germany and a more 
outspoken one in France, while changes are minor for most revenue categories. Portugal and Spain 
have seen a large rise in elasticities of all items, owing to the expansion of their welfare states. This 
rise has pushed elasticities even above those in Germany and France.     
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their way to economic variables via the longer-term supply-side effects. It does not 
necessarily mean that ‘letting the automatic stabilisers work’ will lead to superior 
economic outcomes as such. Fiscal policy that refrains from manipulating spending or 
taxes at every economic turn shields the economy from further shocks. Fiscal policies 
ought to focus attention on the longer-term effects of fiscal policy, rather than 
destabilising it. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Recent years have seen the launch of excessive deficit procedures to Portugal, France and 
Germany, and later for several other EU Member States. The reasons for the breach of the 
deficit rules in recent years are still open to discussion. A variety of political and 
economic factors probably underlie the increase in public deficit and debt ratios. The 
revised Pact loosens the numerical limits and leaves more room for a country-specific 
interpretation of the medium-term budgetary objective. First, it allows for a gradual 
adjustment effort under unfavourable economic conditions, as long as consolidation 
continues in good economic times. Second, the revised Pact also attributes more 
importance to the quality of the budget adjustment. The revised Pact provides for the 
implementation of structural reforms that carry temporary budgetary costs, but which 
through positive supply-side effects enhance the structural balance and thus the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. 
This chapter takes a first step in developing an economic indicator of discretionary fiscal 
stance that takes into account both the cyclical short-term and the long-term supply side 
aspects of fiscal policy. We analyse the budgetary outlook for France, Germany, Portugal, 
and Spain by uncovering underlying past trends in revenue and expenditure. Our 
approach combines insights from the growing empirical literature on the effects of fiscal 
policy modelled via structural VARs with statistical methods for cyclically adjusting 
fiscal balances. Our approach innovates on existing evidence in using a mixture of short 
and long-term restrictions to identify economic and fiscal shocks in a small-scale 
empirical model in output and fiscal variables. This allows for permanent shocks to 
determine trending behaviour of output and fiscal variables à la Blanchard-Quah. 
Discretionary fiscal adjustments are captured by filtering out the fiscal balance for 
cyclical reactions of budget items following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
The model-based indicator we develop shows that pre-EMU consolidations have in last 
instance been based mainly on revenues. The slippages of the recent years owe to the 
unwinding of these measures without accompanying spending cuts. This showed up in 
larger deficits when economic conditions worsened, and a ‘ratcheting up’ in the size of 
government in economic booms. Recent corrective measures seem to rely mainly on 
increasing revenues again. The procyclical bias in fiscal policies has not been eliminated. 
Governments implement bad policies in good times. Fiscal policy induces additional 
economic fluctuations and contributes to aggregate macroeconomic instability. As a 
consequence, the short-term effects of fiscal policy outweigh supply side effects in the 
longer term. A Pact that counters these policy reversals can lead to more sensible policies 
that also focus on the long-term quality of public finances. 
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The analysis in this chapter is consistent with a growing theoretical literature on the 
effects of fiscal policy. DSGE models with nominal rigidities offer a rationale for fiscal 
stabilisation policies. At the same time, these New Keynesian models consider both 
supply and demand side effects of fiscal policy, and find the former to dominate. We find 
that both the supply and demand effects of fiscal policy are important. The current 
version of the model does not allow us quantifying the contribution of supply shocks. The 
results suggest that the government budget can have long-term growth effects, but mostly 
so in catching up countries as Portugal or Spain. More elaborate empirical models could 
incorporate refinements in the compositional adjustment of budget balance. This would 
allow for an explicit assessment of the channels through which fiscal policy transmits its 
effects. Allowing for a different reaction of various budget items to demand and supply 
shocks can be a first step in that direction. We think in particular of spending categories 
that are considered productive (like government investment). This can verify some 
endogenous growth theories of fiscal policy (Turnovsky, 2000). A major channel through 
which fiscal policy acts is also the labour market, either directly – via wage spending or 
public employment – or indirectly. Finally, instead of specifying a model in output and 
fiscal policies only, the inclusion of prices and/or interest rates can lead to a more 
accurate description of the economic shocks.     
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Appendix 5.A    Data Sources 
 Definition      Source 
t g   total expenditure      AMECO 
t t   total revenues      AMECO 
t y   GDP     AMECO 
GDP deflator      AMECO 
potential GDP     
output gap     
cyclically adjusted 
expenditure (categories)    
cyclically adjusted 
revenue (categories)    
other 
cyclically adjusted net 
lending    
AMECO/OECD 
other  chronology of cycle
(a) 
growth rate cycle peak and through dates’
chronology are determined by two 
consecutive quarters of negative growth 
in smoothed industrial production. 
Economic Cycle Research 
Institute (ECRI), at 
www.businesscycle.com, 
algorithm updated in 
September 2005 
Note: AMECO data are for general government, according to ESA-95, in billion of euro (national currency 
definition). The UMTS licensing receipts for the year 2000, or following years, are added to total 
expenditure. Data are from the AMECO database, updated on 4 April 2005. Comparable data definitions 
hold for OECD data. (a) The measure for Portugal is not available.     
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Appendix 5.B    The Fiscal Indicator: Some Additional Results 
a) SVAR based output gap (line) 
and ECRI-dating of cycle (bars). 
 b) SVAR-indicator of fiscal balance (% potential GDP)(line, right-
hand scale) versus debt ratio (% of GDP)(shaded area, left-hand
scale). 
France 
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Discussion 
Jan in 't Veld 
 
 
The chapter by António Afonso and Peter Claeys provides a new method of calculating 
indicators of fiscal policy. The objective is to uncover any underlying past trends behind 
developments in public finances that may explain the current budgetary outlook. The 
authors propose their fiscal indicator as an alternative to the standard method of cyclically 
adjusting budget balances (CABs), which according to them does not properly reflect 
discretionary shifts under control of government. They interpret their results in great 
depth and conclude that a procyclical bias in fiscal policy has resulted in a ratcheting-up 
in the size of governments. I do not disagree with the general thrust of their analysis of 
what has gone wrong with fiscal policy in EMU in the recent years. Rather then 
commenting on the specific aspects of four countries considered, I would like to give here 
a more general discussion of the method and the resulting indicator with a view to its 
usefulness for policy evaluation.  
The strength of the chapter is in my view that the approach based on structural VARs 
allows for a simultaneous determination of a measure of cyclical output and fiscal 
balance. According to the authors their fiscal indicator has as advantage over standard 
CABs that it captures the so called supply side effects of fiscal policy. It should be 
pointed out that the criticism the authors put forward to justify their alternative approach, 
i.e. the difficulties in interpreting the structural balance in the absence of economic 
arguments to underpin the trend-cycle decomposition, applies chiefly to statistical trend 
extraction procedures and less to the production function approach adopted by the 
European Commission. Having said that, the proposed VAR-based indicators provide an 
interesting alternative to the CABs. The production function approach does not take into 
account the growth effects of fiscal policy due to taxation and productive spending, while 
this indicator in principle could include this. As the authors point out, it is therefore more 
consistent with the distinction between supply and demand side effects of fiscal policy 
adjustments found in recent DSGE models, which unlike earlier RBC models not only 
incorporate supply side effects through wealth effects and labour/leisure choice but also 
give a larger role to demand side effects by including financial frictions such as liquidity 
constraints.(Results from these models suggest fiscal policy has a significant demand side 
effects and counter-cyclical fiscal policy has reduced output volatility). 
A second advantage of the VAR-based indicators that the authors propose is that it allows 
identification of confidence bands. The standard CABs have large cumulative uncertainty 
due the various assumptions made in calculating output gaps but this is never shown 
explicitly. Just like Bayesian-estimated DSGE models (with have a proper structural 
identification), the SVAR method applied by the authors allows for an explicit assessment 
of uncertainty. 
SVARs are useful tools. However, it is important to be aware of their shortcomings in 
properly identifying short and long run effects. It has been shown to be difficult to     
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estimate precisely the long run effects of shocks using a short data sample. Faust and 
Leeper (1997) show SVARs that achieve identification through long run restrictions may 
perform poorly when estimated over sample periods typically utilised and various other 
papers have illustrated this. The authors do not describe the estimation of the SVAR 
model in great detail, and many of the problems surrounding SVAR identification may 
not apply to their model, but judging on some of their results the proper identification of 
cyclical and supply shocks seems problematic. 
The authors use a mixture of short and long term restrictions to identify economic and 
fiscal shocks. They identify three structural shocks: (i) "supply" shocks that drive long 
term trend rise in output (also including fiscal policy, i.e.  a combination of shocks); 
(ii) "cyclical" shocks that capture short term fluctuations around steady state equilibrium 
(transitory); (iii) "fiscal" demand shocks distinguished by the elasticity approach (the 
discretionary policy stance, but excluding those policies that have long term growth 
effect, like productive spending and tax policies). When this identification scheme is 
applied to the data the resulting IRFs and forecast error variance decomposition seem at 
first sight somewhat puzzling. The chapter would benefit from further explanation of 
some of the results: e.g. the negligible contribution of "cyclical" shocks to the variation in 
output, the persistent contribution of discretionary "fiscal" shocks (although these are 
restricted to have no long run output effect) to the total variance in output even at longer 
horizons, and various other features in country specific IRFs like the non-Keynesian 
effects of fiscal shocks in France and the relation between positive supply shocks and a 
decline in expenditure in Germany. 
I suspect part of the problem of not correctly identifying cyclical, discretionary fiscal and 
supply shocks is due to the use of annual data by the authors and the estimation of the 
model with a one year lag structure. The question is whether this allows for the proper 
identification of cyclical shocks and its distinction from supply shocks and fiscal shocks? 
It would be interesting to see the results when quarterly data are used instead (like 
Blanchard and Perotti, 1999 and Perotti, 2005). 
Another problem is that the authors do not distinguish compositional detail. Different 
revenue measures have different long term supply effects, and the same applies for 
different expenditure measures. Looking at total revenues and total expenditure is not 
very revealing in this context. This is regrettable, as the authors rightly argue that it is 
highly desirable that an economic indicator of fiscal policy takes into account supply side 
effects. In its current form though, without disaggregating expenditure and revenues, it 
remains something of a black box and one cannot distinguish long term fiscal policy 
effects from other long term shocks that are included in the "supply" shock.  
The resulting structural deficit is defined as structural expenditure minus structural 
revenues (both driven by discretionary fiscal shocks and supply shocks). The fiscal 
indicator is smaller than standard CABs and much more volatile. The volatility makes it 
difficult to interpret the authors' results in any depth and hampers a comparison with the 
cyclically adjusted balances calculated by the Commission and the OECD. As it appears 
that the indicator is surprisingly insensitive to assumptions on newly estimated budget 
elasticities, it seems likely that this volatility is related to the problems in correctly 
identifying cyclical shocks, as so much is attributed to discretionary fiscal policy shocks. 
I suspect that if the shock identification problems can be overcome, this method could 
deliver some very useful insights into the underlying past trends behind developments in 
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6.   
 
The Reliability of EMU Fiscal Indicators: 
Risks and Safeguards 





The effectiveness of any fiscal rule crucially depends on the indicators to which it is 
geared. The indicators should be resilient to manipulation and opportunistic exploitation. 
EMU fiscal rules rely on yearly targets set in terms of traditional indicators of deficit and 
debt. Continued compliance with these targets is expected to ensure long-term fiscal 
sustainability. Arguably, reference to forward-looking indicators would have been more 
appropriate. However, such indicators require complex computations, often relying on 
strong assumptions, and do not lend themselves to be adopted for the enforcement of 
formal rules, especially in a multinational context where moral hazard issues gain 
prominence (Balassone and Franco, 2000). 
Having dismissed sophisticated indicators for the sake of effective monitoring, the 
expectation is that EMU  fiscal indicators should score high in terms of reliability. 
However, recent episodes of large upward deficit revisions suggest that this is not always 
the case. The chapter acknowledges that all fiscal indicators can be manipulated. 
Therefore, replacing current indicators with new ones would not solve the problem. By 
highlighting the weak spots of EMU fiscal indicators, the chapter aims at identifying 
ways to improve monitoring. 
The chapter points out that EMU’s deficit indicator is particularly fragile in two 
respects.
103 First, since it measures net borrowing, it draws a line between transactions in 
financial and non-financial assets, with the latter alone being considered in the 
computation of deficits. But the distinction between financial and non-financial 
transactions is not clear-cut, and the available margins of interpretation can be used 
opportunistically.
104 Second, EMU’s deficit indicator is measured on an accrual basis, 
                                                 
*   The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not commit Banca d’Italia. We 
thank Marco Buti, João Nogueira Martins and Alessandro Turrini for kindly making available to us 
the dataset used for their article. We thank João Nogueira Martins also for his valuable discussion 
and the participants to the European Commission workshop on “Fiscal indicators in the EU 
budgetary surveillance” for useful suggestions. 
103   There is also an issue concerning the definition of the public sector whose deficit and debt have to be 
considered (see Balassone et al., 2006).  
104  This problem is similar to the one arising in the application of the “golden rule”, where the deficit 
measure should only take into account current transactions and exclude capital ones (see Balassone 
and Franco, 2001).     
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relying on estimates which are by their nature subject to an element of subjective 
evaluation.
105 
Partly reflecting concerns over these fragilities, since 1994 EU Member States are 
required to provide the European Commission with a reconciliation account between 
deficit figures and the corresponding change in debt, the latter being a good proxy of the 
cash gross borrowing (Balassone et al., 2006). Moreover, when reliance on accrual 
accounting within the European System of Accounts (ESA) increased (with the switch 
from the 1979 to the  1995 version of the system), Eurostat specified that revenue 
computed in accrual terms should include only those items that are likely to be actually 
cashed in and that over the medium-term accrual and cash data should converge.
106 
However, in the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure relatively little effort 
was put in the analysis of consistency between deficit and debt data, thus failing to 
exploit synergies arising in the joint monitoring of EMU fiscal rules. The problem is 
witnessed by the tolerance exerted by European institutions towards Member States 
submitting incomplete reconciliation accounts. It is probably a consequence of the failure 
to give operational content to the debt rule, and the subsequent focus on the deficit rule.
107  
The chapter argues that even simply comparing deficits with changes in debt can help the 
early detection of inconsistencies in fiscal data. Indeed, changes in general government 
debt were much larger than initial deficit figures in Greece, Italy and Portugal before the 
large upward deficit revisions experienced in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the chapter points out that consistency checks between deficits and changes 
in debt must go deeper than the overall difference between the two indicators. Since 
different items in the reconciliation account (henceforth, SFA for stock-flow adjustment) 
can offset each other, an underestimated deficit does not necessarily imply a large 
discrepancy between deficit and change in debt. 
The chapter presents a simple model of the incentives to resort to fiscal gimmickry under 
EMU deficit and debt rules, based on the partition of SFA into two groups.
108 One group 
includes items that can be used to affect the Maastricht deficit but leave the change in 
debt unaltered (a “deficit-specific” SFA), the other includes items that can be used to 
reduce the change in debt but leave the Maastricht deficit unaffected (a “debt-specific” 
SFA). Econometric estimates based on such model provide evidence that deficit-specific 
SFA tend to increase with the underlying deficit, and debt-specific SFA tend to offset the 
impact of such an increase on total SFA. This suggests not only that opportunistic 
accounting may have taken place to ensure formal compliance with the deficit rule, but 
                                                 
105  Cash-based deficit measures are by no means exempt form the risk of manipulation. However, 
contrary to what happens with accrual estimates, manipulation of cash figures obtained by 
postponing payments and/or demanding anticipated payments find a natural limit in the voice of the 
interested counterparts. 
106   The Treaty and annexed protocols rely on the ESA for the definition of deficit. When the Treaty was 
signed in 1992, and until 1999, the ESA79 version of the system was in place, which allowed 
government accounts to be computed mostly on a cash basis. ESA95 was first implemented in 2000, 
in the release of fiscal data for 1999. See Eurostat (2000) and Regulations (EC) N° 2516/2000 and 
995/2001. 
107  The debt rule demands that, if the debt-to-GDP ratio is above 60 percent, it must be declining at a 
“satisfactory” pace. However, the meaning of “satisfactory” is yet to be defined. 
108  The model is similar in spirit to Buti et al. (2007), but differs in several significant respects.     
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also that debt-specific SFA may have been used to make the ensuing deficit-debt 
discrepancy less visible. 
Attention to the quality of statistics has increased in recent years, also in the context of 
the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Based on case studies and 
econometric evidence, the chapter welcomes this development and argues that that 
detailed analysis of SFA components is crucial to the full exploitation of the monitoring 
synergies arising from the presence of two fiscal indicators.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 briefly reviews the 
reconciliation account between EMU’s deficit and debt indicators. It discusses how the 
headline deficit can be kept low through increases in some SFA components and how 
other SFA components can partly offset the ensuing negative effects on debt dynamics. 
Section 6.3 analyzes large deficit revisions in Greece, Italy and Portugal. Section 6.4 
discusses a simple model of fiscal gimmickry and provides econometric evidence 
suggesting that, indeed, different SFA components have been selectively used to reduce 
both reported net borrowing and the visibility of deficit-specific fiscal gimmickry. 
Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
6.2  The Reconciliation Account (SFA) 
For the purpose of EMU fiscal rules, deficit is defined as the general government net 
borrowing computed on an accrual basis in accordance with ESA95, and debt is defined 
as general government gross financial liabilities at face value.
109 A simplified 
reconciliation account between the change in Maastricht debt (Δb) and the Maastricht 
deficit (d
m) can therefore be written as: 
Δb ≡ d
m+ CA + FAa – FA s – VE      (6.1) 
where: 
a)  CA is the difference between cash and accrual valuations (the latter is used to 
compute the Maastricht deficit d
m, the former determines the actual financing needs and 
therefore is reflected in changes in liabilities as measured by Δb); 
b)  FAa and FAs are, respectively, acquisitions and sales of financial assets (which 
must be added to net borrowing – d
m – to obtain a measure of gross borrowing, consistent 
with the change in gross liabilities – Δb); 
c)  VE (i.e. valuation effects) is a summary measure of SFA arising from changes 
in the face value of outstanding liabilities
110 and from differences between the face value 
of a bond and its issue price.
111 
                                                 
109  This is not the debt definition provided by ESA95, but the relevant financial instruments and the 
reference sectors are those specified within that framework. 
110  For example, those due to debt restructuring operations or to fluctuations in the exchange rate 
affecting the value in domestic currency of foreign currency denominated debt. 
111   The face value of a bond is used to compute Δb while its issue price measures the financing actually 
received by the government and therefore reflects the financing needs measured by the cash gross 
borrowing requirement, i.e. by d
m + CA + FAa – FAs.     
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Identity (6.1) suggests three observations concerning the scope for “opportunistic” 
accounting: 
a)  underestimation (overestimation) of accrued expenditure (revenue) allows 
reporting a lower Maastricht deficit (d
m) but leaves the change in debt (Δb) unaffected as 
it is offset by an increase in cash-accrual differences (CA); 
b)  similarly, the adoption of loose standards in the identification of 
payments/receipts reflecting acquisition/sales of financial assets, reduces the reported d
m 
but leaves Δb unaffected due to the corresponding increase/decrease in FAa/FAs; 
c)  sales of financial assets (FAs) and debt restructuring operations (a component of 




a)  a large difference between Δb and d
m should alert towards the possibility that 
d
m is underestimated; 
b)  a small difference between Δb and d
m cannot be taken to exclude an 
underestimation of d
m since sales of assets and debt restructuring can be used to offset 
inflated cash-accrual differences and net acquisition of financial assets. 
This suggests rewriting (6.1) in order to partition total SFA into two groups. One group 
includes items that can be used to affect the Maastricht deficit but leave the change in 
debt unaltered (a “deficit-specific” SFA, x), the other includes items that can be used to 




m+ x – z         (6.2) 
Mapping identity (6.1) into identity (6.2), however, is not a straightforward exercise. 
First, there are items in the reconciliation account that do not belong to either x or z (this 
is the case of valuation effects arising from fluctuations in the value of foreign currency-
denominated debt and because of bonds issued above/below par).
114 Second, some of the 
individual items in identity (6.1) may be affected by attempts at reducing d
m as well as Δb 
(this is the case of asset sales, FAs, whose total can be lowered by an opportunistic 
classification of transactions aimed at lowering d
m, and can be increased by privatization 
programs undertaken to reduce Δb).  
 
                                                 
112  Importantly, such operations may leave the government’s net asset position unaffected or even 
worsen it. In this respect, one should also control the extent of one-off measures affecting directly d
m 
(Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). There is of course no implication here that privatizations are by definition 
bad policy. However, if they are undertaken with the sole purpose of reducing gross debt – 
regardless of the economics underlying the transaction – then the operations can be questioned. 
113  See also Buti et al. (2007). 
114  Note, however, that by issuing bonds above par, a government could reduce the change in debt 
associated with a given deficit.      
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For the purpose of this chapter, we use the following definitions: 
z =  PRIV + VE        (6.3) 
x = CA + FAa  – OFAs 
where  PRIV indicates revenues from the sale of assets arising in the context of 
privatization programs and OFAs indicates other revenue from the sale of financial assets. 
The proposed treatment of VE and FAs reflects data availability constraints and carries 
some costs. First, based on these definitions, z includes all valuation effects (VE), 
irrespective of whether they can or cannot be controlled by the fiscal authorities. This is 
likely to introduce considerable noise in z and may impede the detection of any 
systematic pattern in “debt-specific” SFA. Second, it is implicitly assumed that sales of 
financial assets different from privatization do not reflect debt reduction motives. This 
may somewhat blur the distinction between “deficit-specific” and “debt-specific” SFA 
components, making it more difficult to detect a systematically selective use of SFA 
items. 
Table 6.1 reports the average values of total, deficit-specific, and debt-specific SFA, 
according to the definitions in (6.3) for the countries which were EU members over 1994-
2004 (excluding Luxembourg). The table shows that the discrepancy between changes in 
debt and deficits has been by no means negligible over the period considered (the average 
for the EU as a whole amounts to 0.6 percent of GDP). The table also highlights a much 
higher value for the deficit-specific SFA component (1.0 percent of GDP), and the 
offsetting role of debt-specific SFA (averaging at 0.3 percent of GDP). 
Table 6.2 reports similar information, but it is based on the original data releases by 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal (i.e. before the revisions which have occurred since 2002). 
The overall SFA averages at 0.9 percent of GDP for the EU countries considered. This is 
the net result of a deficit-specific component of 1.2 percent of GDP, partly offset by the 
debt-specific component (0.3 percent of GDP on average). 







Belgium -0.3  0.3  -0.6 
Denmark 0.8  0.7  0.1 
Germany 0.7  0.0  0.7 
Greece 3.2  0.0  3.2 
Spain 0.3  -0.3  0.7 
France 0.5  0.0  0.5 
Ireland 2.0  0.5  1.5 
Italy 1.1  0.9  0.2 
The Netherlands  -0.1  0.3  -0.5 
Austria 1.2  0.5  0.7 
Portugal 0.9  1.3  -0.3 
Finland 1.4  -0.9  2.3 
Sweden 1.5  1.0  0.5 
United Kingdom  0.4  0.4  0.1 
EU average  1.0  0.3  0.6 
Note: average values over 1994-2004, data after revisions occurred since 2002.     
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Belgium -0.3  0.3  -0.6 
Denmark 0.8  0.7  0.1 
Germany 0.7  0.0  0.7 
Greece 5.0  -0.9  5.9 
Spain 0.3  -0.3  0.7 
France 0.5  0.0  0.5 
Ireland 2.0  0.5  1.5 
Italy 1.4  0.7  0.7 
The Netherlands  -0.1  0.3  -0.5 
Austria 1.2  0.5  0.7 
Portugal 1.5  1.3  0.1 
Finland 1.4  -0.9  2.3 
Sweden 1.5  1.0  0.5 
United Kingdom  0.4  0.4  0.1 
EU average  1.2  0.3  0.9 
Note: average values over 1994-2004, data before revisions occurred since 2002. 
6.3  Deficit Revisions in Italy, Portugal, and Greece  
Evidence supporting the usefulness of crosschecking fiscal data is provided by three case 
studies of significant deficit data revisions. These revisions concerned the 2001 deficit 
outcome in Italy and Portugal and the 2003 deficit outturn in Greece. In all three cases, 
the initial deficit figure was consistent with the forecasts by international organisations. 
This seems to indicate that by looking at the ESA95 deficit in isolation all parties 
involved can get a biased view of fiscal trends.
115  
Italy: the 2001 Deficit Outturn 
In March 2002, the Italian Statistical Office (Istat) released the first statistics concerning 
the 2001 net borrowing. Back then, the deficit was estimated to be 1.4 percent of GDP. 
The outcome was very close to the range of forecasts published by international 
organisations. After several revisions, the 2001 deficit is currently estimated to be 3.1 
percent of GDP. 
Changes to the 2001 net borrowing figures took place between June 2002 and March 
2006. In particular, in June 2002 Istat raised its estimate from 1.4 to 1.6 percent of GDP, 
primarily on account of higher healthcare expenditure. One month later, Eurostat 
announced its decision on the accounting treatment for the purposes of the excessive 
deficit procedure of securitisations carried out by governmental authorities. This implied 
an upward revision of Italy’s deficit to 2.2 percent of GDP. In February 2003, Istat again 
published a higher figure for the 2001 deficit: 2.6 per cent of GDP. This new estimate 
was due to the availability of more complete information on the different government 
tiers’ economic accounts. Two years later, in March 2005, Istat once more revised 
upwards the 2001 deficit, to 3.0 percent of GDP, because of the reclassification of capital 
transfers from the general government to the Ferrovie dello Stato (the state-owned 
                                                 
115  This section is a summary and update of the analysis conducted in two earlier papers (Balassone et 
al., 2004 and 2006).      
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railway company) from financial to real transactions. Two months later, in May 2005, the 
2001 deficit was estimated to be 3.2 percent of GDP mainly because of the upward 
revision of transfers to firms. Finally, in March 2006, due to a GDP upward revision, the 
2001 deficit was indicated to be 3.1 percent of GDP. 
The overall revision can be interpreted in terms of the deficit-specific SFA component (x) 
considered in the previous section: x was initially overestimated. More specifically, the 
deficit revision reflects a reduction of the cash-accrual adjustment by 0.6 percentage 
points of GDP, an increase in the sale of assets by 0.6 points (the reclassification of 
securitization), and a reduction in acquisitions of financial assets by 0.5 points (mainly, 
the reclassification of capital injections in the railway company). 
The decline initially reported for the deficit between 2000 and 2001 (from 1.7 percent to 
1.4 percent of GDP) was in sharp contrast with the dynamics of the change in debt. 
According to the data available in March 2002, the latter rose from 1.6 percent of GDP in 
2000 to 3.5 percent in 2001. This indicator turned out to be more stable than ESA95 net 
borrowing: overall, it was revised upwards by 0.7 percentage points of GDP; moreover, 
revisions took place only up to March 2003. 
Figure 6.1  Italy: Net Borrowing and Change in Debt (millions of euro)
 



















Net borrowing  Change in debt
Figure 6.1 shows the divergence between the ESA95 deficit and the change in debt as it 
first appeared in March 2002 (Panel A) and as it appears now (Panel B). After the 
revisions, the dynamics of the ESA95 deficit is clearly closer to that of the change in 
debt. The joint examination of the indicators could have provided an early warning of the 
likely forthcoming revisions. Banca d’Italia in its Annual Report released in May 2002 in 
fact carried out this comparative exercise.
116  
Portugal: the 2001 Deficit Outturn 
In March 2002 – in its first notification about the 2001 fiscal outcomes – Portugal 
estimated the general government deficit to be 2.2 percent of GDP as against 1.5 percent 
in 2000. At that time, the most up-to-date deficit forecasts by international institution 
were somewhat more favourable.  
Eurostat stated that it was not in a position to certify the Portuguese figures due to, among 
other reasons, the lack of information on capital injections to public corporations – which 
                                                 
116  The Report also included an analysis of the composition of total SFA.      
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had been treated as acquisition of shares and other equities with no effect on the 
government deficit. Moreover, Eurostat stressed that – as some of these capital injections 
might be reclassified as transfers – the notified deficit was to be considered as provisional 
and likely to be increased. 
In the spring of 2002 a commission headed by the Banco de Portugal and also composed 
of representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the National Statistical Institute was set 
up with the mandate of analysing and updating the government accounts. In September, 
the figure for the 2001 deficit was revised upwards to 4.1 percent of GDP. This revision 
was due to a number of factors: new data on the accounts of the local authorities; the 
inclusion in the budget accounts of some injections of capital into publicly-owned 
companies; changes to the methods used to account for expenditure carryovers and 
revenue connected with the EU structural funds; and the expiration of a derogation 
regarding the methods of recording tax and social contribution receipts accruing in the 
year. 
Between September 2002 and September 2004 the deficit was slightly revised upwards 
twice, to 4.4 percent of GDP. In September 2004, Eurostat stressed that there were still 
ongoing discussions with the Portuguese authorities concerning the consistency between 
accrual and cash data for the period 2001-04. One year later, the 2001 deficit-to-GDP 
ratio was revised downwards to 4.2 because of an upward revision of GDP. At that time, 
Eurostat said that it intended to clarify reported cases of capital injections undertaken 
between 2001 and 2004 by various governments, including Portugal. At present, 
according to the European Commission 2006 spring forecasts, the Portuguese 2001 
deficit is estimated to be 4.3 per cent of GDP. Therefore, the overall revision with respect 
to the original data release amounts to 2.1 percent of GDP. 
The initially reported increase in the deficit between 2000 and 2001 (from 1.5 to 2.2 
percent of GDP) was markedly smaller than the one observed for the change in debt. The 
latter rose from 2.5 percent of GDP in 2000 to 5.5 percent in 2001. Over time, the 2001 
change in debt was revised only slightly and mostly because of GDP revisions. According 
to the most recent European Commission data – the change in debt increased from 2.4 in 
2000 to 5.3 in 2001. Panel A of Figure 6.2 shows the initial divergence between ESA95 
deficit and the change in debt; Panel B shows the same variables after the revisions. 
Figure 6.2  Portugal: Net Borrowing and Change in Debt (millions of euro) 
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Greece: the 2003 Deficit Outturn 
At the beginning of March 2004, in its first notification of the 2003 fiscal outcome, 
Greece estimated the general government deficit at 1.7 percent of GDP, as against 1.4 
percent in 2002. At that time, the most up-to-date forecasts by international institutions 
were broadly in line with the data notified by Greece. After several revisions, the 2003 
deficit is currently estimated to be 5.8 percent of GDP. 
Revisions occurred between March 2004 and March 2006. Indeed, already by the end of 
March 2004 Greece sent updated data to the European Commission, revising upwards the 
2003 deficit to 3.0 percent of GDP. In April, in publishing the Spring forecasts, the 
Commission took into account the latter notification. It stressed that “the data for 2003 
are not yet validated by Eurostat and do not therefore provide a reliable basis for 
assessing the budgetary situation at this stage”. The Commission also noted that “[a] fact-
finding mission is being prepared for the end of April in order to have more information 
about the budgetary situation in this country and decide on steps to be taken”. 
At the beginning of May, following an additional notification, Eurostat verified that in 
2003 the general government deficit was 3.2 percent of GDP. In September, the deficit 
and debt figures for the years 2000-03 were significantly revised. In particular, the 2003 
deficit was estimated at 4.6 percent of GDP and the 2003 debt was indicated at 109.9 
percent of GDP. 
Both in the March 2005 Notification and in the September 2005 one, Greece revised the 
2003 deficit upwards by more than half a percentage point of GDP (to 5.2 and 5.7 percent 
of GDP, respectively). In March 2006 the 2003 deficit was estimated to be 5.8 percent of 
GDP. 
Figure 6.3  Greece: Net Borrowing and Change in Debt (millions of euro) 















Net borrowing  Change in debt 
 
As to the deficit, the overall revisions were essentially due to: lower tax revenue (mainly 
VAT); lower payments received from EU institutions in the context of structural funds 
programmes; the reclassification, as a financial transaction, of a payment from the Saving 
Postal Bank to government; upward revisions of military expenditure and of interest 
payments; lower than expected surpluses of social security funds; and incorrect recording 
of hospitals’ expenditure.  
With reference to the debt, the revisions were due to the previous underestimation of 
bonds with capitalised interests and to the overestimation of consolidating assets of social 
security.      
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The initially reported increase in deficit between 2002 and 2003 (from 1.4 percent to 1.7 
percent of GDP) was in line with that observed for the change in debt, the latter rising 
from 5.6 percent of GDP in 2002 to 5.9 percent in 2003. However, the level of the two 
indicators was markedly different (Panel A of Figure 6.3). Panel B shows how revisions 
have completely cancelled the 2003 discrepancy and significantly reduced those for 
previous years. 
6.4  Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Gimmickry: a Simple Model 
An econometric analysis of SFA in EU member countries was first provided by von 
Hagen and Wolff (2005). Their paper refers to the theoretical framework developed in 
von Hagen and Harden (1995, 1996) and Milesi-Ferretti (2003), where governments have 
an incentive to circumvent fiscal rules by hiding the budgetary implications of fiscal 
policies in less visible accounting items (that is, in the SFA). The likelihood of this type 
of window dressing decreases with the costs associated with detection. The authors argue 
that binding deficit rules were introduced only with the start up of the European 
Economic Monetary Union (EMU) – i.e. the SGP – and therefore focus their analysis on 
differences in the correlation between reported deficits and SFA before and after EMU. 
They find no such correlation before 1998, but a negative one (large and significant) 
thereafter, suggesting that SFA were in fact substituting for other transactions which 
would have had an impact on deficits. 
Buti et al. (2007) develop a model where total SFA is split into two components (one that 
can be used to reduce reported deficits and the other to impact debt figures). In this way 
they can separately analyze the interaction between each of the Maastricht fiscal rules and 
fiscal gimmickry. They assume that governments minimize a quadratic loss function 
whose arguments are the deviation of output from its optimal level (influenced by the 
“true” deficit), deviations of reported deficit and debt from the respective fiscal rule, and 
the size of accounting gimmicks. The model suggests that both the deficit-specific and the 
debt-specific components of SFA are positively related to the “true deficit”, and that only 
the debt-specific component also depends on the debt level (though the sign of the 
relation is ambiguous ex ante). The empirical results are partly in line with the theoretical 
predictions of the model.
117 Notably, the authors find that the introduction of the SGP had 
an (increasing) impact on the deficit-specific component of the SFA, but none on the 
debt-specific component. 
In this section, following Buti et al. (2007) we provide separate econometric analysis of 
deficit-specific and debt-specific SFA components. However, we refer to a different 
model as the basis for our estimating equations. We assume that governments derive 
utility (U) from running primary deficits (p): U=U(p). This can be justified either by 
assuming that governments are short sighted and only care about the short-term output 
gains that can be attained through higher deficits, or by reference to the political gain 
directly attainable by increasing transfers targeted to specific groups. In either case, the 
                                                 
117  The authors find no statistically significant relationship between the two components of SFA and 
“true deficits”. They find evidence of a positive relationship between reported deficits and deficit-
specific SFA and of a negative relationship between reported deficits and debt-specific SFA. Only 
debt-specific SFA are found to be affected (negatively) by the debt level.       
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assumption is consistent with the rationale for having a fiscal rule specifying a maximum 
threshold for the deficit, suggesting the need to counteract an asymmetric deficit bias.
118 
Governments’ utility maximization is constrained by compliance with Maastricht’s debt 
and deficit rules. The debt rule mandates that the debt-to-GDP ratio (b) must be lower 
than 60 percent and, if higher than such threshold to begin with, it must be declining 
towards 60 percent at a satisfactory pace. As we have noted earlier, the “satisfactory 
pace” has never been defined, therefore we model this rule as requiring: 
Δb = p + rb – yb – z ≤  W        ( 6 . 4 )    
where W=0 if b>60, W=60–b if b<60 
i.e. the change in the ratio of debt to GDP (Δb) – as determined by the “true deficit” 
(d=p+rb where rb indicates interest payments), the reducing effect of output growth (yb), 
and the debt-specific SFA (z) – must be negative if b is above 60 percent to start with.
119 
The change in the debt ratio can be positive if b<60 to start with, but it cannot bring b 
above 60 percent of GDP.
120  
The deficit rule requires that reported deficits (d
m) be lower than 3 percent of GDP. 
Similarly to what happens for the debt ratio, if the reported deficit ratio is above 3 percent 
to start with, a gradual reduction is expected. Without loss of generality, and by analogy 
with the debt rule, we assume that in this case the reported deficit, as a minimum, must 
not increase further. The deficit rule is therefore modelled as: 
d
m = p + rb – x ≤  H         ( 6 . 5 )    
where H=3 if d
m<3, H=d
m  if  d
m>3 
where x denotes the deficit-specific SFA component.
121 
Finally, we assume that the opportunistic use of deficit and debt-specific SFA (x and z, 
respectively) carries a cost C=C(x,z), with C’>0 and C”≥0. Following Buti et al. (2007) 
the costs can be thought of as deriving from the risk of being caught (higher x and z are 
more visible) as well as from suboptimal allocation of resources (not all spending items 
lend themselves to classification as transactions in financial items) and financial 
asset/liability management.  
In sum, the maximization problem facing the authorities can be described as follows: 
Maxp,x,z    U(p)  –  C(x,z)       (6.6) 
s.t.   p + rb – yb – z ≤ W  where W=0 if b>60, W=60-b, if b<60 
     p + rb – x ≤ H    where H=3 if d
m<3, H=d
m  if  d
m>3 
                                                 
118  The quadratic loss function adopted in Buti et al. (2007) is symmetric in deviations from the optimal 
real output growth where real output growth depends linearly on the “true deficit”.
 
119    With respect to the analysis in Section 6.2, scaling the variables by GDP requires the consideration 
of the reducing effect exerted by output growth on the debt ratio.
  
120  In this way we explicitly model the constraint also for countries where b<60 (Buti et al., 2007, 
assume z=0 for b<60).  
121  This formulation allows differentiating the constraints applying to countries with reported deficits 
above and below 3 percent of GDP, rather than use dummy variables at the estimation stage.     
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whose Lagrangean is: 
U(p) – C(x,z) – λ1 [p + rb – yb – z – W] – λ2 [p + rb – x – H]     (6.7)    
with first order conditions: 
U’ – λ1 – λ2  =   0         ( 6 . 8 a )  
– Cx + λ2  =   0         ( 6 . 8 b )  
– Cz + λ1  =   0         ( 6 . 8 c )    
λ1 ≥ 0    p + rb – yb – z – W ≤ 0  λ1 [p + rb – yb – z – W] = 0  (6.8d)  
λ2 ≥ 0    p + rb – x – H ≤ 0    λ2 [p + rb – x – H] = 0  (6.8e)  
Since Cx ,Cz > 0 by assumption, from (6.8b) and (6.8c) it follows that λ1, λ2  > 0, which in 
turn we use in (6.8d) and (6.8e) to get: 
z = p + rb – yb – W             (6.9)  
x  =  p  +  rb  –  H        (6.10) 
We use these equations as the basis for our econometric analysis and estimate the 
following two regressions: 
zt = α0  + α1 dt + α2 ytbt-1 + α3 Wt + εa        ( 6 . 1 1 )  
xt = β0  + β 1 dt + β 2 Ht + εb         ( 6 . 1 2 )  





t-1 if  d
m
t-1>3. 
From the signs in (6.9) and (6.10), we expect: 
(a)   α1 > 0 ;    α2 , α3 < 0  
(b)   β 1 > 0 ;    β 2 < 0 
We expect both types of SFA to be positively related to the level of the “true deficit”  
(α1, β1 > 0): the higher the “true deficit”, the higher the x and z values required for formal 
compliance with the rules (see also Buti et al., 2007). 
The debt level plays no direct role, and it only affects the debt-specific SFA through the 
“growth effect” (i.e. the reduction of the debt ratio determined by GDP growth, which is 
larger the larger the debt). The use of z to keep debt dynamics under control becomes less 
necessary when the growth impact is higher, hence the negative sign expected for α2. 
The constraints determined by the deficit and debt fiscal rules enter directly the 
corresponding estimating equations. We expect the levels of z and x to be negatively 
correlated with, respectively, the maximum allowed change in debt and the maximum     
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allowed deficit (α3, β 2 < 0). In other words, the more binding the fiscal rule the higher 
the incentives to resort to fiscal gimmickry. 
Since  x, z, and p (and therefore d) are simultaneously determined, we report results 
obtained using two stage least squares. We present two sets of estimates: one uses the 
most recent data releases, the other one considers the values first reported by Greece, 
Italy, and Portugal over the period 1998-2004 (that is data published before the statistical 
revisions discussed in Section 6.3). We also introduce a dummy variable to test for 
structural breaks after 1998.  
The sample includes data for fifteen countries over 1994-2004. We also run regressions 
on the sub-sample of euro-area members. Deficit-specific SFA are obtained from the Buti 
et al. (2007) dataset as the sum of cash-accrual differences and of net acquisitions of 
financial assets, excluding privatization, following the discussion in Section 6.2. The 
“true deficit” is obtained by summing the deficit-specific SFA to deficit data used in the 
context of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) as reported in the AMECO database. 
The “growth effect” is computed using data from the AMECO database. Finally, and 
again in line with the discussion in Section 6.2, debt-specific SFA are obtained residually 
by subtracting from total SFA the deficit-specific SFA component and the growth effect. 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 report the estimation results, which are in line with expectations from 
the model. All coefficients are correctly signed, statistically significant and exerting 
quantitatively large effects on the dependent variables. There is no significant difference 
between results for the EU15 and those for the euro area. Using the original data releases 
for Greece, Italy, and Portugal induces an improvement in the regression fit for the 
deficit-specific equation, but not for the debt-specific one, possibly reflecting the limited 
extent of revisions to changes in debt compared to revisions in deficits. 
The deficit-specific SFA is positively correlated with the “true deficit”. For each one 
percent of GDP increase in the true deficit there is an estimated 0.3 percent of GDP 
increase in deficit-specific SFA. The deficit-specific SFA is also negatively correlated 
with the maximum allowed deficit (H). The increase in deficit-specific SFA associated 
with a one percent of GDP increase in the allowed maximum deficit is estimated at 0.2-
0.25 percent of GDP, using the data set which includes recent revisions to data for 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal, and to almost 0.5 percent of GDP, excluding such revisions. 
The debt-specific SFA is positively correlated with the “true deficit”. For each one 
percent of GDP increase in the true deficit, there is an increase by about 0.3 percent of 
GDP in debt-specific SFA, enough to offset the corresponding estimated increase in 
deficit-specific SFA. The debt-specific SFA is negatively correlated with the “growth 
effect”. For each one percent of GDP increase in the growth effect, there is a 0.30-0.35 
percent of GDP decrease in debt-specific SFA. Finally, the debt-specific SFA is also 
negatively correlated with the maximum allowed change in debt (W). For each one 
percent of GDP increase in the allowed maximum change in debt, there is an estimated 
0.2 percent of GDP decrease in debt-specific SFA.      
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Table 6.3  Determinants of Deficit- and Debt-specific SFA – EU15 
EU15 – 1994-2004 – 2SLS fixed effects estimation (1) 
Dependent Variable  Deficit SFA (x)  Deficit SFA (x)  Debt SFA (z)  Debt SFA (z) 
Data set  Current Values (2) Original Values (3) Current Values (2)  Original Values (3)
Constant 0.5  1.28*  1.63**  1.39* 
  0.94 2.32 2.62 2.04 
Dummy 1999  0.97**  1.09**  0.38  0.19 
  3.29 3.54 1.25 0.57 
“True deficit”  0.31**  0.33**  0.33**  0.31** 
  5.97 6.11 5.62 4.94 
Growth effect      -0.34**  -0.29* 
     2.89 2.19 
Deficit rule (H)  -0.27*  -0.45**     
  2.43 3.97    
Debt rule (W)      -0.2**  -0.18** 
     5.72 4.76 
Number of 
observations 
134 134 129 129 
R²:   within  0.276  0.339  0.385  0.329 
 between  0.353  0.398  0.446  0.348 
 overall  0.299  0.346  0.203  0.159 
Notes: (1) Adjusted T- statistics in italics. *, ** indicate coefficient significance at the 95% and 99% 
level, respectively. "True Deficit" and "h" are instrumented by their lagged values. 
(2) Data as in the latest releases available. 
(3) 1998-2004 data for Greece, Italy, and Portugal are those from first official releases 
 
 
Table 6.4  Determinants of Deficit- and Debt-specific SFA – Euro area 
Euro area – 1994-2004 – 2SLS fixed effects estimation (1) 
Dependent Variable  Deficit SFA (x)  Deficit SFA (x)  Debt SFA (z)  Debt SFA (z) 
Data set  Current Values (2) Original Values (3) Current Values (2)  Original Values (3)
Constant 0.27  1.5*  1.65**  1.39* 
  0.46 2.27 2.13 1.62 
Dummy 1999  0.87**  0.98**  1.71  -0.05 
  2.8 2.91 0.5 0.13 
“True deficit”  0.29**  0.32**  0.30**  0.28** 
  4.78 4.83 3.97 3.38 
Growth effect      -0.35**  -0.29* 
     2.68 1.99 
Deficit rule (H)  -0.21  -0.48**     
  1.68 3.67    
Debt rule (W)      -0.2**  -0.18** 
     4.69 3.83 
Number of 
observations 
101 101  99  99 
R²:   within  0.258  0.349  0.330  0.269 
 between  0.451  0.408  0.467  0.378 
 overall  0.345  0.340  0.195  0.151 
Notes: (1) Adjusted T- statistics in italics. *, ** indicate coefficient significance at the 95% and 99% 
level, respectively. "True Deficit" and "h" are instrumented by their lagged values. 
(2) Data as in the latest releases available. 
(3) 1998-2004 data for Greece, Italy, and Portugal are those from first official releases 
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Similar to von Hagen and Wolff (2005) and to Buti et al. (2007) we find a structural 
break around 1998. In line with the result in Buti et al. (2007), the break appears to affect 
only the equation for deficit-specific SFA. There are two possible explanations for this. 
One is the usual argument that the introduction of the SGP has made the deficit rule more 
stringent and increased the incentive to use SFA. The other is that with the switch to the 
accrual-based ESA95 in 1999, a further channel of deficit-specific SFA opened, namely 
cash/accrual differences, which was previously not available. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The reliability of EMU’s fiscal indicators has been questioned by recent episodes of large 
upward deficit revisions. This chapter points out that EMU’s deficit indicator is 
particularly fragile in two respects: the identification of transactions in financial assets 
and the assessment of accrued revenue and expenditure. It argues that margins for 
opportunistic accounting mainly arise from these two weak spots. 
Even the simple comparison between deficit and change in debt can help early detection 
of inconsistencies in fiscal data. Evidence from three case studies of significant deficit 
data revision suggests the usefulness of crosschecks between deficit and changes in gross 
debt to reduce the scope for fiscal gimmickry. 
Changes in general government debt were much larger than initial deficit figures in 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal, before the large upward deficit revisions experienced in 
recent years. In Italy, the revision process was gradual and lasted four years. Although the 
initial discrepancy between the change in debt and the deficit was more than 2 percent of 
GDP, the highest annual revision amounted to only 0.8 points. In Greece, a large 
discrepancy between the two indicators was present for several years before the process 
of statistical revisions abruptly started in 2004.  
Nevertheless, since different items in the reconciliation account between deficit and 
change in debt can offset each other, consistency checks must go deeper than the overall 
difference between the two indicators. Italy provides an interesting example. In 2001 total 
SFA amounted to 4.3 percent of GDP, as against “only” 1.2 percent in 2000. However, 
deficit-specific SFA were higher in 2000 than in 2001 (3.4 vs. 3.0 percent of GDP), and 
the increase in total SFA in 2001 reflected the decline in the offsetting debt-specific SFA. 
Econometric estimates discussed in Section 6.4 provide evidence that deficit-specific 
SFA tend to increase with the underlying deficit and debt-specific SFA tend to offset the 
impact on total SFA of such an increase. This suggests not only that opportunistic 
accounting may have taken place to ensure formal compliance with the deficit rule, but 
also that debt-specific SFA may have been used to make the ensuing deficit-debt 
discrepancy less visible. 
Attention to the quality of statistics has increased in recent years also in the context of the 
reform of the SGP. Since 2004, notifications include more detailed information, which 
now refer to the various sub-sectors of the general government. In addition, some steps 
have recently been taken to improve statistical governance at the EU and national level. 
The regulation concerning the statistics used for the excessive deficit procedure has been 
amended. The role of Eurostat as the statistical authority in the context of the excessive     
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deficit procedure has been reinforced by introducing formal requirements of 
completeness and internal consistency of fiscal data reported to the Commission and by 
disciplining Eurostat’s interaction with member states through “dialogue” and 
“methodological” visits. In order to improve transparency and accountability of national 
statistical authorities, the Regulation mandates the public availability of data reported by 
Member States as well as of inventories describing the methods, procedures and sources 
used by member states, and requires the publication by Eurostat of regular reports on the 
quality of data. To bolster the operational capacity of the Commission, Eurostat has 
conducted an internal redeployment of staff in order to reinforce the activities linked to 
the validation of economic and fiscal accounts and created a dedicated unit. Finally, the 
directors of national statistical institute and Eurostat adopted a European Statistics Code 
of Practice, defining standards for the independence of the national and community 
statistical authorities. The Code lists a set of indicators to be used to review the 
implementation of the Code itself. The Commission is setting up a reporting system to 
monitor adherence to the Code of Practice by the national statistical authorities and 
Eurostat. 
The analysis of SFA along the breakdown suggested in the chapter may enhance the 
effectiveness of these reform efforts. To this end, the reconciliation account between 
deficit and change in debt reported in the notifications should identify all financial assets 
and therefore there should be no residual item labelled as “other assets”. Moreover, 
national authorities should routinely provide justification for cash-accrual differences in 
annual data for individual accounting items. In due time Member States should also be 
requested to provide a full set of government accounts covering both deficit formation 
and its financing. Such a set of accounts should include both cash and accrual figures. 
Given the unavoidable information asymmetry between the community and Member 
States, ensuring the independence of the national statistical institutions is crucial. This is 
not just an issue of enforcement of fiscal rules; it is an issue of accountability to the 
public and of good management of public resources.     
 
Table 6.5  General Government Net Borrowing/Lending, 2000-04
* 
 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of 
 2001  2002  2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2005 2003  2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Belgium  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Denmark  2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.2 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.0 2.8 2.7 
Germany  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.3  -2.7 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -3.6 -3.5 -3.7 -3.7 -3.9 -3.8 -4.0 -3.7 -3.7 
Greece  -0.9 -0.8 -1.9 -2.0 0.1  -1.4 -1.4 -3.6 -1.2 -1.4 -4.1 -4.9 -1.7 -5.2 -5.8 -6.1 -6.9 
Spain  -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -0.9 0.0  -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.0  -0.3 -0.3 0.3  0.3  0.0  -0.3 -0.1 
France  -1.3 -1.3 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -4.1 -4.2 -4.2 -3.7 -3.7 
Ireland  4.5 4.5 4.3 4.4 1.7 1.1 1.1 0.9 -0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -0.4  0.2 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.5 
Italy  -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -1.4 -2.6 -2.6 -3.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.6 -2.9 -2.4 -2.9 -3.4 -3.0 -3.4 
Luxembourg 5.3 5.8 6.1 6.3 5.0 6.4 6.3 6.2 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.0 -0.1  0.5 0.2 -1.1  -1.1 
Netherlands  2.0  2.2  2.2  2.2  0.2  0.1  0.0  -0.1 -1.1 -1.9 -1.9 -2.0 -3.0 -3.2 -3.1 -2.5 -1.9 
Austria  -1.1  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.6  -0.2  -0.2  -0.5  -1.1  -1.1  -1.5  -1.3  -1.1 
Portugal  -1.4 -1.5 -2.8 -2.8 -2.2 -4.2 -4.4 -4.4 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.2 
Finland  6.7 7.0 6.9 7.1 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.2 4.7 4.3 4.3 4.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.3 
Sweden  4.0 3.7 3.4 5.1 4.7 4.5 2.8 2.5 1.2 0.0 -0.3  -0.2  0.7 0.2 0.1 1.4 1.8 
UK  2.1 1.8 3.9 3.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 -1.4  -1.6  -1.7  -1.6  -3.2  -3.4  -3.3  -3.2  -3.3 
Euro  area  **  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  -1.3 -1.6 -1.6 -1.7 -2.3 -2.3 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7 -2.8 -3.1 -2.8 -2.9 
Notes: * Spring notifications’ initial estimates and subsequent revisions (as a percentage of GDP). A negative sign indicates a deficit; a positive sign indicates a surplus. 
UMTS proceeds are included. 
** Excluding Greece in 2000.     
 
Table 6.6  General Government Debt, 2000-04
* 
 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of 
 2001  2002  2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2005 2003  2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Belgium  110.9 109.3 109.6 109.1 107.5 108.5 108.1 108.0 105.4 105.8 105.4 103.2 100.5 100.0 98.5  95.6  94.7 
Denmark  47.3 46.8 47.4 50.1 44.4 45.4 47.8 47.8 45.2 47.2 47.2 46.8 45.0 44.7 44.4 42.7 42.6 
Germany  60.2 60.3 60.2 60.2 59.8 59.5 59.4 59.4 60.8 60.8 60.9 60.3 64.2 64.2 63.8 66.0 65.5 
Greece 103.9  102.8  106.2 106.2 99.7  107.0 106.9 114.8 104.9 104.7 112.2 110.7 102.4 109.3 107.8 110.5 108.5 
Spain  60.6 60.4 60.5 61.2 57.2 56.9 57.5 57.8 54.0 54.6 55.0 52.5 50.8 51.4 48.9 48.9 46.4 
France  58.0 57.4 57.2 57.2 57.2 56.8 56.8 57.0 59.1 58.6 59.0 58.2 63.0 63.9 62.4 65.6 64.4 
Ireland  39.1 38.9 39.3 38.4 36.6 36.8 36.1 35.8 34.0 32.3 32.6 32.1 32.0 32.0 31.1 29.9 29.4 
Italy  110.2 110.6 110.6 111.2 109.4 109.5 110.6 110.7 106.7 108.0 108.0 105.5 106.2 106.3 104.2 105.8 103.8 
Luxembourg 5.3 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.5 7.2 5.7 5.7 7.5 6.5 4.9 7.1 6.3 7.5 6.6 
Netherlands  56.3 56.0 55.8 55.9 53.2 52.8 52.9 52.9 52.6 52.6 52.6 50.5 54.8 54.3 51.9 55.7 52.6 
Austria  62.8 63.6 66.8 67.0 61.7 67.3 67.1 67.1 67.9 66.6 66.7 66.0 65.0 65.4 64.4 65.2 63.6 
Portugal  53.8 53.4 53.3 53.3 55.6 55.6 55.6 55.9 58.0 58.1 58.5 55.5 59.4 60.1 57.0 61.9 58.7 
Finland  44.0 44.0 44.5 44.6 43.6 43.8 43.9 43.8 42.7 42.6 42.5 41.3 45.3 45.3 44.3 45.1 44.3 
Sweden  55.6 55.3 52.8 52.8 56.0 54.4 54.4 54.3 52.4 52.6 52.4 52.0 51.8 52.0 51.8 51.2 50.5 
UK  42.9 42.4 42.1 42.1 39.0 39.0 38.9 38.8 38.6 38.5 38.3 37.6 39.8 39.7 39.0 41.6 40.8 
Euro  area  **  70.0 70.0 70.2 70.4 71.6 69.2 69.4 69.6 71.3 69.2 69.5 69.8 70.4 70.9 71.2 74.1 74.5 
Notes: * spring notifications’ initial estimates and subsequent revisions (as a percentage of GDP) 
** Excluding Greece in 2000.     
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Table 6.7  General Government Change in Debt, 2000-04
* 
 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of  Spring of
 2001  2001  2003  2002 2003 2004 2003 2004 2005 2004 2005  2006 2005 2006
Belgium  0.3 0.4 0.2 2.0 1.9 1.6 -0.1  0.3 0.3 -2.1  -2.1  -2.0  0.5 0.8 
Denmark  -2.5 -2.6 -2.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 1.0  0.7  0.7  -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 -0.4 0.0 
Germany  0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 3.9 3.9 4.1 3.3 3.2 
Greece 6.4  6.3  8.7  4.0 8.3 8.3 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.7 9.1 8.9 
Spain  1.8 1.8 2.0 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  1.0 0.8 
France  1.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.8 3.7 4.0 5.5 6.0 5.8 4.3 4.5 
Ireland  -3.8  -3.8  -3.6  1.6 1.4 1.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.3 
Italy  1.5 1.6 1.5 3.5 3.8 4.2 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.9 3.5 3.6 
Luxembourg  0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.6  0.0 0.2 0.9 0.6 
Netherlands -2.7  -2.8  -2.9  0.2 0.5 0.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.3 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.0 
Austria  1.0 1.3 2.6 0.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.2 1.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 2.0 1.9 
Portugal  2.2 2.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.2 5.2 2.5 2.5 2.3 3.8 3.7 
Finland  0.9 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 3.7 3.8 3.6 1.7 1.7 
Sweden  -6.8  -6.8  -6.5  2.4 3.2 3.2 -0.2  0.1 0.1 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.0 
UK  -0.7  -0.8  -0.8  -1.4  -1.4  -1.4  1.4 1.4 1.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.7 
Euro  area  **  0.9 0.9 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 
Notes: * Spring notifications’ initial estimates and subsequent revisions (as a percentage of GDP) 







The fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
have stimulated a large strand of economic literature. Most of this literature is on how to 
interpret the available data, how to perform cyclical adjustments, how to identify the 
underlying budgetary position and the discretionary behaviour of government, etc. The 
infrastructure of indicators (how the deficit is defined; how it is compiled; how reliable 
and accurate it is; should it be compiled on a cash or on an accrual basis, should it cover a 
narrowly defined government or a wider public sector) has received much less attention. 
Balassone, Franco and Zotteri are among the rare authors that have devoted attention to 
these issues. And they have done it with quite a provocative spirit, even daring to 
consider that the indictors that are relevant for fiscal surveillance in the EU have been a 
“misleading compass”, as they put it in a previous and related paper (Balassone et al., 
2004). 
The effectiveness of fiscal rules depends crucially on the quality of the fiscal indicators. 
The quality of statistical indicators can be generically defined as “fitness for use”. It is, in 
fact, a complex multidimensional concept; it covers relevance, timeliness, coherence, 
completeness, comparability across time and space, accuracy, reliability, transparency, 
etc. The topic of the chapter is on reliability; in technical terms, reliability refers to the 
closeness of the initial values to the subsequently revised figures. The authors note that 
the EU fiscal indicators do not score high in terms of reliability. This is worrying for two 
reasons: First, in the implementation of the EU fiscal framework, the most relevant 
decisions – such as deciding whether an excessive deficit exists or has been corrected, if a 
given country is complying with Council recommendation, or even if a country has 
fulfilled the criteria to enter the euro area, or ultimately whether the Council will have to 
impose sanctions – are taken on the basis of the first outcomes. The subsequently revised 
data – though of better quality – appear too late to have any decisive impact on the policy 
decisions. So if the first outcomes are subject to large revisions afterwards, important 
decision will be taken on the basis of wrong data. A second reason to be worried is that, 
as the authors point out, given that the fiscal rule is based on a rather simple indicator, 
one would expect it to be reliable. Presumably, other more complex fiscal indicators were 
rejected (implicitly if not explicitly) because the government deficit would be simple, 
easy to compile and reliable.  
Balassone  et al. establish a link between lack of reliability and opportunistic 
manipulation, i.e. political pressure to get data that are rosier than the reality, at least the 
first outcomes even if these are revised afterwards. If the lack of reliability is directly 
connected with opportunistic manipulation, then the solutions the authors propose seem 
to be quite appropriate: (i) increase the scrutiny of the government accounts and (ii) 
                                                 
*   The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and are not attributable to the European 
Commission.     
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strengthen the status of the data compilers, by giving more independence and 
accountability to the national statistical institutes. In the latest two or three years, the 
Commission has taken several steps in this direction, including all the suggestions by the 
authors. Obviously, it is very early to say how fruitful such steps are.  
But are political pressures and opportunistic behaviour the main cause of the lack of 
reliability of fiscal data in the EU? Or are there other causes? If the lack of reliability of 
government accounts was directly and decisively connected with political pressures, one 
would expect the countries with less reliable data to be those that have had more 
problems with the respect of the EU fiscal reference values, and vice versa. The three 
countries that the authors use in their case studies (Greece, Italy and Portugal) would 
confirm the conjecture. Yet, we could also expect similar problems with the French and 
German figures. Now, if we consider data reported by Member States since 1994, France 
and Germany have the most reliable deficit data in the EU.
122 So the question is: what do 
the French and German have that avoids them to resort to the same gimmickries of 
Greece, Italy and Portugal. (Or, do they resort to other tricks?) If I now apply the model 
proposed in the chapter, I am led to conclude that France and Germany bear larger costs 
(Cx) for entering in data manipulations with the purpose of hiding their deficits. Why? Is 
this because of institutional reasons? Are the French and German statistical institutes 
more independent than in other Member States? It would be interesting to research on 
what can be done to increase the reputation costs for producing unreliable data in Greece, 
Italy and Portugal.  
If we try identifying what are EU Member States with the less reliable accounts we get 
some surprising results. Among the countries that have reported the less reliable data, we 
find not only Greece, Portugal and Italy, but also Sweden, Luxembourg and Denmark. 
Now, these are among the countries that have had less trouble in complying with the EU 
fiscal framework. Of course, the data revisions in Sweden and Denmark did not catch the 
public opinion, as the ones in Italy and Portugal, not to say Greece, but the magnitudes 
are not dissimilar. My point here is that the opportunistic manipulation of data certainly 
has an implication of the reliability of data, but there are other factors at play. It may be 
the reputation of the data compilers, irrespective of their status of independence, or the 
resources, competence or expertise available to each statistical institute, or even the more 
or less complex institutional arrangements in each country, or because some countries 
enter into more complex transactions than others. Or perhaps, the reliability difficulties 
would simply reflect the fact that our accounting rules are excessively complex and 
unreliability is somewhat inevitable, or very costly to avoid. We do not know. We would 
also need more research on this. 
The authors identify two fragilities of the deficit indicator: (i) the fact that it is measured 
in an accrual basis and (ii) the fact that it is measured net of financial transactions. Do the 
authors believe that these two fragilities are such that the deficit definition should be 
changed? Would a cash deficit including some financial transactions be a better, and 
more reliable, definition? My understanding is that the authors believe that the current 
deficit definition is still preferable to any other, and they simply want to pinpoint the 
areas that need to be closely scrutinised by Eurostat. 
                                                 
122   For an analysis of the reliability of government deficit and debt statistics in most EU countries, see 
Gordo and Nogueira Martins (2007).     
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7.   
 
Uncertainty Bounds for Cyclically Adjusted Budget Balances 




This chapter addresses issues concerning the uncertainty surrounding estimates of the 
output gap and, in turn, the cyclically adjusted budget deficit. Uncertainty about the size 
of the output gap is likely to be reflected in uncertainty about the size of the cyclical 
adjustment to be applied to the budget deficit. Our main objective in this chapter is to 
evaluate the uncertainty associated with a commonly used estimate of the output gap and 
to demonstrate how this should be reflected in uncertainty about the cyclically adjusted 
budget deficit. The degree of uncertainty associated with the estimate of the output gap 
for a period in the past, when computed now, is noticeably less than that associated with 
the estimate of the current (or real-time) gap. Since typically policy-makers are concerned 
about the current gap, we focus on evaluation of real time estimates and their uncertainty. 
Uncertainty about the cyclically adjusted budget deficit is further compounded by 
uncertainty over the link between the output gap and the budget deficit. If the gap were to 
be caused by tax rich elements of demand, such as consumption, then the impact of a 
given gap on the deficit would be larger than when the gap is caused by changes in a tax 
poor component of demand, such as exports. We therefore undertake a further analysis of 
the sources of shocks and study their impact on the uncertainty surrounding the budget 
deficit. 
In the second section of the chapter we discuss methods of estimating the output gap and 
the associated uncertainty. We focus on the Harvey-Trimbur (2003) estimator, which 
approximates a parametric version of the ideal band pass filter discussed in Baxter and 
King (1999). We utilise this estimator in part because it allows an analytical derivation of 
its standard deviation, which we present in this section. We then present and evaluate real 
time estimates of the output gap and the associated uncertainty for the UK, Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium. In the third section we calculate the 
cyclically adjusted budget deficits from the real time output gap data and present 
uncertainty bands around these estimates. The fourth section looks at the sensitivity of 
our results, by applying different coefficients from a model-based analysis of multipliers 
to the output gap in the calculation of the cyclically adjusted deficit. The final section 
draws conclusions about the difficulties associated with producing reliable estimates of 
the cyclically adjusted budget deficit. 
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7.2 Estimating  the  Output Gap and Its Uncertainty 
Model Uncertainty 
The output gap, the difference between actual and potential output, has an importance in 
the popular debate which can tend to run ahead of the problems in measuring it; the 
output gap is not observable. The choice of what measure, or estimator, of the output gap 
to use is more than a dry academic issue. As the analysis of Canova (1998) showed, for 
example, inference can be sensitive to measurement. In this chapter we largely abstract 
from issues concerning model uncertainty and consider just one leading output gap 
estimator – the Harvey-Trimbur cycle. This is sufficient to make our point that use of the 
output gap in real-time can be problematic since it is often measured imprecisely. The 
Harvey-Trimbur cycle is a model-based estimator based on unobserved components 
(UC). It is a generalisation of the class of Butterworth filters that have the attractive 
property of allowing smooth cycles to be extracted from economic time series - indeed 
ideal band pass filters emerge as a limiting case; see Harvey and Trimbur (2003).  
Statistical and Parameter Uncertainty: Estimation in Real-time 
An additional source of uncertainty associated with output gap estimates derives from the 
fact that policy makers do not have the luxury of being able to wait before deciding 
whether the economy is currently lying above or below its trend level. They have to 
decide, without the benefit of hindsight, whether a given change to output in the current 
period is temporary or permanent, that is whether it is a cyclical or trend movement. As 
discussed by Mitchell (2003) their problem can be interpreted as a forecasting one, since 
these real-time output gap estimates are forecasts, in the sense that they are expectations 
of the output gap conditional on incomplete information. Only with the arrival of 
additional information, such as revised historical data and data not available at the time, 
do the output gap estimates eventually settle down at their ‘final’ values.
123 These real-
time or end-of-sample output gap (point) estimates have been found to be unreliable, in 
the sense that there is a large and significant revision or forecasting error; see Orphanides 
and van Norden’s (2002) application to the US economy and Mitchell’s (2003) to the 
Euro-area.  
Since in the absence of data revisions, revisions to real-time output gap estimates are 
explained by forecasting errors, it is important when de-trending in real-time to produce 
good forecasts of the (log) level of the underlying series. Application of an UC model can 
be seen implicitly to forecast future values optimally. This follows from the fact that for a 
correctly specified model, application of the one-sided Kalman filter is equivalent to 
application of the two-sided filter (smoother) to the underlying series extended infinitely 
into the future with optimal forecasts. These optimal, minimum mean square error, 
forecasts are derived via the Kalman filter, exploiting the state-space representation for a 
given output gap estimator. There is therefore no need for forecast extensions. 
We note that when computing the cyclically adjusted budget deficit the European 
Commission in fact rely on a production function approach to measuring the output gap; 
see Denis et al. (2006). But since TFP is de-trended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter there 
remains an end-of-sample problem. Future values of TFP are therefore forecast prior to 
                                                 
123   Values are never truly final because data revisions and the arrival of new data are a continuous 
process.     
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application of the de-trending filter in an attempt to improve the reliability of the real-
time estimates. But as mentioned above reliability will only be improved if ‘good’ 
forecasts are produced. Indeed, since the Hodrick-Prescott filter implicitly assumes the 
data are generated by an IMA(2,2) model, if future values are forecast using an 
alternative model, this then raises concerns about why the Hodrick-Prescott filter is itself 
used if an IMA(2,2) model is not believed to be the ‘true’ model. In any case, given that 
the European Commission must be uncertain about the accuracy of their measure and also 
still expect revisions to their real-time output gap estimates they should, as we consider 
below, produce a measure of uncertainty associated with it and in turn the cyclically 
adjusted budget deficit. Even if the estimates are not revised, they are not known with 
certainty, and hence must have a sampling distribution. As the Hodrick-Prescott filter is a 
mechanical device it is possible that the uncertainty of the estimates would have to be 
bootstrapped from the data, but it is still possible to estimate uncertainty measures. 
Real-time and ‘Final’ Estimates of the Output Gap in the Euro-area 
To investigate the unreliability of real-time output gap point estimates for Euro-area 
economies the following experiment is undertaken. Full sample or final estimates of the 
output gap are derived using data available over the (full) sample-period using data up to 
2006q1. Real-time output gap estimates are computed recursively from 1980q1. We use 
data from the 1960s to 1980q1 to provide a real time estimate of the output gap for 
1980q1.
124 Then data up to 1980q2 are used to re-estimate the output gap (that involves 
re-estimation of the parameters of the models used to measure the output gap) and obtain 
real-time estimates for 1980q2.
125 This recursive exercise, designed to mimic real-time 
measurement of the output gap, is carried on until data for the period up to 2006q1 are 
used to estimate the real-time output gap for 2006q1. These last estimates are the ‘final’ 
values, where real time and full sample estimates converge. 
Throughout we use only the latest vintage of GDP data. What we call the real-time 
estimate is strictly the quasi-real estimate of Orphanides and van Norden (2002). If we 
considered real-time data we should expect to find an even greater degree of unreliability 
associated with the real-time estimates. Nevertheless revisions to published GDP data 
were found by Orphanides and van Norden (2002) to be less important than so-called 
statistical revisions. Statistical revisions are explained by the arrival of new data helping 
macroeconomists, with the advantage of hindsight, better understand the position of the 
business cycle, and also perhaps revising what model they use to identify and estimate it.  
                                                 
124   We ignore the fact that GDP data are published with, at least, a one-quarter lag. 
125   In the notation of Harvey and Trimbur (2003) we set m=n=2 in each recursive sample, although for 
the UK we consider also increasing n to n=3. The models are not subjected to standard goodness-of-
fit tests to help identify potential weaknesses/model mis-specification. Future work should consider 
this.     
 
Table 7.1  Real-time and Final Output Gaps as Yearly Averages 
 Germany  UK  France  Italy  Spain  Netherlands  Belgium 
 Final  Real-
time  Final  Real-
time  Final  Real-
time  Final  Real-
time  Final  Real-
time  Final  Real-
time  Final  Real-
time 
1990  2.47  1.41 2.70 0.62 2.38 0.43 2.15 0.44 -0.21  -0.58 1.80 0.36 1.44 0.05 
1991  3.16  1.50 -0.86 -0.07 1.92 0.55 1.71 -0.62 0.56 -0.31 1.71 -0.03 1.10 -0.39 
1992  1.80  -0.03 -3.02 -1.43 1.30 0.17 0.59 -1.01 0.14 -0.33 0.40 -0.37 0.41 -0.58 
1993  -0.48  -1.50 -3.15 -0.91 -0.88 0.13 -1.93 -2.12 -0.86 -0.73 -1.26 -0.64 -2.07 -0.90 
1994  -0.34  -1.91 -1.54 -0.52 -1.41 -0.96 -1.28 -1.45 0.41  0.34 -1.56 -0.39 -0.94  0.08 
1995  -0.31  -1.10 -0.92 0.58 -1.47 -0.72 -0.02 -0.27 0.14  0.50 -1.41 0.01  0.81  0.71 
1996  -0.94  -1.14 -0.85 0.50 -2.29 -0.53 -1.00 -0.30 -0.11 0.14 -1.21 0.14  -0.76 -0.03 
1997  -0.72  -1.01 -0.37 0.61 -2.12 -0.74 -0.66 -0.33 -0.04 0.17 -0.39 0.29  0.24  0.35 
1998  -0.74  -0.62 0.20 0.81 -1.06  -0.41  -0.88 0.07 -0.12 0.27 0.76 0.48 -0.38 0.08 
1999  -0.30  -0.69 0.73  0.83  0.11 -0.02 -0.59 -0.05 -0.04 0.03  1.94  0.39  0.06  0.12 
2000  1.48  0.01 1.66 1.03 1.83 0.30 1.63 0.95 0.28 0.16 2.80 0.30 1.33 0.42 
2001  1.52  0.19 1.28 0.91 1.81 0.99 1.94 0.88 0.07 -0.32 2.19 -0.04 0.47 -0.28 
2002  0.46  -0.37 0.55 0.28 0.93 0.54 1.03 -0.22  -0.15  -0.26 0.64 -0.53 0.05 -0.54 
2003  -0.58  -0.95 0.49 -0.04 0.37  0.13  0.00 -0.81 -0.09 -0.09 -0.70 -0.87 -0.72 -0.54 
2004  -0.75  -0.93 0.76  0.16  0.35 -0.15 -0.22 -0.86 -0.03 0.09 -0.93 -1.09 -0.12 -0.02 
2005  -0.63  -0.68 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -1.12 -1.08 0.07  0.13 -0.91 -0.79 -0.35 -0.09 
Notes: Output gaps as a % of trend GDP; real time estimates based on a sample from the start of data to the date where the gap is recorded; full sample uses all data. 
German GDP data was ‘spliced’ at unification so that the GDP of united Germany moved in line with West Germany before unification and with total Germany 
thereafter.     
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Table 7.1 gives an indication of what the real-time and final output gap estimates look 
like. It lists the average real-time and final output gaps over a calendar year. Consistent 
with previous research, these figures indicate how unreliable real-time output gap 
estimates can be. They often paint a different picture to the final estimate, and clearly 
illustrate how one can misjudge the position of the business cycle in real-time. In general 
the full sample estimates are more ‘long period’ volatile than are the real time estimates. 
The latter tend to track actual output more closely, suggesting that perhaps too much 
signal is read into the current data.  
We can draw out further relevant differences between the real-time and final estimates 
shown in Table 7.1. The German output gap estimates suggest that it was difficult to 
estimate the degree of excess capacity in the period after German unification and that data 
at the time may have been interpreted as suggesting trend growth had risen, when it 
probably had not. The same could be said of the mini-boom around 2000, when 
perceptions of the subsequent period of slow growth were absent.  
The lack of cyclicality in the real time output gap estimator is also apparent in the 
outturns for France and Italy, but in both cases the ‘short period’ volatility of the real time 
estimator is apparent. The strength of the early 2000s boom in France is only really 
apparent with hindsight, and the same is true in Italy, although subsequent below capacity 
growth may be apparent there. The correlation of the real time and final estimates is 
stronger in Italy than for the other countries. 
The Spanish output gap, measured either in real time or over the full sample appears to be 
much less ‘long term’ volatile than the other estimates presented here. This may reflect 
too little quarterly noise in the data, or the generally smooth evolution of actual output. 
Conversely the Netherlands shows long and large cycles which evolve in a smooth way 
whichever technique is used, whilst Belgian data show much more ‘short period’ 
volatility in the estimates of the cycle. 
The real-time unreliability of output gap (point) estimates is summarised more fully in 
Table 7.2, both for full sample and real-time estimates. The table also examines the 
filtered estimates or the quasi-final estimates in the parlance of Orphanides and van 
Norden (2002). UC models use the data in two ways in the sense that first they estimate 
the parameters of the model, denoted by the vector Θ, and secondly they use these 
estimates to obtain the filtered and smoothed estimates of the output gap, namely the 
quasi-final and final estimates of the output gap, respectively. The filtered and smoothed 
estimates are the expected value of the output gap conditional on information available at 
time t (t=1,2,...,T) and T, where T≥t, respectively. Let us denote the real-time estimates, 
based on recursively updated estimates of the parameters of a given UC model Θ, by yt|t; 
let yt|T denote the final estimates of the output gap at time t, that use full-sample 
information T to estimate Θ, and then let yt|t ( T Θ ˆ ) denote the filtered estimates of the 
output gap at time t using these full-sample based parameter estimates. 
Table 7.2 indicates that as the future becomes the present output gap estimates are 
revised. Real-time point estimates of the output gap in the Euro area are unreliable, in the 
sense that there is a large and important revision error. This is reflected by the correlation 
coefficients against the final estimates being on average only 0.44. Reflecting the 
importance of ex post information in re-defining the parameter values, the filtered 
estimates are more reliable than the real-time estimates: correlation is higher averaging 
0.66. Parameter uncertainty appears to be a dominant source of the unreliability of real-    
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time estimates. We note that while one might consider an output gap estimator for which 
there is no parameter uncertainty (such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter), so that the filtered 
and real-time estimates are equivalent, our experience suggests that there remains a 
significant difference between the real-time and ‘final’ output gap estimates; e.g. see 
Mitchell (2003).  
Table 7.2  The Unreliability of Real-time Output Gap Point Estimates 
   mean  min  max  s.d.  correlation 
vs. ‘final’  RMSE 
‘final’ -0.042  -2.353  2.117 0.958  1  0 
filtered -0.025  -1.526 1.029 0.555  0.51  0.827  Belgium 
real time  -0.016  -1.265  0.975  0.492  0.391  0.89 
‘final’ -0.15  -2.516  2.496 1.44  1  0 
filtered -0.405  -1.541 1.165 0.691  0.773  1.038  France 
real time  -0.231  -1.768  1.161  0.555  0.59  1.203 
‘final’ -0.083  -2.399  3.533 1.423  1  0 
filtered -0.212  -2.187 2.432 1.033  0.644  1.103  Germany 
real time  -0.299  -2.402  1.852  1.064  0.485  1.317 
‘final’ -0.048  -3.732  3.659 1.597  1  0 
filtered -0.388  -2.661 1.455 1.029  0.726  1.156  Italy 
real time  -0.316  -2.499  1.67  1.064  0.614  1.291 
‘final’ -0.158  -3.275  2.877 1.491  1  0 
filtered -0.124  -1.718 0.954 0.647  0.687  1.148  Netherlands 
real time  -0.079  -1.227  0.716  0.536  0.232  1.465 
‘final’  0.001 -1.139 0.842 0.337  1  0 
filtered 0.021 -0.86 0.743 0.285  0.467  0.325  Spain 
real  time 0.039 -1.005 1.228 0.371  0.385  0.396 
‘final’ -0.438  -4.998  4.868 2.461  1  0 
filtered  0.481 -2.181 3.136 1.207  0.84  1.835  UK 
real  time  0.317 -2.9 2.474  1.071  0.405  2.375 
Notes: s.d. is the standard deviation of the output gap; correlation vs. ‘final’ is the correlation of the filtered 
or real-time output gap estimate against the full-sample estimate; RMSE is the root mean squared error of 
the filtered or real-time estimate against the ‘final’ estimate. 
Uncertainty Associated with Output Gap Estimates 
It is not simply a question of this output gap forecast proving to be right and another 
forecast proving to be wrong. Point forecasts are better seen as the central points of 
ranges of uncertainty. A forecast of 2% must mean that people should not be surprised if 
the output gap turns out to be a little larger than that. Moreover perhaps they should not 
be very surprised if it turns out to be much larger or indeed nothing at all. Therefore, 
consistent with recent developments in the forecasting literature, it is important to provide 
a description of the uncertainty associated with real-time output gap estimates via interval 
or density forecasts. Indeed, the ‘optimal’ real-time estimate of the output gap need not 
equal the mean or conditional expectation. It can be ‘rational’ to use biased real-time 
estimates. Furthermore, measures of uncertainty are useful in their own right if interested 
in analysing and communicating, for example, risk and volatility, or the probability of a 
downturn. Our concern in this chapter is with producing measures of uncertainty 
associated with the cyclically adjusted budget deficit estimate, as measured in real-time.     
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Measuring the Uncertainty Associated with the Output gap 
We consider a simple approach to measure uncertainty that relies on a state-space 
representation for the output gap estimator. Conditional on Gaussianity (of the 
disturbances driving the components of the state vector) and knowledge of the covariance 
matrix of the estimated state vector confidence intervals around the output gap can be 
presented, and density estimates derived.
126 Other distributions could be considered 
although we confine attention to the Gaussian case since this both has the advantage of 
simplicity/familiarity and is sufficient to illustrate the role of forecasting uncertainty. 
Let Pt|t denote the Kalman filter based variance of the output gap at time t, yt|t, using 
information available up to time t; the output gap is one of the elements of the state vector 
in the UC model. Then conditional on Gaussianity, the density is N(yt|t, Pt|t), from which 
the 95% confidence interval around the point estimate, for example, can be extracted. 
Note that we are considering filter uncertainty only and ignoring parameter uncertainty. 
Accounting for parameter uncertainty should be expected to increase the width of the 
confidence bands around the point estimates. 
With known and constant parameters, uncertainty is greater around the real-time (strictly 
the ‘filtered’ estimate) than the ‘final’ estimate. This is seen as follows. Denote the 
revision between the real-time and final estimates by Rt|T = yt|T - yt|t. With known and 
constant parameters (i.e. for the filtered rather than real-time estimates of Table 7.1), this 
variance Pt|t’ decreases as t′ increases; Pt|t = Pt|T +Var(R
*
t|T). The variance of the filtered 
(or one-sided) estimate is therefore greater than that of the smoothed (or two-sided) 
estimate, Pt|T, by a positive scalar equal to the variance of the revisions between the 




t|T = yt|T - yt|t( T Θ ˆ )). This is the familiar 
result that the variance of the filtered (forecasted) estimate is equal to the variance of the 
outturn, Pt|T, plus the square of the bias, Var(R
*
t|T). This assumes the revision process has 





Just as point estimates of the output gap forecast in real-time can be evaluated ex post 
against the final estimates (as in Tables 7.1 and 7.2), the accuracy of real-time measures 
of uncertainty can and should be evaluated ex post; see Mitchell (2003) for further details. 
This is possible since a “good” interval forecast, as defined by Christoffersen (1998), 
should both have correct unconditional coverage (in the sense that on average 
observations fall in the interval to the predicted degree) and secondly be such that 
observations fall inside the interval in a random manner which is not clustered. Below we 
focus on how the uncertainty estimates associated with the output gap can be used to 
produce a measure of uncertainty associated with the cyclically adjusted budget deficit.  
We detail the uncertainty concerning output gap estimates for selected years in Table 7.3. 
Although recursive, real time, estimates give less ‘long term’ volatility, they are in 
general noticeably less certain than full sample estimates. Hence even if we think, in real 
time, that the economy has an output gap of around zero, we cannot be at all certain about 
that. In 1990 six out of seven countries have real time estimates that were 30 to 100 per 
cent less certain than the full sample estimate. A similar pattern is clear in 1995 as well, 
                                                 
126   The Kalman filter recursions automatically return estimates of the covariance matrix of the state 
vector. The diagonal elements of these matrices then can be used to construct the confidence 
intervals and density estimates. This approach has also been followed, for example, by Orphanides 
and van Norden (2002).     
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with only the Netherlands having a real time estimate that is more certain than the full 
sample estimate. Full sample uncertainty rises over the time period and approaches that of 
the real time estimate. Only in Spain are both estimates of the uncertainty in the gap low 
and stable. 
Table 7.3  Standard Deviations of Output Gap Estimates in Selected Years – Full 
Sample and Recursive Compared 
1990 1995 2000  2005 
Full-sample  0.881 0.881 0.887  1.069  Belgium 
Recursive  1.145 1.380 1.283  1.261 
Full-sample  2.169 2.184 2.192  2.686  France 
Recursive  3.956 2.996 3.057  2.822 
Full-sample  1.018 1.021 1.043  1.448  Germany 
Recursive  1.309 1.605 1.976  1.557 
Full-sample  1.067 1.071 1.089  1.472  Italy 
Recursive  1.645 1.800 1.691  1.680 
Full-sample  1.718 1.722 1.738  2.043  Netherlands 
Recursive  1.164 1.373 1.422  2.078 
Full-sample  0.430 0.430 0.431  0.522  Spain 
Recursive  0.799 0.503 0.649  0.625 
Full-sample  1.393 1.431 1.470  2.226  UK  
Recursive  2.526 2.740 2.521  2.363 
7.3  Cyclically Adjusting the Budget Deficit 
The patterns of evolving uncertainty detailed above should be reflected in our uncertainty 
about the scale of the cyclically adjusted budget deficit. The relationship between the 
deficit as a percent of GDP (BUD) and the cyclically adjusted deficit as a per cent of 
GDP (CABUD) depends on the sensitivity of revenues and expenditure to the cycle. The 
links between output and the budget deficit are discussed, for instance in Mélitz (2000), 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Wyplosz (2003). It is common to assume that an 
increase in the output gap of 1.0 per cent of GDP (more use of capacity) reduces the 
deficit by 0.5 per cent of GDP; we discuss this assumption further in section 7.4 below. 
We may write the cyclically adjusted budget deficit (CABUD) for the UK, for example, 
as dependent on the observed deficit (BUD) and the output gap (OG) 
UKCABUD=  UKBUD  -0.5*UKOG      (7.1) 
Given the uncertainty in the output gap, and on the assumption that the budget deficit and 
the cyclical coefficient are known, then we may write the standard deviation SD of the 
CABUD as a function of the standard deviation of the output gap: 
SD(UKCABUD)  =  0.5*SD(UKOG)      (7.2) 
We apply this formula across seven European countries, applying the time varying 
estimates of the standard deviation of the output gap to produce bounds of uncertainty 
around budget deficits. The SD of the full sample estimate has generally settled down by 
1990, but the real time estimates of the SD vary noticeably over time. 
We focus here on estimating the real time cyclically adjusted deficits. These are of 
concern to policy-makers, who have to make decisions in real-time. In Barrell et al.     
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(2006) we also plotted the cyclically adjusted deficits, based on final estimates of the 
output gap and its uncertainty (SD). Unsurprisingly these indicate less uncertainty about 
the central estimate than the real-time estimates. In any case, Figures 7.1-7.7 below plot 
alongside the real-time cyclically adjusted budget deficit and the predicted degree of 
uncertainty, the final (point) estimate for the cyclically adjusted budget deficit. 
Differences between this and the real-time estimates indicate further the potential for 
making policy-mistakes in real-time. In each chart we also plot the outturn for the deficit. 
Our budget deficit data have not been adjusted for any of the myriad of one-off measures 
we have seen in the last decade in Europe; hence we include mobile phone receipts in the 
deficit. This explains why most countries go into surplus around 2000. After 2002, when 
these receipts fade away, Germany and Italy show cyclically adjusted deficits that are 
more than 2 standard deviations away from zero, suggesting it is very unlikely that they 
could ever be judged to have been ‘in balance or surplus’. France on the other hand has a 
cyclically adjusted deficit that just about includes zero within its 95% confidence bounds; 
but this reflects the noticeably greater uncertainty about the French output gap than that in 
the other countries. The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain are all close to balance or in 
surplus in a cyclically adjusted way in the last few years. The UK has been in a 
statistically significant deficit position for some years, but this judgement is both 
marginal, and less pressing than for France, for instance, because the UK is not a member 
of EMU. 
Inspection of Figures 7.1 to 7.7 also shows that the actual deficit falls within the 
confidence bands, which could have been computed in real-time, around the cyclical 
adjusted budget deficit. This is not surprising, and perhaps not a source of great relief, 
given how wide the degree of uncertainty associated with the real-time estimates is.  
The real time estimates of the CAB for France suggest that the country was in sustained 
deficit with little chance of achieving its commitments. However, there was a sustained 
improvement in the run up to EMU, with zero being well inside the uncertainty bounds 
for some years. After the formation of EMU, fiscal discipline appears to have been 
reduced, and zero drops out of the bounds.     
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The Italian budget position improved markedly between 1990 and 1996, and by 1997 the 
target of zero appears to be temporarily at least within the bounds of probability. Special 
measures between 1997 and 2001 gave a plausible looking outturn, but the central 
estimates and the bounds have recently moved away from zero.  
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The low level of uncertainty around the Spanish budget deficit reflects the low 
uncertainty around the output gap estimates using our estimator of the output gap. 
However, these narrow bands leave the budget well within the bounds of close to zero 
over the last 3 years. The bounds using this estimate still suggest that the underlying 
position is strong, but the estimator is not the only one available, and an alternative 
estimator would help shed light on the position. 















SPGBR outturn SPGBR-cyclically adjusted SPGBR-adjusted upper bound
SPGBR-adjusted lower bound SPGBR-adjusted full sample
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The Netherlands is the only country to include both zero and 3 per cent within the real 
time 95 per cent confidence interval in the last 5 years of our sample. It is hence the only 
country where we are statistically unable to see whether or not it is likely to meet one or 
both of its treaty and Council commitments. However, even given the uncertainty about 
the current cyclical position, which is greater here than in most other countries (except 
perhaps France) we can be reasonably sure that the surplus we currently see has some 
structural component and is unlikely, at the 95 per cent confidence level, to involve an 
underlying deficit position in breach of the 3 per cent floor. However, in 2003 for a 
period the budget deficit was sufficiently large that it is unlikely that it could be explained 
by cyclical factors, in that the bounds did not include zero. 
The uncertainty surrounding the output gap estimate in Belgium is noticeably lower than 
in the Netherlands, and we can be relatively sure, at the 95 per cent level, that the current 
position represents a structurally adjusted budget deficit of somewhere between -1.5 and 
+1.5 per cent of GDP.  















BGGBR outturn BGGBR-cyclically adjusted BGGBR-adjusted upper bound





     
198 
7.4  Uncertainty in the Adjustment 
The cyclical adjustment of the budget deficit is not just subject to uncertainty over the 
output gap, but also to uncertainty over the impact of the output gap on revenues and on 
spending and we should take account of both of these at the same time.
127 Tax revenues 
tend to fall with the cycle and at least some items of expenditure can be regarded as 
cyclically sensitive
128. Transfers to individuals in relation to their employment state are 
clearly cyclically sensitive, and this sensitivity varies across countries. In our sample it is 
low in Italy and high in Germany for instance, and hence we would expect the German 
budget deficit to be more cyclically sensitive than that of Italy. Expenditure and taxes 
generally move less than one for one with the level of spending, although in some 
countries, such as Germany, tax rates are higher on cyclically sensitive variables. A slow 
down in activity in Germany driven by weak consumption would reduce tax revenues 
rather more than it would in the UK, for instance. Income taxes also fall less than in 
proportion to the output gap because of the existence of thresholds and higher rates. As 
we can see, the details of individual countries benefit and tax system should affect the 
relationship between budgets and cycles.  
There has been considerable debate about the scale of changes in revenues and spending 
in relation to the cycle. It is widely thought that a 1% deviation in GDP from its trend 
might cause a 0.5 percent of GDP change in the budget deficit. This figure is perhaps a 
little high and it should differ noticeably between countries and will also depend on the 
causes of the cyclical movement. A slowdown in activity driven by falling export demand 
is likely to have noticeably less impact on revenues than one driven by weak consumer 
spending, as the latter is more tax rich than the former. It is clear from this that producing 
a single gross measure of the sensitivity of the budget to the cycle is at best misleading. 
Although a single measure is simple and transparent, the trade off with information about 
the causes of the shift in the budget may be too great.  
Discerning discretionary fiscal policy moves is difficult, as it involves the detailed 
analysis of budgets and their impacts. Changes in tax rates and the definition of tax bases 
must be seen as discretionary movements in the government position, as must changes in 
plans for expenditure on goods services and transfers. In general an improvement in the 
budgetary position made by a conscious discretionary policy might be expected to have a 
contractionary impact on the economy in the short term, although it might lead to lower 
long-term real interest rates, and these might offset the contractionary impact of the 
policy.  
It is important not to assume that any non-cyclical movement in the budget represents 
discretionary policy. Random variations in tax receipts or in spending may push the 
budget outturn well away from its predicted level without there being a cyclical 
explanation or a discretionary policy driving the change. Economic models cannot 
encompass all of the factors driving the economy, and models explaining tax receipts are 
                                                 
127   More formally, if cabud=adj*OG and the adjustment factor and the output gap were independent 
then var(cabud) = var(adj)*var(OG) + mean(adj)
2*var(OG) + mean(OG)
2*var(adj). It would be 
possible for us to utilise this formulae, but OG and adj may not be independent, and hence it would 
be misleading. Calculating the joint distribution of OG and adj is possible, but would be time 
consuming, and we leave it to a later project. 
128   Although we may be able to find a statistical relation between other items of expenditure and the 
cycle, we regard such movements as discretionary, and we would not include then in our 
adjustments.     
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bound to be incomplete descriptions. Tax receipts may change even when both the tax 
base and the tax rate do not move. A change in tax paying behaviour after the 
introduction of self assessment in the UK in the 1990s could not have been picked up by 
any model. A shift in the pattern of consumption away from taxed to untaxed goods may 
not be picked up in equations for indirect tax receipts unless we have very detailed 
models. Both of these events will look like random (but explicable) elements in our 
analysis of taxes.  
Modelling the Economy 
We use the National Institute Global Model, NiGEM, to scale the relationship between 
output gaps and the budget deficit. It is an estimated world model, which uses a ‘New-
Keynesian’ framework in that agents are presumed to be forward-looking but nominal 
rigidities slow the process of adjustment to external events
129. Economies are linked 
through the effects of trade and competitiveness and are fully simultaneous. There are 
also links between countries in their financial markets as we model the structure and 
composition of wealth, emphasising the role and origin of foreign assets and liabilities. 
We have forward-looking wages, forward looking consumption, forward-looking 
exchange rates and long-term interest rates are the forward convolution of short-term 
interest rates.  
Each country has a description of its domestic economy that can be broken up into 
sectors: the government, the labour market, consumption behaviour, the supply side of the 
economy and financial markets. We need to ensure that interest rates, rt, are set to 
stabilise the economy. We use a policy of nominal aggregate targeting and inflation rate 
targeting, or the two pillar strategy advocated by the European Central Bank 
*) ( )*) ( ( 2 1 t t t t t t t P P Y P Y P r Δ − Δ + − = γ γ         (7.3) 
All variables are in logs, PY is (the log of) nominal GDP, P is (the log of) the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) inflation rate, and a * denotes a target.  
We have models of direct and indirect taxes, and of government spending. We consider 
the financing of the government deficit (BUD), and we allow either money (M) or bond 
finance (DEBT). 
BUD = ΔM + ΔD E B T        ( 7 . 4 )  
Current fiscal revenues can be disaggregated. Personal taxes (TAX, which includes both 
personal income tax and social security contributions) depend on personal incomes. 
Corporate taxes (CTAX) depend on longer term profitability. Indirect taxes (MTAX) 
depend on consumer expenditure. Transfers to individuals (TRAN) depend upon prices 
and on unemployment, and hence these vary with the economic cycle. Government 
consumption and investment (GC and GI) which are assumed to be on plan except for 
random fluctuations, and they are not influenced by the cycle. As GC and GI are in 
constant prices, we convert them to nominal terms using the private consumption CED 
deflator. Government interest payments (GIP) are modelled as the income on a perpetual 
                                                 
129   The structure and the simulation properties of NiGEM are described in, Barrell et al. (2003).     
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inventory, the change in the debt stock each period paying the long interest rate in the 
issue period until it is replaced.
130 The budget balance thus reads:  
BUD = TAX + MTAX + CTAX - TRAN - GIP - GC*CED - GI*CED   (7.5) 
We normally assume budget deficits are kept within bounds in the longer term, and taxes 
rise to do this. We can describe the simple fiscal rule as 
Taxt = Taxt-1 + φ  [GBRT  –  GBR]        (7.6) 
where Tax is the direct tax rate, GBR is the government surplus target and actual surplus. 
The feedback parameter φ is designed to remove an excess deficit in less than five years. 
If fiscal solvency is ‘off’, it is turned back on again after our experiment.  
Brunila et al. (2002) use the Commission model QUEST to quantify the impacts of output 
on the budget deficit, and we can evaluate the properties of our model similarly. In 
general, output effects on the budget increase with the size of the government sector and 
the share of cyclically sensitive components of taxation and spending, and hence we 
would expect them to vary across countries. Country specific factors such as the degree of 
openness and the flexibility of the labour market will also matter. Blanchard (2000) and 
Barrell and Hurst (2003) suggest that supply shocks are different from demand shocks in 
their impacts, and hence we only analyse the relation between output and the deficit in 
response to shocks to demand. In order to do this we evaluate the impact of demand 
changes on the economy and on tax revenues, and then look at the effects of tax changes 
on output.  
We may write the shock multiplier as (where tax is direct taxes, itax is indirect taxes, ctax 
is corporation, tran is transfers, C is consumption, I is investment, X is exports and Y is 
GDP):  
dS dX dX dy dS dI dI dy dS dC dC dy
dS dtran dtran dy
S dctax dctax dy dS ditax ditax dy dS dtax dtax dy DS Dy
/ * / / * / / * /
/ * /





The left hand side of this expression is the shock multiplier, which we evaluate for 
consumption, investment and exports, and the last three terms represent the shock 
multipliers if there were no automatic stabilisers. If we have a consumption shock then 
dI/dS and dX/dS are set to zero by definition, and similarly for investment and export 
shocks. In order to evaluate the impacts of shocks on the deficit we need to evaluate the 
first four terms of the right hand side of this expression. This requires that we calculate 
the impact of each shock on tax revenues and on transfer spending, and that we calibrate 
the effect of an unanticipated change in tax revenues on output.  
We first look a the impact of 1% of GDP changes in consumption, investment and export 
volumes sustained for 1 year, when they return to baseline for one quarter and 
subsequently the dynamics of the model are allowed to work. We assume that there is no 
                                                 
130    The perpetual inventory attempts to take account of countries like Italy and Belgium where there are 
large proportions of short-term public debt.      
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interest rate response in this year, but after the year the monetary authorities respond. The 
fiscal authorities are assumed to leave tax rates unchanged for the year and then adjust 
direct taxes to achieve their budget target. The model is run with forward looking 
financial markets, and exchange rates and long rates jump in the first period.
131 These 
multipliers are generally below those for discretionary changes in government spending 
on goods and services, but these multipliers are also likely to be below 1.0. Barrell et al. 
(2004) discuss standard fiscal simulations on NiGEM and suggest reasons why Germany 
has the largest multipliers on this table. The average of these three demand shocks is 
taken by evaluating the estimation variance of the equations, reflecting the uncertainty in 
our understanding of them, and weighting the multipliers by these variances, multiplied 
by the shares each has in GDP, and rescaled so that the weights add to one. Hence a 
larger component (consumption) may have a more similar weight to a more uncertain 
component (investment) than GDP shares would suggest. 
Table 7.4  Multiplier Effects of a 1% of GDP Impulse for One Year 
   Consumption Investment  Exports  Average 
France    0.70 0.62 0.67 0.68 
Germany    0.89 0.77 0.89 0.89 
Italy    0.60 0.53 0.58 0.59 
UK    0.64 0.60 0.64 0.64 
Spain    0.80 0.73 0.85 0.83 
Euro  Area  0.72 0.65 0.73 0.72 
Notes: UK in EMU. Interest rates fixed for the first year. No fiscal feedbacks for the first year. The ECB 
uses a two-pillar strategy. The exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking. Average uses the 
variance of the errors on the structural equations weighted by the share of GDP for the component. 
The impact of the shocks on the public finances will depend upon the importance of the 
three types of tax we model (direct, indirect and corporate) as well as the significance of 
transfers in the economy. We would expect shocks to consumption to have a much more 
significant impact on the budget as consumers expenditure is a significant part of the 
indirect tax base. However, the significance of indirect taxes varies between countries, 
and hence the impacts of the consumption shock also vary. Investment and export shocks 
are likely to be less tax rich.  
The impact of any shock on the economy affects the Government budget directly and 
indirectly through either spending or tax receipts. If the output effect of the shock is small 
then the impact on income and corporate tax revenues will be smaller, as will the impact 
on transfer payments. Output effects will be smaller the more open the economy and the 
more consumption smoothing or rather the smaller are liquidity constraints. The 
generosity of transfer payments differs significantly between countries, and is probably 
least important in Italy for instance. Hence small open financially liberalised economies 
with low multipliers will have lesser effects from shocks onto the budget, and large 
countries with generous social security systems will have larger effects. In addition the 
impacts of a shock on the budget depend on whether the item being shocked is taxed 
heavily. We can see from Table 7.5 that the impacts of consumption shocks on the budget 
is markedly higher than investment or export shocks, as we would expect, and in general 
export shocks have slightly more budgetary impacts than do investment shocks.  
                                                 
131   Multipliers are always less than one in these models, and are generally less than those given in 
unstructured VAR analyses such as that of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).      
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Table 7.5  Effects on Budget as a % of GDP of a 1% of GDP Impulse for One Year 
   Consumption Investment  Exports  Average 
France    0.46 0.14 0.15 0.31 
Germany    0.58 0.27 0.31 0.45 
Italy    0.47 0.18 0.20 0.28 
UK    0.36 0.18 0.20 0.27 
Spain    0.59 0.24 0.28 0.42 
Euro  Area  0.51 0.19 0.22 0.34 
Notes: UK in EMU. Interest rates fixed for the first year. No fiscal feedbacks for the first year. The ECB 
uses a two-pillar strategy, the exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking. Budget effects from 
shocks are rescaled to give the impacts of a 1% change in GDP.  
Table 7.6 records the rescaled impact of the shocks on budget deficits, so that we can see 
the tax richness of each shock when GDP changes by 1% as a result. We utilise these 
estimates in the analysis of uncertainty over the budget deficit, and we attribute the 
probabilities from Barrell and Hurst (2003) to each source of shocks in order to produce 
an average effect. Our analysis suggests that the impact of the cycle on the budget should 
be closer to 0.45 than the 0.50 used above and in other studies. But if we are clear on the 
source of the shocks that have driven the output gap then we can be more accurate in our 
assessment of the cyclically adjusted budget position. 
Table 7.6  Effects on Budget as a % of GDP when GDP Changes by 1% as a Result 
of Shocks 
   Consumption Investment  Exports  Average 
France    0.67 0.23 0.22 0.45 
Germany    0.66 0.35 0.35 0.51 
Italy    0.79 0.35 0.34 0.48 
UK    0.57 0.30 0.30 0.42 
Spain    0.74 0.33 0.32 0.52 
Euro  Area  0.73 0.29 0.29 0.46 
Notes: UK in EMU. Interest rates fixed for the first year. No fiscal feedbacks for the first year. The ECB 
uses a two-pillar strategy. The exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking. 
If receipts have different sensitivities to the output gap, then the nature of the shock 
facing the economy will determine whether the downturn is budget rich or not. Given the 
frequency of different types of shocks in the 1990s to the five economies we look at, we 
can say that the average adjustment for demand shocks should be 0.52 for Spain, 0.51 for 
Germany, 0.48 for Italy, 0.45 for France and 0.42 for the small government UK. We can 
see that if shocks are from exports or from investment then the impacts on the deficit are 
noticeably smaller than the multipliers associated with consumption shocks, with an 
average impact of 0.33 for investment shocks in the large Euro Area countries and 0.32 
for export shocks in the same group. Consumption shocks have more impact on tax 
revenues, and the average impact is 0.66 for France and Germany, and 0.75 for Italy and 
Spain. Hence we need to look at the source of demand shocks in order to evaluate the 
cyclical adjustment that would be appropriate in a given situation. This parameter 
uncertainty increases the uncertainty bounds involved in evaluating deficits, but it may 
not be an insurmountable problem to decide whether a downturn in demand is driven by 
domestic or by foreign factors.  
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In Table 7.7 we set out the upper and lower bounds for budget deficits in both real time 
and over the full sample for 1992 and for 2004 for the UK, France and Germany using 
estimates of the impacts of the gap on the deficit. We use 0.33 to represent the impact of 
external shocks on deficits, 0.66 to estimate the impact of domestic demand shocks. We 
also include estimates based on a sensitivity of 0.45, which is the shocks weighted 
average from Barrell and Hurst (2003).  
Table 7.7  Cyclically Adjusted Budget Deficits
* 















UK 1992  -6.433  -4.923  -3.538 -6.308 -5.720  -2.871  -8.570
b=0.5 2004  -3.211 -3.590  -1.680 -5.501 -3.289  -0.956  -5.623
UK 1992  -6.433  -5.436  -4.522 -6.351 -5.963  -4.082  -7.843
b=0.33 2004  -3.211  -3.462 -2.201 -4.723 -3.263  -1.723  -4.803
UK 1992  -6.433  -5.074  -3.828 -6.321 -5.792  -3.227  -8.356
b=0.45 2004  -3.211  -3.552 -1.833 -5.272 -3.282  -1.181  -5.382
UK 1992  -6.433  -4.440  -2.612 -6.268 -5.492  -1.731  -9.254
b=0.66 2004  -3.211  -3.712 -1.190 -6.234 -3.314  -0.234  -6.395
Germany 1992 -2.474  -3.376  -2.378 -4.374 -2.457  -1.131  -3.783
b=0.5 2004  -3.679 -3.305  -2.130 -4.480 -3.216  -1.684  -4.747
Germany 1992 -2.474  -3.069  -2.411 -3.728 -2.463  -1.587  -3.338
b=0.33 2004  -3.679  -3.432 -2.657 -4.208 -3.373  -2.363  -4.384
Germany 1992 -2.474  -3.286  -2.388 -4.184 -2.459  -1.265  -3.652
b=0.45 2004  -3.679  -3.343 -2.285 -4.400 -3.262  -1.884  -4.640
Germany 1992 -2.474  -3.665  -2.348 -4.982 -2.452  -0.701  -4.202
b=0.66 2004  -3.679  -3.186 -1.635 -4.737 -3.068  -1.046  -5.089
France 1992  -3.945 -4.595  -2.465 -6.726 -4.032  -0.908  -7.155
b=0.5 2004  -3.710 -3.887  -1.480 -6.295 -3.633  -0.859  -6.407
France 1992  -3.945 -4.374  -2.968 -5.780 -4.002  -1.941  -6.064
b=0.33 2004  -3.710  -3.827 -2.238 -5.416 -3.659  -1.829  -5.490
France 1992  -3.945 -4.530  -2.613 -6.448 -4.023  -1.212  -6.834
b=0.45 2004  -3.710  -3.870 -1.703 -6.036 -3.641  -1.144  -6.137
France 1992  -3.945 -4.803  -1.991 -7.616 -4.059  0.064  -8.183
b=0.66 2004  -3.710  -3.944 -0.766 -7.122 -3.608  0.053  -7.270
Note: * Changing the effect (b) of OG on CABUD. 
 
We are particularly interested in whether or not a set of bounds around a cyclically 
adjusted deficit might for instance include a possibility that the country was close to 
balance or in surplus in a cyclically adjusted sense. We can see from the table that only 
France saw itself in this position, and then only in 2004 if shocks were predominantly 
from consumption and the real time estimate was to be used. In this table no country and 
coefficient pair, either in real time or over the full sample could be said to be clearly in 
line with a Treaty commitment not to breach a deficit floor of 3 per cent of GDP, even in 
a probabilistic sense of being 95% certain that this is not the case. This suggests that even 
if we include all the one-off measures in the last 5 years it is very unlikely that the UK, 
France and Germany have been running a structural surplus. Thus it is very likely that 
they have breached a reasonable level of borrowing of 3 per cent of GDP.
132 
                                                 
132   The UK uses a different set of guidelines, and sets its borrowing to be no greater than the level of 
public investment over a cycle. Given this has not exceeded 2 per cent of GDP we could make a     
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7.5  Implications and Conclusions 
Monetary Union requires some form of fiscal pact, and although it is in the interests of all 
to follow that pact, it is in the interests of each country to find special reasons why the 
pact constraints may not apply to it in a particular year. The pact was designed to set 
limits to borrowing, with penalties available for sustained breaches of the targets. These 
penalties are supposed to take account of the impacts of the cycle on the deficit, but these 
impacts are uncertain. We have investigated one representative estimator of the output 
gap and derived its distribution, giving us a simple way of evaluating its uncertainty. This 
in turn allows us to put uncertainty bounds around the budget deficit given an estimate of 
the output gap on the deficit. We then discuss the uncertainties involved in the 
relationship between the output gap and the deficit, showing that the source of shocks 
impacts on the uncertainty surrounding a deficit projection. 
All estimates of the output gap are uncertain, and ours is probably no worse than others. 
Even those that are not revised are not known with certainty at the point when they are 
made. There is a strong case for using production function based estimates of the output 
gap, as in Denis et al. (2006), but these are more difficult to calculate than our measure, 
and it is more complex, but not impossible, to evaluate the associated uncertainty. Even if 
we know with certainty the parameters of the production function we still have to 
estimate trend hours, trend productivity and the equilibrium level of employment. If these 
are estimated using a filter, which is common, then it is possible to evaluate directly their 
uncertainty and feed this into the gap. If they are the result of reduced form calculations, 
then a more complicated process of looking at the error variance on the reduced form has 
to be gone through.  
It is our contention that the error bounds around any estimate of the output gap are wide. 
Given these uncertainties it will always be possible to put bounds around the cyclically 
adjusted deficit. We strongly advocate that this should be done by all official bodies 
involved with the evaluation of deficits in Europe as well as by the scientific community. 
It would be more prudent to accept that we are ignorant rather than argue about gaps; 
hence we should evaluate budget deficits in probabilistic terms. This would involve 
asking whether a budget target is within the 95 per cent (or 64 per cent) bounds around 
the cyclically adjusted deficit. In undertaking this analysis it is also useful to discuss the 
source of weak demand that has caused the output gap and then use an appropriate 
coefficient (perhaps not 0.5) in the adjustment. In all cases humility over our ignorance 
and strength about the obvious, such as the scale of recent deficits in France and 
Germany, are important characteristics of sensible debate. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
simple adjustment to our figures of this magnitude; hence we can say that the balance of probabilities 







The chapter by Barrell, Hurst and Mitchell constitutes an excellent analytical exercise. It 
was a pleasure to read it. The chapter is a rigorous attempt at gauging the degree of 
uncertainty associated with the measurement of the cyclically adjusted budget (CAB) 
balance (and of the underlying output gap) in major EU member economies. Apart from 
the solution of analytical and computational challenges, my interest in this work is 
primarily from the standpoint of the policy maker.  
When reading the chapter I was reminded of the book by former U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Rubin (2003) about his approach to decision-making during his years in government and 
in investment banking. The essential point was that he took policy decisions or business 
decisions always with a view to assessing and weighing in real time the uncertainties 
surrounding those decisions – without the benefit of any formal gauge. In particular, the 
conduct of fiscal policy for stabilization purposes presupposes real-time estimates of the 
output gap. At the supranational EU level, output gap estimates are necessary for 
surveillance to ascertain whether a member country’s underlying fiscal position is in line 
with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Beyond the realm of fiscal policy, 
reliable output gap estimates are also a key ingredient in the formulation of monetary 
policy, not only by central banks that follow a Taylor rule, but even by those that target 
inflation alone. Yet the reliability of such estimates is viewed with widespread scepticism 
– as expressed for example recently by Rogoff (2006, p. 320). Therefore, in this broad 
context, the experiment reported in this chapter is most welcome from the perspective of 
multiple users.  
The chapter contributes to a clearer understanding of the cyclically adjusted budgetary 
position in real time. It makes a quantitative assessment of the uncertainty surrounding 
point estimates of the output gaps, by comparing real-time estimates with full-sample 
measures of the gap. It applies a model-based approach, drawing on unobserved 
components. The resulting output gap measures and the respective uncertainty bands are 
then translated into CAB measures on the basis of stylized budgetary sensitivity 
parameters. By this measure, the authors find that in Italy, France, Germany and to a 
lesser extent UK, the general government accounts have not been close to balance or in 
surplus position in recent years. On the other hand, for Spain, the Netherlands and 
Belgium fiscal balance is obtained. These results can be examined on the basis of four 
criteria: robustness, sensitivity, versatility, and usefulness.  
                                                 
*   The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and are not attributable to the National 
Bank of Hungary.     
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On robustness, in principle, the calculations seem reasonable, although it is surprising 
that the uncertainty bands are rather wide for most countries. Less surprising is that the 
real-time bands are larger than the full-sample bands. However, on this criterion, the jury 
is still out until further testing with alternative methodologies (as done to some extent for 
the United Kingdom). Furthermore, the capacity of this approach to capture structural 
shifts is questionable, and more important, there remains an end-point problem. A 
possible solution of this problem may lie in the application of the trend-cycle filter 
developed by Mohr (2005) that combines an HP-filter with an unobserved-components 
model-based approach. 
A closely related criterion is the sensitivity to alternative budgetary parameters. 
Obviously, the entire computational chain cannot be stronger than the weakest link. In 
this regard, the sensitivity test conducted on the budgetary impact of various GDP 
components is persuasive. And, of course, future application of this approach could be 
fine-tuned to specific countries and specific periods.  
As regards versatility, the results for Spain and the Netherlands give rise to some 
scepticism. It would be worth probing deeper whether the narrow uncertainty bands for 
Spain are attributable to some peculiar structural characteristic, model specification, or 
virtual absence of statistical error. In the case of the Netherlands the estimates are 
counter-intuitive in that the real-time bands are somewhat narrower than the full-sample 
bands. Perhaps this is due to unusually large revisions of the underlying data.  
Research on the uncertainty of real-time estimates of the output gap should be useful for 
policy-making purposes. A retrospective assessment of the cyclically adjusted budgetary 
position has considerable value added for fiscal policy analysis.
133 Specifically, this 
should provide more reliable information for national policy decisions, as well as for 
surveillance by EU authorities under the Pact, especially in assessing performance under 
the excess deficit procedure.   
However, a pending question, to be tackled by future researchers, concerns the forward-
looking application of the estimated uncertainty around real-time output gaps. In other 
words, this would involve inquiring into the extent to, and manner in, which past 
estimates of uncertainty bands can be extrapolated to the period ahead with a view to 
better capturing, and possibly to counteracting, the impact of cyclical fluctuations around 
trend output. Beyond fiscal policy, as anticipated in my opening remarks, this line of 
research is potentially useful for monetary policy as well. Estimates of the uncertainty in 
real-time measures of the output gap should be helpful for the preparation of increasingly 
accurate growth forecasts, including through fan charts that presuppose a reliable point 
estimate for the current time period. 
134 
                                                 
133 In a way, this is analogous to the to the analysis in Chapter 2, regarding the reaction of fiscal policy for 
restoring sustainability 
134 At present relatively few central banks prepare fan charts for growth along with the usual fan charts for 
inflation. Among the exceptions, the Bank of England and the National Bank of Hungary publish them in 
their periodic inflation reports.     
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Finally, estimates of the uncertainty around real-time output gaps underscore the 
importance of exercising caution and transparency in actual policy formulation. Indeed, 
by and large, these findings should discourage governments from relying on optimistic 
macroeconomic projections, and EU entities from accepting them. In this respect, my 
favourite is Canada’s rule-of-thumb approach, whereby the government builds fiscal 
forecasts on macroeconomic projections generated by private sector (mostly think-tanks) 
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